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RAMAPRASAD DAS**

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Editor :

RAMAPRASAD DAS

Head of the Department of Philosophy

University of Calcutta

Secretary,

University Colleges of Arts & Commerce :

ANIRUDDHA RAY

Publisher-in-charge :

DILIP KUMAR MUKHERJEE

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Professor Pritibhusan Chatterjee
1923—1977

Prof. Pritibhusan Chatterji died much before his time, leaving a vacuum for those who were close to him. His death, however, will be mourned by a much wider circle who knew him as a teacher and as a man. For them the pangs of grief will have an added poignancy that he should have fallen ill, never to recover, when he was so far away from his home.

His academic and intellectual attainments are already well known to need any fresh affirmation, and his contribution to the faculty will remain for ever enshrined in the memory of those of his innumerable students whose fund of philosophical knowledge he took so much pains to enrich.

We lament his pre-mature death especially because the academic tradition that he inherited in this University will probably never have a more ardent or zealous champion.

This issue of the Journal is in respectful memory of Prof. Pritibhusan Chatterji.

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

H. G. Lewis : Professor of History and Philosophy of Religion, King's College, London ; President, International Society of Metaphysics.

R. A. Mall : Senior Alexander von Humboldt Scholar, Köln.

Swami Ranganathananda : of Ramakrishna Mission.

Usharanjan Chakrabarti : on the staff of Maharaja Manindra Candra ... College, Calcutta.

Pabitra Kumar Roy : on the staff of the Visva Bharati, Santiniketan.

Moti Bir Rai : on the staff of Darjeeling Government College.

Saradindu Banerjee : Head of the Department of Philosophy, Scottish Church College, Calcutta.

Uma Mitra : a research scholar.

S. N. Ganguly : Reader in Philosophy, Calcutta University.

Prahlad Kumar Sarkar : member of the staff of the Philosophy Department, Calcutta University.

Kumud Goswami : Reader in Philosophy, Calcutta University.

Kalikrishna Banerjee : Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University ; National Lecturer in Philosophy, 1976-77.

MIND AND BODY

H. D. LEWIS

I

Few things have been discussed more extensively in recent philosophy than the issue of the relation of mind and body. This has come about for various reasons, but an outstanding reason is the prevalence of severely empiricist views. For the empiricist nothing is real besides observable reality. This makes it peculiarly difficult to recognise any existence other than our corporeal being, and in line with that assumption there is a very widespread tendency to conceive of our own being entirely in terms of the behaviour and dispositions of our bodies. Philosophers like Plato and Descartes come in accordingly for very severe criticism and indeed ridicule, for they regard our mental existence as the distinctive thing about us and as a mode of being entirely different from corporeal reality or the disposition of our bodies. In neither of these instances would the body be thought entirely unimportant. Even for Plato the body needs its proper provision and care. He paid great stress on healthy living and sensible exercise to keep the body in trim. But for Plato the body remained of little inherent importance, it had to be cared for mainly to prevent its being a more serious obstacle to the functioning of the mind than was avoidable. To deny the body is to expose ourselves to inflamed and distorted physical craving, and for this reason a wise man keeps his body in good shape and satisfies its needs. But there is little suggestion in Plato's work of the ways in which our bodies may be positively involved in the achievements and activities which are of

most inherent worth. The body is not evil, but it is trivial ; and the more we can escape from subjection to it, the better. The important part of a man is his mind or reason, and the mind fulfills itself best when the mortal coil has been shuffled off altogether. In this I think Plato was not wholly right, and in my book, *The Self and Immortality*, I have devoted an entire chapter to the theme of the importance of the body, in our present existence, as a positive source of rewarding achievement. All the same, I think Plato was right in essentials in holding that the distinctive side of our nature is the mental or experiential one and that the body is only incidentally contributory to the ends that matter. Descartes, in the main, saw the position more clearly and took considerable interest in the functioning of the body and in scientific understanding of it, though he may also have underestimated the place of the body as a positive and distinctive source of worth-while activity. Both thinkers seem to me right in the sharpness of the distinction they draw between mental and physical existence, but this has also made them the butt of very sharp criticism in a secular and empiricist culture.

II

It is important before we proceed to understand what exactly is involved in the sort of Cartesian dualism which has come under such sharp attack in our time. The claim that is made is that bodily reality, coloured, shaped, extended as it is (extendedness in particular), is radically different from thoughts, sensations, feelings etc. The latter have no strict location in themselves or any other physical property, but they are extensively conditioned by states of our bodies, though not wholly determined by the body. In its turn the mind influences the body. As long as I stand in my present position with my eyes open, I am bound to have

certain, perceptual experiences, to see this room and its furniture for example, and this conditions the thoughts which I shall have. But my thoughts and intentions influence my body, I will to stay where I am to continue this lecture, and this in fact happens. There is continuous interaction of mind and body.

One does not have to subscribe to everything in Descartes, account of this subject to consider the central theme to be sound. I believe that, in essentials, dualism is sound, and I have tried to establish this in many of my writings. But we have also to learn from our critics, and it seems to me that we are in a better position to present the dualist case today by having to take account of extensive recent criticism of Cartesian dualism, however wrong-headed some of it appears to be.

Let me now offer some examples of these criticisms :

1) One common line of criticism is that the dualist tells us little about the alleged transaction between mental and physical states. How is the influence conveyed from one side to the other? If we take this objection at its face value, we shall find ourselves liable to manufacture unreal entities or media to meet the case. The simple and proper answer is that we do not need, at any level, to find some link between cause and effect or explain how they are related other than learning the course of them from the way we find that things happen. There is indeed more to be said about causation, but not in the way of discovering explanatory transactions between causal sequences. The simple fact is that we discover in experience that certain mental states bring about changes in our bodies (I will to move my arm and it moves), and that certain states of our bodies, ultimately (as we learn in sophisticated thought) of the brain, induce or make possible certain states of mind. We cannot explain this further, but that is no reason to deny that it happens.

2) A further objection is that if we claim some immediate inner awareness of our own mental states, in some way in which the body is not also involved, this alleged "private access" requires us to deny that there are any occasions on which our friends, or an expert psychiatrist, may know us better than we know ourselves. There certainly seem to be occasions when we may learn about ourselves, or correct our own impressions of ourselves, from the observation and wisdom of others. But the dualist has no need to deny this. All that the assertion of 'private access' (if that is the proper term) implies is that we know our own experiences at the time in having them. We may misdescribe our experiences, or fail to account adequately for their causes (as when I say I have a toothache when in fact the pain is a 'referred' one having its source elsewhere). But I cannot fail to be aware of the sort of experience I have at the time of having it. I may also be mistaken about my dispositions or general traits of character, as when I seem to myself to be more generous or brave than I actually am. But this does not affect my apprehension of what I do or feel at a particular time, but only what I am liable to do or feel on other occasions. The dualist does not have to claim 'direct access' to dispositions; we discover these, in one's own case, in the same way as we learn about the characters of other people from fallible deductions from what we observe from time to time.

3) It is supposed that, if we claim 'private access' to our states of mind, we can have no justification for claiming to know the states of mind of other persons than ourselves. Solipsism is the logical consequence of dualism. If this were the case, then dualism would be clearly faulty. For we all believe ourselves to be in genuine fellowship with one another. But the dualist is in no way exposed to the peril suggested. He claims private access to his own mind, but this does not preclude his claiming to have knowledge of 'other minds' in *other* mediated ways. There is no reason

to suppose that one sort of thing can only be known in one sort of way, though that is a dogma that many philosophers have subscribed to today. We know about other persons through their bodies, by looking at them, hearing them or examining some physical state of affair which their bodily activities have brought about, their writings, the implements they used, the sort of houses they built and so on. But what we do learn about in this way is not itself bodily but states of mind.

The objection is often made here today that if knowledge of other minds is mediated, then there must be some way in which the initial correlation between certain bodily states and mental states is established and what could this be, when *ex hypothesi* we never observe the mind of another person directly? But to this we must reply that we have no need to establish the correlation in this way. It is, on the contrary, a case of finding the mental operations of other persons to be the reasonable explanation of physical behaviour which would be totally inexplicable otherwise.

A mistake which is often made by opponents of dualism is to suppose that our mental acts are isolated atomic episodes. Thus Professor Gilbert Ryle asks 'How many acts of will did you perform before breakfast?' or 'When did the boy perform the act of will in diving off the board?'. The answer to this travesty is that our mental life is continuous, we are intending continuously to do all that we do at any moment in our sustained conduct. I do not will to move my arm and then leave it to the arm to make the complete intended movement. I will all the changes all the time.

III

In the alternative which he proposes to Cartesian dualism Ryle finds it very difficult to give a proper account of purposive activity. What distinguishes this from reflex or automatic

action ? How to distinguish between persons and puppets, men and clocks ? His answer is in terms of dispositions. When we hit the target on purpose, we do not do it just on this occasion ; but can be counted on to do it on other similar occasions and allow for change in the circumstances, the veering of the mind, the removal of the target to a further point etc. This is perfectly proper in itself, and the recovery of the importance of dispositions, in philosophy and psychology, is an important achievement. But it is a very grave mistake to suppose that in telling the dispositional story, we have said all that matters. The dispositions can only count if they are activated, not directly in the physical changes but initially in our arguing mental states. To leave out the latter is to have *Hamlet* without the Prince. We are not just physical behaviour and dispositions. The continuous mental state is the essential item.

Further considerations by which philosophers have been much impressed are : (1) The obvious causal dependence of mind on states of our bodies. The dualist, however, in no way denies this. What most of us do deny is that this dependence amounts to complete determination. But there is no reason to accept that conclusion. I could not write these words now if my brain and my eyes and my nerves and muscles were not working effectively. But the reason why I write these particular words is my understanding of their meaning and the course of my reasoning. If, as some maintain, all that I do could be predicted from the state of my brain and my physical circumstances, we would have to conclude that my own purpose or intention has in fact nothing to do with my action, and that seems plainly contrary to experience. Furthermore the causal dependence of the mind, in some measure, on the states of the body is a contingent one. There is no inherent reason why it should hold in some radically different mode of being. (2) Some who do admit that we have an 'inner', non-physical mental life, hold that the

present body is nonetheless essential for the identification of persons. It is through association with a particular body that one becomes the particular person that one is. I find it hard to follow this. Admittedly we identify one another through our bodies or through something that results from bodily activity, like writing or the use of various implements. But each one identifies himself to himself independently of this. I do not have to observe my own body to know what I am intending and thinking or feeling. If I have a pain, I know that it is I who have this pain in the fact of having it. Furthermore we find ourselves to be ourselves in dreams but there is no reference to my physical body here, although it is still operative causally. I am not aware, if I dream that I am playing cricket in the field, of my actual physical body being stretched out in bed. But I still have my dream experience as the person I normally know myself to be.

IV

The question is sometimes raised at this point of the position of subhuman creatures. Do we ascribe a soul to them also? I do not know about a soul, as this word has various uses. But all that I have said hitherto about mental and physical existence hold in the case of brutes as much as in that of human beings. The dog's behaviour is not just reflex action. He has perceptive experience like the rest of us, and if he is in pain he feels this pain as human beings do and does not learn about it obliquely by noticing his own reactions.

So far, then, I have been maintaining that, along with our observable behaviour (and acting upon it) there is a continuous course of mental events. But how do we ascribe these to ourselves if more is involved than association with a particular body? The answer, I submit, is that each person knows himself as the person he is in the very process

of having any experience. Experiences do not just happen in the void. They are the experiences of a particular being. They are owned or they belong. But this kind of belonging is unique. It has no proper parallel elsewhere. I know myself as the being I am in having any kind of experience. There is thus no criterion (or need of criterion) for identification of oneself to oneself. In the basic sense personal identity is ultimate, but there is a subsidiary sense in which I can identify myself by description—my name, where I live, what my skills and dispositions are, what I like and dislike and so on. But I could lose my awareness of this, as in severe loss of memory and still be aware that all that is happening to me at any time happens to me as the particular being I inwardly find myself to be.

But how, if this is admitted, do I know that I am the same person through various experiences, the same now as the person who entered the room half an hour ago. One answer here would be the Kantian one, namely, that in order to be aware of the world as a meaningful ordered system, I have to be the *same* subject in all my experiences. It is just possible to offer an alternative explanation here—I may have been created in an instant with all my present aptitudes, 'memories' and skills. But all that is so highly unlikely that no one takes it seriously. My present knowledge and skills come obviously from past experience, directly or by learning to learn, and for this to be possible I must have been the identical subject in all experience. This has always seemed to me a sound approach, although I would wish to go further than Kant on the occasions when he seemed to think of the self as just an 'imaginary focus'. The self has to be some kind of entity to meet the Kantian requirement itself.

This is where James Ward and others made a considerable advance in developing Kantian philosophy in the 19th century. Ward insisted that the subject, while always remaining subject, must be some kind of entity, though not

like objects in the world we apprehend around us. In the same vein recent philosophers have warned us against trying to characterize the self while insisting that it must all the same be real. I have, in this context, used the word 'elusive' in my own writings and in the title of the first volume of my Gifford Lectures.

V

I wish however to go further than the Kantian argument in yet another way, namely, in consideration of what I call strict memory. There are many things we may be said to remember. I remember the date of the battle of Waterloo. But I do not remember the battle. I do remember coming into this room half an hour ago, I remember the event myself. In these cases I recall the past event, not just in the sense of what happened, but *including the same awareness of myself as if being I am now that I had at the time*. I thus establish a firm connection between myself as I know myself to be now and myself in the past, and around this may be built the further things that I know about myself from the same sort of evidence as is available to other persons observing me.

We have thus the notion of an on-going mental process always owned by a subject which identifies itself to itself as a distinct irreducible being though without the supposition that this self could exist or function independently of having some experiences. This self is in constant interaction with the physical body during our present existence, and the body has an indispensable part to play, not only causally, but logically or as a means of limitation and focusing experience, in the present conditions of our existence.*

* The above is one of the three lectures which Professor Lewis delivered in Calcutta University as K. C. Bhattacharya Memorial Lecturer for the year 1975.

SOME LEADING PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

R. A. MALL

I

The term 'phenomenology' is overloaded with many widely varying meanings. For Johann Heinrich Lambert who first used this term 'phenomenology' stands for a 'theory of illusion', for he defined phenomenon to mean the illusory features of human experience. Kant's treatment of the same term led to a redefinition of phenomenology. He distinguished objects as they appear from objects as they are in themselves. The objects and events as they appear in our experience are in Kantian terminology "phenomena"; objects and events as they are in themselves independently of the forms of our cognitive faculties are "noumena". Hegel in his first great work *Phenomenology of the Spirit* maintained that phenomenology is the science of mind's coming to know itself as it is in itself through the study of the various stages of its own development. But phenomenology as we shall deal with here is the name given to a methodological discipline practised and founded by Edmund Husserl.

Unfortunately, views differ very widely regarding the nature of this movement initiated by Husserl. Sometimes it is misunderstood to be a metaphysics or ontology and a phenomenologist is painted to be one gazing at the sky. Some complain that the language of phenomenology is too esoteric to be understandable. This group maintains that the concepts and the technical methods of doing phenomenological research seem to be very mysterious. The main purport of the present paper is just to clarify

this last mentioned misunderstanding by way of explaining a few leading concepts of this very fertile movement. We cannot do full justice to the richness of this movement in such a short paper. It is always a risky undertaking to try to reduce the work of a great philosopher to a few basic propositions. If one applies this caution to the case of Husserl, one easily sees the hopelessness of such an undertaking.

Husserl's way of doing philosophical research was to start again and again in order to reach the basic foundation of all our thinking. Every basic foundation has to be of the nature of 'original experience'. The aim of phenomenology is clearly to show the presuppositions of all sciences—natural as well as social. Husserl gave himself the name of a 'true beginner' for he never stopped starting anew. This way of doing philosophy aimed at a "first philosophy" as a "rigorous science" in the truest sense of the term. This is the main theme of Husserl's book *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*.

It is true that Husserl was a mathematician, but he never blindly followed the ideal of mathematical sciences. Husserl's understanding of mathematical thinking was deep enough not to blind him towards its limitations. He could easily see the uncritical presuppositions of mathematical sciences. His use of the term 'science' is quite different. In order to guarantee the scientific character to any serious human enquiry the point of departure must be the casting of a phenomenological doubt upon the implicit presuppositions of all our habitual thinking—scientific or otherwise. It was a firm belief of Husserl that none of the so-called rigorous sciences using mathematical language can lead us toward an ultimate understanding of our experience of the world we live in (*Lebenswelt*). Since phenomenology is always searching for the originary experience which gives evidence to what we say, feel and do, it cannot be labelled

as idealism, realism, empiricism, rationalism and so on. The real seat of phenomenology is before and beyond all these distinctions. It is a gross misunderstanding of phenomenology to believe that it is anti-scientific not caring for empirical observations, analysis, sensory perception. As a method of philosophical thinking, phenomenology wants just to work out the ways and means which can always be reactivated in order to trace the meanings of our experience of the world.

II

The Concept of Intentionality :

Hume, Descartes and Kant are the prominent philosophical figures Husserl generally converses with. Husserl too is in search of an indubitable starting point for philosophical thinking. The well known Cartesian attempt is of great importance to Husserl. He has nothing to say against the certainty of "cogito ergo sum" of Descartes. But he of course criticizes him of not being radical enough in his methodology. In radicality Hume surpasses Descartes, says Husserl.

The Husserlian criticism of Descartes centres round the Cartesian terms "ego, cogito". Descartes took the cogitations to be isolated entities in the stream of our thought and paid no heed to the intentional character of all our thinking and experience. He failed to make a radical distinction between the act of thought and the object of thinking. F. Brentano, Husserl's master, had already discovered the intentional character of all our mental act. All experiences as they appear within our consciousness are necessarily referred to the objects experienced. Every thought is thought of..., for there is no such thing as thought, fear, memory, imagination as such.

Husserl coined a technical term "intentionality" to designate the essential relationship between our acts of experiencing and the corresponding objects experienced. This

character of intentionality of all our cogitations lead us to differentiate sharply between the act of thinking, imagining, remembering, fearing, and the object thought of, imagined, remembered and feared. Husserl went deeper than Brentano in his enquiry into the intentional character of our cogitations. For Husserl an act is not a psychological activity, but it is an intentional experience. Husserl also talks of a field of intentionality and maintained it to be one of the most important topics of phenomenological research.

Intentionality refers to all acts and does not stand for a thing or an entity. It characterizes acts and the intentional analysis which Husserl is pursuing is not a psychological method.¹ All cogitations are from their very nature intentional and it is wrong to maintain that they get this character of intentionality after being lived as psychical experiences. Husserl never speaks of any internal or external aspect of intentionality ; the question of immanence and transcendence does not arise here at all. Intentionality for Husserl is just the most fundamental way of the being of human consciousness. Phenomenologically speaking, the character of intentionality of human consciousness precedes its social character.

Husserl radicalizes also the Cartesian concept of the ego which is the indubitable truth and is the outcome of Cartesian meditations. Cartesian way of defining consciousness as cogitations is not complete, for he fails to clarify the unity of the *cogito* with the *cogitatum*. This means that the essence of consciousness is not so much cogito but intentionality.

III

The Concept of phenomenological Reduction (Epoché) :

Husserl is very Humean in taking Descartes to task for his doubting the existence of the external world. This is exactly the point where phenomenological criticism sets in and Husserl starts a Cartesian Meditation all over again. In order to arrive at the pure field of consciousness Husserl

developed the technique of "phenomenological reduction" which has raised a lot of discussions and misunderstandings.

The use of the technique of phenomenological reduction does not deny the existence of the outer world. The phenomenologist just suspends his belief in its existence. Husserl emphasizes over and over again that we intentionally and systematically refrain from all judgments related to the existence of the world. This practice he terms "putting the world in brackets" or "performing the phenomenological reduction". It is wrong to think these notions mysterious. All that Husserl is doing is inventing a new technical device. He radicalizes with the help of this device the Cartesian method of doubt.

Husserl admits that the practice of phenomenological reduction involves an artificial (*unnatürlich*) change in man's natural attitude. The natural attitude (*natürliche Einstellung*) does not bother about the presuppositions involved in its relation toward the world. What Husserl aims at is to reach a level of indubitable certainty which is beyond the realm of mere belief. The purpose of this technique of phenomenological reduction is to disclose the pure field of consciousness. This pure field of consciousness can be explored and studied in its own right and Husserl believes that the discovery of such a field would enable us to lay bare the ways and means upon which all our beliefs—scientific and otherwise—are founded. Since there is a correspondence between the features of this reduced realm of pure consciousness and the features of our empirical determinations, the phenomenologist is confident that his discoveries within this reduced field would stand the test in the mundane sphere of our life, in the world we live in.

The world that is put in brackets exists even after the practice of the reduction technique, but now it exists as a "phenomenon" within this reduced sphere of pure consciousness. This technique, if applied with the necessary

radicalism to our different attitudes, is of far reaching consequences. We put in brackets not only the outer world along with all things in it, but also the various cultural objects in it, e.g., society, institutions etc. We suspend thus our belief in the validity of our judgments about this world. The practice of this technique involves not only the suspension of our practical knowledge of the world but also the suspension of the propositions of all sciences—natural as well as social. Even the "I" as a psycho-physiological unit, a part of this mundane sphere, has to be suspended. A successfully radical accomplishment of this technique leads thus to the suspension of the world in every respect. What remains after the world has been put in brackets is the real 'transcendental sphere' which is purely 'a prioristic' in character.

It is sometimes maintained that such a suspension of all our habits would ultimately lead to an absolute nihilism. If I have annulled, so speak, not only the world of natural as well as social sciences but also my own psycho-physiological unit, what then remains? Is it not right to maintain that nothing can be left outside the brackets?² The answer is a clear-cut 'No'. What is left after the performance of reduction is the whole richness of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its fullness and integrity. This stream of consciousness, of conscious life, is full of all sorts of poetic activities along with the cogitations and experiences.

We have already mentioned the intentional character of all our cogitations. They are essentially cogitations of something; they always refer to intentional objects. This intentional character of all our cogitation is not lost; it is there within the reduced sphere of our stream of thought. It is rather purified and can be made more explicit. My perception of this mango tree in my natural attitude corroborates my belief in its existence and this belief is the ground of my further judgements about this tree. Now I perform the phenomenological reduction. What I do is to

refrain from believing in the existence of this mango tree. What now happens is this: The mango tree perceived remains outside the bracketing, but the perception as an intentional act is doubtless an element of my reduced sphere of thought. Now this perception is not "perception as such", without any reference; it is always "perception of....." What I am now doing is that I abstain from attaching to this perception any judgment whether this mango tree really exists outside or not. It is not the corporeal thing the "mango tree" to which my perception refers, but 'the intentional object of preserved perception' is the 'mango tree as I perceived it'. This phenomenon, that is to say, 'the mango tree as I perceived it' may not have an equivalent in the outer world, in the world bracketed. Thus we see that the whole world is still preserved within the reduced sphere of our stream of cogitation, only in so far as it is now the intentional correlate of my conscious life. But these correlates, these intentional objects, are now no longer the real things of the outer world as they really exist, but the phenomena as they appear to us. We may try to comment further on this very difficult distinction.

I perceive a blossoming mango tree in the garden. This perception of mine in the sense of my act of perceiving the blossoming mango tree in the garden is an indubitable element in the stream of my thought. It is also true and valid for the phenomenon "blossoming mango-tree-as-it-appears-to-me" which is nothing but the intentional object of my act of perceiving. This phenomenon related to the stream of my thought is independent of the fate of the real mango tree in the garden outside in the world. The real mango tree may undergo all sorts of changes, its blossoms may wither away or it may be destroyed, but the perceived phenomenon "blossoming-mango-tree-as-it-appears-to-me" remains unaffected by all these changes taking place with the real tree, in the real world. This 'phenomenon' remains also

untouched by the performance of the phenomenological reduction.

IV

Noesis-Noema :

The two moments in the life of intentionality—the act of perceiving and the object perceived, i.e., the intentional act and the object intended, are termed technically *noesis* and *noema* and intentionality consists of them. The noetical moment in our intentionality is the basis of our meaning-giving activity. Each act of perceiving and its intentional object are indubitable elements within the reduced sphere of our pure cogitations. Not only that, even my doubt whether there corresponds a real mango tree in the outer world is certain.

Our foregoing analysis has shown us that our cogitations and their intentional objects are sure elements of our stream of thought and they remain untouched by all the changes that may happen to their correlates in the outer world. Husserl always distinguishes between the act of perceiving and the perceived, the act of remembering and the remembered, the act of loving and the loved, and so on. This is a distinction between “cogitare” and “cogitatum” ; in Husserlian terminology, this means the distinction between “noesis” and “noema”.⁸

But our analysis of this fundamental noesis-noema correlativity does not mean that the cogitations are not subject to certain modifications. When I perceive any corporeal thing, my perceiving act suggests to me other possible aspects of the same thing : the front side suggests the backside, the outer the inner and so on. All these moments may be called the “inner horizon” of the perceived

object. This perceived object as noema can be systematically explored in that we follow the intentional indications which are lying within the noema itself. Husserl speaks also of an "outer horizon" which means this : The mango tree refers to my garden, the garden to the vast field, the vast field to the road, the road to the city, the city to the province, the province to the country and so on to the universe. There is no detached object as such, but there is always a field of cogitations with a horizon (James uses the term "fringes"). All these implications and indications described above as inner and outer horizon are to be found within the noema itself. If I follow these indications, the noema does undergo modifications. But the noetical side, the perceiving act, does not undergo any change.

We can also talk of noetical modifications which are due to the perceiving act itself. The important distinction made between 'originary' and 'derived experience' helps us to make our point clear. Much misunderstanding centres round the phenomenological concept of "evidence". The sense in which the term is used in phenomenology is not mystical ; it is no hidden quality of an altogether different and occult type of intuitive experience. Evidence in phenomenology is the demand of referring derived experiences to the originary ones.

Phenomenology develops here a different theory of time. All cogitations are related in inner time in which the present cogitation has two openings—two fringes so to say. These are the "retention" and "protention" connecting the present cogitation with the past and the future respectively. All references to the past are just by way of recollection and to the future by way of anticipation. All this radicalizes and revolutionizes our theories of memory, experience, time and so on. It is at this point where phenomenological criticism of the psychology of association sets in.

Phenomenology radicalizes not only our approach toward the outer world and the things and beings in it, but Husserl also introduces a new concept of "ideal objects". When Husserl uses this concept, it has nothing to do with any type of ideas with metaphysical origin. Husserl is neither a Platonic nor a Kantian nor a Berkeleyan nor a Hegelian. The notion of ideality which Husserl introduces is not a ready-made something which can be worked out with the help of a few steps of analysis. The phenomenological ideality stands in a very intimate relation to the concepts of teleology and meaning. An ideal object is any meaningful entity (entity not as a substance), say, the concept of number, the melody of the music, an axiom, a theorem, a sentence and so on. Even our social and cultural objects which are meaningful are to be taken as the intentional correlates of our cogitations.

Phenomenology develops a very important theory of semantics. The characteristic of a sign is that it suggests and refers to another thing belonging to a different category. The sign "plus" stands for a specific mathematical notion and can be written and spelled in different languages. But the ideal object that is indicated (meant) by this sign is the same. The same analysis holds true to the different specific sign systems or languages. These signs indicate the ideal objects without being themselves these ideal objects.

V

The Concept of Constitution :

One of the most important concepts of far reaching consequences is the concept of 'constitution' in phenomenology. Husserl's theory of constitution maintains and tries to show that all that is transcendent must be understood immanently. The reduced sphere of pure consciousness with all the

cogitations within it is a field which serves as the last stratum upon which all meaning-giving activities of our intentional experiences depend. This can be made clear if one keeps in mind the Husserlian concept of noesis-noema correlationship which holds true to all types of constitutions.

There is a great misunderstanding about this concept. It is generally mistaken to mean "creation" or "bringing forth". In the realm of arithmetic in particular and mathematics in general it of course holds true, but its real meaning is that it stands for the process of tracing back the originary cogitations which give meaning to all objects. And there is nothing which is not an intentional correlate of a noetical act. To constitute means thus to show the original source of meaning.

Our knowledge of an object represents the sedimentations of our previous mental acts which have constituted this object. Every object has thus its own history. In our every day life of natural attitude we are satisfied with the ready-made objects of our thought and do not ask as to how they come to be what they are. The radical step of the phenomenologist demands the laying bare of the different activities of our consciousness constituting the different objects of our thought. This theory of constitution has provided us with a deep insight into the nature of logic. The main phenomenological contention is that no science can be deduced either from the facts or from the psychological processes of those who comprehend and order these facts. Phenomenological constitution is neither a psychological nor a formal one.

The Aristotelian formal logic operates with just ready-made concepts and tries to work out operational techniques. Such a logic assumes the principles of predicability. Phenomenology emphasizes the notion of pre-predicative level of our experience. At this level the intentional objects and their qualities are not well circumscribed. In other

words, we cannot maintain that we possess originary experiences of detached things and qualities. This means further that there is a field of our experience which must be brought in relation to our predicative level which logic deals with. It is our mind that selects certain elements from within this field, and an understanding of predicative judgments can only be guaranteed by an approach to those mental processes by which the pre-predicative experience has been constituted. Thus the ready-made concepts of formal logic must be referred back to those constitutional processes, and the logic of these underlying constitutional processes, must therefore be the basis of all formal logic. Such an investigation can take place only within the pure reduced field of our stream of thought which again is accessible only after the performance of the phenomenological reduction. This is where Husserl distinguishes between the 'formal' and the 'transcendental' logic in his book bearing the same title.

Husserl's analyses in this book show us very clearly that there are different presuppositions of our formal logic. The world of logic is not my private world and its truths are intersubjective, that is to say, objective. Husserl thus shows the importance of the role of our intersubjectivity within this field of logic. The role of our intersubjectivity consists not in showing that there is a field of logic referring to the world common to all of us, but it consists in showing 'how' we come to this common world of logic at all. Phenomenology is thus neither friendly nor hostile to meta-logical or metaphysical theories, but it simply tries to determine the spheres where and where alone these theories have their legitimate applications. The notion of validity phenomenology is in search of is neither purely psychological nor formal but evidential, that is to say, originary.

VI

The Technique of Eidetic Variation :

Husserl was never tired of emphasizing the distinction

between the empirical and the eidetical approach. He calls phenomenology an eidetic science which deals not with existences but with essences (*Wesen*). This does not imply that phenomenological methods cannot be applied within the empirical sphere. But the evidential and *a prioristic* character of phenomenology can be assured only by recourse to the eidetical sphere. The term "essence" (*Wesen*) is one of the very naughty terms giving rise to a number of misunderstandings of the methods of phenomenology.

This term "Wesen" is overloaded with metaphysical connotations in the philosophical literature. Even many sympathetic readers of Husserl failed to study him because his "*Wesensschau*" was taken to be nothing else but a "*Schau*" (intuition) of the lofty Platonic Ideas. They thought that one needs to be mystic in order to have an access to these "Wesen". But all this is a sheer misunderstanding and Husserlianism is not a modern version of Platonism. Husserl's eidetic approach is as much a methodological device as the method of phenomenological reduction. The way this eidetic method, *i.e.*, the method of eidetic variation, works is as follows. Phenomenology always emphasizes the role played by our fancy in our philosophical thinking. As Schutz clarifies this method by taking the example of a cube which I perceive on the desk before me. Remaining in the natural attitude I perceive this thing as real. In the phenomenologically reduced sphere the 'phenomenon' cube—the cube as it appears to me—retains the same qualities as an intentional object of my act of perceiving. But suppose I am interested in finding out the qualities that are common to all cubes. I do not want to use thereby the generally used method of induction which suffers from so many unwarranted presuppositions, *e.g.*, that there exist similar objects. All that I have before me is this single concrete cube on this desk. I am free, however, to vary this object in my fancy in that I transform its shape, size, colour, surroundings, perspective and so on. This is

what goes by the name of "eidetic variation". I may thus freely imagine an infinite number of cubes. But all these possible variations leave the qualities common to all imagined cubes untouched, such as rectangularity, limitations to six squares, corporeality. This set of characteristics of all imaginable cubes I shall call the essential characteristics of the cube, or using a Greek term the "eidos" of the cube. It is needless to mention that this method of imagined variation may be performed in order to find out the "eidos" of anything, say, of colour, house, and so on.

This eidetic variation does not deal with the concrete real things but only with the possibly imaginable things. Phenomenology deals thus not only with the objects perceived, but also with objects imagined and in certain cases the latter are of even greater importance for the phenomenological approach. It is sufficiently clear that the purpose of this technique of eidetic variation is the solution of a special task. A true phenomenologist is not so much interested in the "meanings" as they are constituted by the activities of our intentional consciousness. This method of eidetic variation leads consequently not only to a new theory of induction, but also to different spheres of ontology. Suppose we want to know the reason behind the relation of incompatibility—we could easily do it with the help of the method of eidetic variation.

VII

The Concept of Lebenswelt :

One may be easily led to think from what has been said above that phenomenology confines itself to objects which are ideal, imagined and possible. One of the most revolutionary concepts of phenomenology is the concept of *Lebenswelt* (Life-World). Husserl thematizes this idea of *Lebenswelt* in his later works : *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Experience and Judgment)

and *Krisis* (Crisis). All sciences—natural as well as social—are, according to Husserl, nothing but a dynamic totality of human activities. The different sciences are the outcome of the constitutive performances of our mind. Every scientific idea or object has its own history of becoming. It is a sedimentation of the already accomplished mental processes. Husserl is convinced that the most fundamental 'basis of meaning' (*Sinnfundament*) in every science is what is known to be pre-scientific life-world (*Lebenswelt*). This *Lebenswelt* is one common to all of us. In the course of our scientific development and on the onward march of the constant process of idealization and formalization this fundamental foundational nexus is lost sight of. This pre-scientific *Lebenswelt* is transformed so far that the idealities created by the different sciences are themselves naively substituted for the life-world and the objects therein. Such a forgetting leads to a stage in the development of the sciences which then results into a crisis. This crisis of sciences is ultimately a crisis of foundation. One of the main symptoms of such a crisis is the disturbed self-understanding and self-appraisal of the different sciences.

All that is there is constituted; it is an accomplishment of our consciousness (*Bewusstseinsleistung*). Even the life-world is no exception to this rule. Phenomenological philosophy claims to study man in his *Lebenswelt* and it wants to study the life-world in a rigorously scientific manner. This means that the life-world itself must be shown to be constituted. The sphere within which this constitution takes place is the transcendental subjectivity. This sphere, this instance of transcendental subjectivity, takes nothing for granted; it accepts nothing as self-evident. Since it undertakes to bring everything to self-evidence, it transcends all naive philosophies. Husserl goes so far as to call the science of the transcendental subjectivity the real positivism and the phenomenologists the real positivists (*wahre Positivisten*).

Lebenswelt is, according to Husserl, the world we live in; it is the basis of all theoretical as well as practical activities. It is the basis of all our knowledge whatsoever, says Husserl in his *Crisis*. Life-world is the universal field with an elastic horizon. It is the pre-predicative, pre-scientific world. It is generally and rightly contrasted with the scientific world full of abstractions, idealizations and formalizations. Life-world itself is not something idealized, but rather it is idealized and transformed in our scientific practice. Life-world is concretely lived and experienced, whereas the scientific world is an abstract construction. The scientific world gets its meaning through the process of construction, methodological operations, whereas the life-world through the concrete experiences. There is a great similarity between the Husserlian concept of the "Lebenswelt" and the Jamesian concept of the "universe of discourse". But Husserl takes this universe of discourse itself to be something constituted and proposes a science of the Lebenswelt which is very closely connected with the concept of the "A priori" of the Lebenswelt. There is no Lebenswelt without the subject that constitutes and lives it. The Husserlian analysis of the Lebenswelt is just the first step toward working out the most fundamental science of transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity is after all the ultimate, most original and the richest ground of all constitutions.

VIII

We have attempted to describe some of the leading phenomenological concepts along with their philosophical implications. Phenomenological analysis can rightly be said to be a 'universal constitutional analysis' within the most fundamental and dynamic framework of the noesis-noema relationship. The performance of the phenomenological reduction results into an altogether different radical attitude which thematizes the reduced field of all our intentional

cogitations within the stream of thought. The world that this reduction puts in brackets now reappears as phenomenon. But the reduced world-phenomenon is no copy of the outer world. It seems to be just the otherwise: The real outer world is a correlate of the world-phenomenon. Since constitution is no creation, it cannot be asserted that phenomenology views the world as an illusion. This is one of the most intriguing and controversial parts of phenomenology. And Husserl has been never very clear on this point. He of course seems to intend to steer clear of the Berkeleyan subjectivism and Śāṅkara's theory of illusion.

We believe that a sympathetic interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology without being uncritical might be of great help to us in our attempt to solve some of these controversial problems. And by a sympathetic understanding of phenomenological philosophy we mean that phenomenology is in the first instance a very fruitful method of search and research with endless possibilities.*

* Dr Mall read this paper in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta, in December, 1975.

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2. One may rightly criticise Husserl's choice of words like "putting in brackets", "reduction", "epoche" and so on, for these terms have been used also in the sceptical philosophies. It would have been, suggests Robberechts, more appropriate to use the term 'enrichment' instead of 'reduction'.
3. W. James also makes a distinction between "thinking" and "the object thought of", although his analysis takes place at a mundane level of our experience, whereas Husserl analyses the reduced sphere of our conscious life after the performance of phenomenological reduction.

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ETHICS OF A MODERN CORPORATION

SWAMI RANGANATHANANDA

I

Ever since the modern industrial revolution set in, man has been more often discussing only the *economics* of a business or industrial enterprise. But contemporary national and international conditions demand the recognition and appreciation of the *ethics* of such enterprises as well, over and above its obvious economic aspects. This is but the counterpart of the modern political state getting transformed from a mere law and order police state to a *welfare state*.

Before the onset of the modern Industrial Revolution in England in the 18th century, all over the world, industry was just a domestic enterprise. That Revolution introduced, for the first time in history, the Factory System of production. In the early phase of this system, however, there was not much separation of work and worker from home. But the beginning of the present century saw the final separation of home and work, arising from the facilities of rapid transport and large factory establishments. Many modern writers have stressed this as the main cause of the mechanisation and de-humanisation of the worker by modern industry. In the words of George Goyder :

"The world we lost as a result of this Revolution was the world of emotional security based on the home and its human ties."¹

Added to this factor was the dominant profit motive of modern industry in the interest of the investor and the shareholder, where the worker became a commodity to be hired and fired in the interests of the profits to the capitalist

investor. This dominance of the profit motive in modern industry carried high prestige arising from the stress on it by leading economists from Adam Smith onwards. In the early phase of modern industry, this dominant profit motive, while revolutionising production, with its competitive aims and methods, also exploited and debased the increasing number of workers who were drawn to it as wage-earners.

The modern trade union movement all over the world is the product of the early struggles of industrial workers in England to combine, with a view to resisting this exploitation by the capitalists. In its early phase, this struggle was fierce and long, for the law was against all such moves by the workers to unite against the capitalist. The Combination Act of 1799 made all such moves by workers, such as calling a meeting or attending a meeting to discuss raising of wages, shortening of hours, the collection or contribution of money for such meetings, or declining to work, were offences under the law punishable by imprisonment. These were the dismal conditions under which the efficient modern industrial system progressed.

It took 26 years of hard struggle by the workers to win, in 1826, the right to organise themselves within the law. Another fifty years passed before the workers acquired, in 1875, the legal right for collective bargaining. By the end of the Second World War, the Trade Union Movement, in all industrially advanced countries, had become well-established, and workers' rights had become protected by law. These developments were also assisted by the establishment of the proletarian States, through political revolutions, in U.S.S.R. and other countries.

The Trade Union Movement was a counter-challenge thrown to the dominant profit motive of the capitalist. That challenge, however, was also dominated by the same profit motive, but on behalf of the working class. This was sought to be achieved by collective bargaining, which involved also,

strikes by the Unions and lock-outs by the Managements, wherever necessary. Such a situation involved also much loss of productivity, detrimental to the society as a whole, the interests of which found very little place in the worker-capitalist confrontation. Such a confrontation did not also permit human values to emerge out of the production process.

II

Exploitation of man by man is the bitter fruit of the profit motive. By extending that motive as the dominant consideration of the Unions also, the evils of modern industrialism became only enhanced.

At a time when introduction of ethical values in an economic enterprise was but a cry in the wilderness, R. H. Tawney, in his book *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, observed :

“A reasonable estimate of economic organisation must allow for the fact that, unless industry is to be paralysed by recurrent revolts on the part of outraged human nature, it must satisfy criteria which are not purely economic”.

The *social irresponsibility* of capitalist economics has been expressed vividly by several writers who are advocates of *technology with a human face*. Says E. F. Schumacher, the passionate advocate of technology with a human face and of the importance of a greater stress on intermediate technology for all developing countries like ours :

“In the current vocabulary of condemnation there are few words as final and conclusive as the word ‘uneconomic’. If an activity has been branded as uneconomic, its right to existence is not merely questioned but energetically denied.....Call a thing immoral or ugly, soul-destroying or a degradation of man, a

peril to the peace of the world or to the well-being of human generations ; so long as you have not shown it to be 'uneconomic', you have not really questioned its right to exist, grow, and prosper.....

... ..

"In the market place, for practical reasons, innumerable qualitative distinctions which are of vital importance for man and society are suppressed.....To the extent that economic thinking is based on the market, it takes the sacredness out of life, because there can be nothing sacred in something that has a price. Not surprisingly, therefore, if economic thinking pervaded the whole of society even simple non-economic values like beauty, health or cleanliness can survive only if they prove to be 'economic'."*

And offering a critique of such an economic approach and motivation in terms of such non-economic values highly prized by man, Schumacher remarks :

"What is the meaning of democracy, freedom, human dignity, standard of living, self-realisation, fulfilment ? Is it a matter of goods or of people ? Of course it is a matter of people. But people can be themselves only in small comprehensible groups. Therefore we must learn to think in terms of an articulated structure than can cope with a multiplicity of small-scale units. If economic thinking cannot grasp this, it is useless. If it cannot get beyond its vast abstractions, the national income, the rate of growth, capital-output ratio, input-output analysis, labour-mobility, capital-accumulation ; if it cannot get beyond all these and make contact with the human realities of poverty, frustration, alienation, despair, breakdown, crime, escapism, stress, congestion, ugliness, and spiritual death, then let us scrap 'economics and start afresh.'"

Stating that it is the intrusion of human freedom and responsibility that makes economics metaphysically different from physics, and that all real human problems arise from the *antinomy* of order and freedom, Schumacher calls for a blending of both in a healthy business corporation.

In the post-Second World War period, there has been deep thinking in various parts of the world on the nature and scope of modern industrial organisation. A wave of disillusionment about all aspects of modern industry and technology had set in, creating in its wake a wave of humanistic thinking and a re-assessment of the role of both profit-motivated capitalism and trade unionism in human development and fulfilment. Dehumanisation arising from the debasement of work and the worker, by the converting of work into a battleground of self-assertion and self-interest; the huge size of modern industrial corporations and their impersonal functioning, and their ruthless drive for technological thoroughness without caring for human cost—all these present serious challenges to human wisdom all over the world. Modern industry has also to face the challenge of all types of environmental pollution affecting human welfare.

To put profit before people is to debase the people, and make the profit so gained dismal, and the work performed increasingly boring and meaningless. Beyond a certain point, a worker cannot find satisfaction by high monetary returns alone. For his spiritual satisfactions, he needs the stimulus of involvement of his heart and mind, along with that of his hands, in his work, and of knowing that what he does is of significance to himself and his fellow humans. In the absence of these, the worker becomes increasingly mechanised and dehumanised. Modern industry distorts the human psyche by breeding the evils of alienation, frustration, and general unfulfilment in millions of working people, and thereby distorts the social situation as well. Work plays a significant part in human development and fulfilment. If a dominant

profit motive debases the work and the workers, a dominant service motive elevates both. *Service motive* can make even a humdrum work pleasant and significant, by spiritually enriching and nourishing the worker inwardly.

III

The *Bhagvad Gītā* is acknowledged to be the longest philosophical poem expounding the greatest philosophy of work. Work and worker constitute its central theme. The *Gītā* presents work as the means of the *abhyudaya*, material and social welfare, of the worker and, through him, of his society, and of his *niḥsreyasa*, spiritual growth and fulfilment. The latter is the product of the worker's consciousness of his work as *service* conducive to the welfare of society. The *Gītā* also exhorts the worker to gradually rise to the level of viewing such service as *worship*—worship of the Divine in man. This is the famous *buddhi yoga*, *yoga* of enlightened Reason, of the *Gītā*, which Sri Krishna expounds and eulogizes in verses 48 to 51 of its second chapter.

"Yogasthaḥ kuru karmāni sangam tyaktvā dhananjaya ;
Siddhyasiddhyoḥ samo bhūtvā, samatvaṁ yoga ucyate."

['Giving up attachment, equal-minded in success and failure, do all work, O Arjuna, established in the *yoga* (of *buddhi*) ; this evenness of mind is called *yoga*.']

"Dūreṇa hyavaram karma buddhi-yogāt dhananjaya ;
Buddhau śaranam anviccha, kṛpaṇāḥ phalahetavaḥ."

['Work (prompted by the profit motive and for mere sensate satisfactions) is far inferior, O Arjuna, to (work done under the guidance of) the *yoga* of *buddhi* ; resort to (this) *buddhi* ; small-minded and short-sighted are they who work (only) for selfish advantage.']

"Buddhi-yukto jahātiha ubhe suktaduṣkṛte ;
Tasmāt yogāya yujyasva yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam".

['The man endowed with *buddhi* (enlightened Reason) goes beyond (the relativity of) both the merit and demerit of all work, in this very life ; strive, therefore, to acquire the *yoga* (of *buddhi*) ; *yoga* is spoken of as dexterity in work.']

"*Karmajam buddhiyuktāḥ hi phalam tyaktvā manīṣiṇaḥ
Janmabandhavinirmuktāḥ padam gacchantyanāmayam.*"

['Wise people endowed with (the *yoga* of) *buddhi*, detached from the fruits derived from work, and freed for ever from the bondages of existence, attain to that state of life which is beyond all evil.']

Not only workers and managements in industry, but also all politics and administration, will have to imbibe the spirit of this *buddhi yoga*, if mankind is to realise its objective of human development and fulfilment, of a national and international socio-political order based on social justice and social peace, of a polity free from all kinds of exploitation, not merely economic, but also political, intellectual, and religious. That this *buddhi yoga* of the *Gītā* has the power to bring about peace and justice in the world at large was voiced, in the course of one of his speeches, by no less a person than the Secretary-General of the U.N.O., the late Dr. Hammarskjöld, when he translated and commended the sentiments of the verse 49 referred to above.

IV

The post-war humanistic impulse has led to a reassessment of capitalism by some Western economists and of trade unionism by some West European Marxist thinkers. The trend of this reassessment is in the direction of the replacement of the conflict, centred in the profit motive, by co-operation arising from the service motive. Increasing numbers of communist thinkers in Western Europe have recently started stressing the wisdom of the involvement of the workers in, in

place of the folly of perpetual *conflict with*, the industrial enterprise concerned, as the practical way to bring about humanisation of modern industry and technology. They also stress that producer satisfaction must go hand in hand with consumer or market satisfaction. There has been a similar response from the enlightened section of the capitalist side also, of favouring man, in a system of man in conflict with the machine. Some thinkers refer to this as the *qualitative revolution* to supplement the earlier *quantitative revolution* of the modern industrial technique. Here, for the first time, since 100 years of modern industry, we notice a healthy trend on the part of both capital and labour towards co-operation, so as to secure the progressive adaptation of the modern industrial machine to the human needs of the working people. There is thus a general trend of a greater involvement of the workers and the management within the company, with a view to bringing about progressive change in its structure, functioning and objectives.

Private enterprise, under capitalism, is not concerned with what it produces but only with what it gains from production ; this constitutes one of the social non-responsibilities of individualism, the ugly face of the tyranny of the profit motive. Man, as a *private individual*, takes interest in non-profit values ; he seeks things of utility to enjoy things without utility. But man, as a *businessman*, concerns himself only with economic profits. Hence his social and human non-responsibility. And it is this social non-responsibility that is cut at the roots by the *Gītā* teaching of *buddhi yoga* referred to above.

The challenge to this capitalistic thought has come from modern socialism of the communist and socialist varieties. The constant and common theme of both types of socialism is the *end of exploitation of man by man*. The main difference between communists and socialists relates to the non-acceptance, by socialists, of economic determinism and class-war

advocated by communists. The socialist vision of a non-exploitative society has been an influence in India for over 100 years, beginning with Swami Vivekananda. In fact, the main socialist ideas have influenced Indian thinking of man and society from the time of the Upanishads nearly four thousand years ago. The *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā* expound the spiritual equality of man in the light of the one Ātman, Divine Self, present in all. The teaching against greed in all the world religions is socialistic in its operation. The *Gītā* gives an ethical orientation to the concept of *yajña*, or sacrifice, in its third chapter (3.13) :

“*Bhujate te tvagham pāpā ye pacantyātma kāraṇāt.*”

[Those sinners who cook (and eat) only for themselves, verily, eat only sin].

Swami Vivekananda has described the modern age as the age of the emergence of the *sūdras*, of the proletariat. Says he,

“I am a socialist, not because I think it is a perfect system, but half a loaf is better than no bread.”⁴

The other systems have been tried and found wanting ; let this one be tried—if for nothing else, for the novelty of the thing. A redistribution of pain and pleasure is better than always the same persons having the pains and pleasures. The sumtotal of good and evil in the world remains ever the same. The yoke will be lifted from shoulder to shoulder by new systems, that is all.

Speaking on *The Future of India* at Madras in 1897, Swami Vivekananda had said :

“The days of exclusive privileges and exclusive claims are gone, gone for ever from the soil of India, and it is one of the great blessings of the British Rule in India. Even to the Mohammedan Rule we owe that great blessing, the destruction of exclusive privilege...The duty of every aristocracy is to dig its own grave ; and the sooner it does so, the better. The more it delays, the

more it will fester, and the worse death it will die.”^s “

According to R. P. Masani, Dadabhoy Naoroji, the outstanding economic thinker and political leader of the pre-Gandhian Indian National Congress, had attended the International Socialistic Congress at Amsterdam in 1904 and had cultivated some association with the British Socialists. Gandhiji, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vinoba Bhave, and our present Prime Minister, Srimathi Indira Gandhi, apart from hundreds of other thinkers and political leaders, have been advocates of a non-doctrinaire type of socialism for India ; they do not equate collectivism with socialism. They are also strong advocates of citizen's freedom. Even the Indian communists, in participating in the democratic parliamentary institutions in India, have abjured the extremist lines of ideologies and programmes. And recently, the European Communist parties have also started abandoning the earlier doctrinaire approaches. The influence of Indian culture and philosophy has softened the rigidities of Marxism in the Indian context, and opened the way for the adoption, by the nation, of a socialism with ethical and human motivations, in tune with the spiritual inheritance of the Indian people.

V

The Indian Constitution, in its very Preamble, lays down some of the essential democratic and socialistic principles, such as people's sovereignty, justice, equality, fraternity, liberty, and the dignity of the individual. And during the debates on the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer had said :

“The Constitution, while it does not commit the country to any particular form of economic structure or social adjustment, gives ample scope for the future legislatures and future parliament to evolve any economic order and undertake any legislation they chose in public interests.”

The Constitution, in its Directive Principles, affords plenty of scope for making India socialistic; and the impending Amendments to the Constitution, in the light of the above remarks by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer, if adopted by Parliament, will give effective expression to the socialistic aspirations of the Indian people.

The central problem of socialism has been the squaring of the two great urges of man, namely, freedom and equality. In normal circumstances, both cannot co-exist. In the human context, stress on freedom tends to increase inequality, and stress on equality tends to decrease freedom. The French Revolution stressed freedom and the Russian Revolution stressed equality. In the economic sphere, Capitalism upholds freedom and denies equality, while Marxism upholds equality and restricts freedom. India is faced with the challenge of combining these two great values of freedom and equality; India is striving to usher in *socialistic equality in the context of democratic freedom*. While doing so, she is encroaching on some peripheral aspects of *Fundamental Rights*, with respect to freedom, only with a view to strengthening and implementing the *Directive Principles* of her Constitution with respect to equality. This is inescapable in the context of a long-established feudal social system, and in the interests of its early replacement by a democratic social order; for freedom in a feudal context means only freedom of wealth and monopoly to exploit the weak and the helpless. *But the freedom offered in the Fundamental Rights will shine in all its glory in India after the Directive Principles have achieved a satisfactory measure of levelling up of the common people.* Curtailing of the freedom to exploit others is the surest way to enhance all-round freedom. And freedom is the first condition of growth, proclaims Swami Vivekananda, who also presents this value as the supreme gift of Vedānta.

It is obvious that a mere economic or political approach can never help the nation to effect this union of freedom and

equality. It needs a spiritual approach which, fortunately, is available to our people from our philosophers and spiritual teachers, both ancient and modern. The genius for synthesis, characteristic of Indian wisdom, when it begins to affect the thinking of our people in a pervasive way, can be expected to make our politics, administration, and society achieve this happy blend of democratic freedom with socialistic equality.

Nineteenth-century capitalism received its stimulus from the materialism of the century's physics and biology. As presented by Thomas Huxley, collaborator of Darwin: Whereas Ethics means the making of as many as possible fit to survive, biology expounds Evolution as *struggle for existence and survival of the fittest*. Nineteenth-century capitalism translated this in human terms into colonial exploitation and cut-throat competition which, in due course, exploded into the two catastrophic world wars. But just as twentieth-century physics has ceased to be materialistic in the crude sense as understood in the last century, the revolutionary advances in the science of biology in the twentieth-century have made ethics central to Evolution at the human stage.

Speaking on 'The Evolutionary Vision', the late Sir Julian Huxley, the noted biologist, and grandson of Thomas Huxley, gave a spiritual orientation to the evolutionary process :

"Man's evolution is not biological but psycho-social. It operates by the mechanism of cultural tradition, which involves the cumulative self-reproduction and self-variation of mental activities and their products. Accordingly, major steps in the human phase of evolution are achieved by breakthroughs to new dominant patterns of mental organisation of knowledge, ideas and beliefs—ideological instead of psychological or biological organisation."⁶

Discussing, in the light of these revolutionary ideas of twentieth-century biology, the aim of human evolution, or evolution at the human stage, Sir Julian Huxley says :

"In the light of our present knowledge, man's most comprehensive aim is seen not as mere survival, not as numerical increase, not as increased complexity of organisation, or increased control over his environment, but as greater fulfilment—the fuller realisation of more possibilities by human species collectively and more of its component members individually."

And pleading for a scientific study of the scope of this concept of fulfilment, Huxley says :

"Once greater fulfilment is recognised as man's ultimate or dominant aim, we shall need a science of human possibilities to help guide the long course of psychosocial evolution that lies ahead."

India is fortunate to have such a *science of human possibilities* as the central theme of her *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

Capitalism lays stress on quantity. Ethical and spiritual values lay stress on quality. And Huxley, in his lecture on 'The Evolutionary Vision', speaks of *quality* emerging as the criterion of evolution at the human stage, in place of *quantity*, which dominated the organic or the pre-human phase of evolution.

VI

It is against this background of thought of ancient Vedānta, twentieth-century science and modern human experience, that we have to view economic activities of industrial corporations and business ventures in modern India. New scientific truths take time to influence social thinking and action ; and much of our current socio-economic thinking and action is still influenced by nineteenth-century science. Ethical values, what India calls *dharma*, are inseparable from any ordered human society. Bereft of them, man becomes reduced to a beast, says Indian wisdom : *dharmena hinah*

paśubhiḥ samānāḥ. Dharma as the principle of integration of man with man in society, does not mean religion in the sense of creed, doctrine, or ritual, nor any scheme of other-worldly salvation. A mere accumulation of bricks does not constitute a building. It needs cement to unite brick with brick to make for its integrated structure. Similarly, a mere aggregation of men does not constitute society. *Dharma* stresses the idea of mutuality and inter-dependence of man in society. Man needs the context of other human beings for his very humanisation. This is how Sri Krishna expounds *dharma* in the *Kaṇṇa Parva* of the *Mahābhārata* (8.45.50):

Dhāraṇāt dharma ityāhuḥ, dharma dhāryante prajāḥ.

Indian philosophy considers *kāma*, sensate satisfaction and *artha*, wealth, the means to *kāma*, as valid human pursuits, or *puruṣārthas*. But it considers *lobha*—greed and *moha*—delusion, arising from unchecked desire, as unethical, because they are anti-social. To restrain these two pursuits from becoming anti-social, Indian philosophy presents a third vital human pursuit or *puruṣārtha*, namely, *dharma*—ethical sense. It is *dharma* that helps all people, not just a few powerful and clever ones, to experience the maximum *kāma* and *artha*. And Sri Krishna, the human manifestation of the one divine self in all beings, endorses this validity of *Kāma* in the *Gitā* (7.11):

Dharmāviruddho bhuteṣu kamo'smi bharatarṣabha.

(‘I am that *kāma*, sensual desire, in all beings, which is unopposed to *dharma*.’)

Indian philosophy refers to *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma* as the *trivarga*, the inseparable group of three, treats them as the universal warp and woof of all ordered human society, and presents *mokṣa*, absolute freedom of the fourth *puruṣārtha*, as an optional trans-social pursuit meant for those few who desire, and dare, to go deeper into the spiritual dimensions of life and realise one’s true nature in all its glory. For all the rest, this *mokṣa* experience comes, within the limitations

of the social context, as *dharma*. *Dharma*, thus, is the confluence of social and the trans-social ; and every sacred and secular literature of India sings its glory. Indian culture is rooted in, and inspired by, this great value of *dharma*.

It is the echo of this great value that we get in the concept of *psycho-social* evolution of twentieth-century biology referred to earlier. With the most versatile organ, namely, the cerebral system, given to man by nature, says today's biology, evolution, at the human stage, has ceased to be primarily organic, and has become psycho-social. It demands that man, with the help of this cerebral system, detach his psyche or self from the organic system and make it grow and expand, in ethical awareness and social feeling, so as to realise its oneness with other psyches in society. Here we get an echo of the *anāsakti-yoga* of the *Gītā*. All greed, delusion, and exploitation proceed from the self,—when centred in, and attached to, the organic system. By psycho-social evolution, man *grows spiritually* and becomes capable of digging affections in each other, of communicating with each other, of working in a team. It is at this deeper level that he becomes capable of realising the value of *dharma*, ethical sense, from within himself, and expressing himself, naturally and spontaneously, in moods and acts of service, and becomes also incapable of exploiting other human beings.

Our national cultural ethos will not allow our people to drift into the worship of, what several modern economic thinkers refer to, as, the false god of G.N.P., an unchecked pursuit of organic satisfactions, of a mad rush after material affluence. Our philosophy tells us how and why to pursue these, and when and how to stop, and what higher things there are to pursue. If our own tested cultural values guide us in our economic pursuits in the modern period, we shall be satisfied with a measure of decent material and social welfare for all our people.

VII

This itself will provide, in the context of the immense population of our country at low levels of economic development, a wide field for our industrial enterprises. The stimulus for expansion and diversification of industrial production and making monetary profits is, therefore, to be sought in a national economic policy designed to effect a wide diffusion of purchasing power among our people. Therein will lie the real thrust of Indian socialism. Production of luxury and conspicuous consumption goods, according to Swami Vivekananda, has also a place, and can be encouraged, in a socialistic order, only as a means to provide gainful work for the poor.

In this context, the new concept of 'fulfilment' presented by Julian Huxley as the goal of evolution at the human state, as against 'organic satisfactions' which nineteenth-century biology had presented as the goal of all evolution, and which twentieth-century biology relegates to its pre-human phase, becomes significant.

"But like population explosion, this consumption explosion cannot continue much longer. It is an inherently self-defeating process. Sooner, rather than later, we must get away from a system based on artificially increasing the number of human wants, *and set about constructing one aimed at the qualitative satisfaction of real human needs, spiritual and mental, as well as material and physiological.*"⁹

When economic activity is conducted in the light of this philosophy of man and society, it ceases to be primarily a profit-making venture. Profit-making does remain as one of its important motivations; but it becomes subordinated to the service motivation.

This is the ethical role of a modern corporation, the word 'modern' breathing the spirit of modern science, of the modern humanistic values and urges, and the trials and

tribulations of industrial experiences, of the post-war period. Our country is fortunately placed in that we are in the early stages of our industrial development. Our industry has to learn from the dismal post-war experiences and warnings of British and Western European industry, and take steps to define a new role for our managements and trade unions, and *a new national purpose for our corporations*. A new revolution in trade unionism will follow a new concept of an industrial corporation in which the profit motive of the employer, which gave rise to the counter profit motive of the employee, gives way to the service motive. This will provide a context of a national partnership between management and labour, not for exploiting the corporation for mutual advantage, which may happen only in a capitalist system, but for the service of all the constituent parties concerned. It will flow from a *social purposes clause* to be inserted in the corporation's aims and objects, and incorporated in the Company Law itself.

When we thus make the profit motive secondary and the service motive primary, we convert both management and the labour of a corporation into what they really are, namely, *citizens of free India engaged in a partnership within a national productive enterprise*. This Management-Labour partnership then becomes the custodian of the wider interests of society. And it is in that high role of free and responsible citizens with its wider national horizons and awareness of national responsibilities, that the representatives of labour, now, being inducted to the managements, become a source of strength to the corporation. Such a process will hasten the conversion of the corporation into a *trust* for the good of society. It is in such a responsible corporation, inspired with this ethical and human motivation, that workers can be expected to play a responsive and responsible role from the ship floor to the board room. Such a corporation will harmonise the demand of all the constituents of the corporation, namely, the workers, the investors and the shareholders, the state, the consumer,

and the community at large. A corporation's obligations are two-fold, internal and external. Internal—to the corporation, for its continuance and development ; to its employees, for their human dignity, development of skills, promotion, and security ; and to its investors and shareholders for a reasonable return on their investment. External—to the state, by way of taxes due ; and the consumers, for supply of quality goods at reasonable prices, and to the community at large, by suitable welfare measures. The ethics of a modern corporation will also include the responsibility for producing only such goods as are beneficial for humanity needed for its development and fulfilment.

VIII

Exploitation of man by man is not the evil monopoly of only corporate industry and business. It has been long practised by our people in the domestic sphere as well. If a man or a woman in distress approaches our homes for a job, we rarely offer him or her the wage commensurate with the job, but what can purchase one at the lowest level of his or her distress. It is good for us, who have plenty of religion about us, to know that this is rarely done by the people of the 'materialistic' West. What is still more tragic is the fact that the householder concerned, as also his or her friends, applaud such unethical and low behaviour as *practical intelligence* ! We here mistake cleverness and cunning for intelligence. The sooner our people learn to treat such intelligence as folly, and as crime against God and man, against God in man, the better for us and for our nation.

When we rise to this ethical and human level of thinking and action, we shall rise to the level of true citizenship of a democratic and socialistic India. This signifies the spiritual growth of the *grhastha*, or householder into the citizen.

THE impact of millions of such citizens on the functioning of our industrial, financial, and business institutions, and on all our politics and administration, will be healthy and weighty in an unprecedented degree. *The good life begins in the privacy of our life when we are unobserved by others.* It is millions of such attitudes and acts, mostly quiet and silent, that make a society *dhārmic* or ethical, imparting thereby substance and soulfulness and reality to the democratic and socialistic political structure of the nation. This is true nation-building, according to Swami Vivekananda, through man-making education and man-making religion.

IX

The Trade Unions and the Ministries and Departments of Labour need to turn their attention to the qualitative improvement of the life of our working people. It is obvious that, while collective bargaining has raised the worker's wages and salaries, there has not been a corresponding rise in the cultural level of his or her life.

It is time that our nation turns its attention to the qualitative improvement in the life of millions of our working people. Apart from secular education, the one powerful source of cultural uplift and qualitative improvement of the life of our people is religion—not of the magical and superstitious variety, but *bhakti* and *bhajan*. Apart from adequate and general secular education, family planning and religion form two other important factors for raising the cultural level of our workers. Family planning, though very necessary as a programme for raising the quality of life of the worker and his family is not sufficient for achieving so great a purpose as cultural uplift. It must be accompanied by the ministrations of that science and technique of religion which imparts dignity, strength, and an inner enrichment to man in all

stations of life. Schopenhauer's warning : 'when men achieve security and welfare, now that they have solved all their problems, they become a problem to themselves'; can evoke only one response from any sensible person, namely, an immediate resort to the science and technique of enriching one's inner life.

Our people have built up, through the ages, a good capital of this inner richness; let us not, in the modern period, eat up this precious capital, but add to it while drawing on it. That is the way of wisdom. It is the culture of *bhakti* and *bhajan*, derived from thousands of saints and poet-singers, of all castes and creeds, that has made for *the unique phenomenon of the dissociation of poverty from crime in our country*. Our working people must be educated to prefer, once again, *bhajan* at the end of a day's labour to drunkenness and brawls. Our poor are poor only in their pockets, but not in their hearts; their inborn culture makes them kind and hospitable, gladly sharing their piece of bread with a visitor. We are fast losing this wealth of culture in our common people by the materialistic impact of modern industrialism. This tragedy must be averted. Swami Vivekananda, accordingly, wrote in one of his letters from America to his workers in India : "Keep the motto before you : *Elevation of the masses without injuring their religion.*"

The presence of a large segment of public sector corporations in our country, dissociated from the vice of the exploitations associated with the private sector, and controlling the commanding heights of the national economy, is a vital factor in giving our technology a human face. Public and private sector industries have to realise that private affluence and public squalor in our country is a standing challenge to our political system and to our social conscience. We have also to safeguard ourselves against the current materialistic philosophy behind modern production techniques which stimulate insatiable human cravings, and create ecological

problems and which mutilate man and distort the social situation.

Introducing into our industry ethical values, and giving our technology a human face, also involves, as suggested by Schumacher, adoption of intermediate and small-scale technologies, which are labour intensive, in place of high technology where it is not relevant. Using the the scarce capital resources available to start thousands of small work units, and giving gainful employment to millions constitutes the ethics of industrial enterprise in our country today. This is to follow the wise lead given by Gandhiji: 'Not mass production, but production by the masses.' And, since the last two years, our national policy has happily turned in this direction.

X

Public sector corporations have a great responsibility, therefore, to uphold ethical and human values in industry, along with achieving productive efficiency and rising profits, and thus set an example to all private sector corporations in the country. When ethical and human values will inspire industrial and business corporations in India, we can see the end of exploitation of man by man, and man by money power, in our country. This will help to fulfil Gandhiji's dream, in spirit, if not in letter, of the principle of *trusteeship* inspiring industrial and business activities in India. There are already some small industrial ventures in our country, sponsored by some of the members of Gandhiji's constructive work movement, which function under the trusteeship principle advocated by Gandhiji. It is heartening to find that such ventures, with slight variations, are functioning in some of the Western countries as well. I cannot conclude this exposition of the *Ethics of a Modern Corporation* better than by conveying the blessings, on the subject, pronounced by the Father of the Nation.

Writing in the *Harijan* of 31 March, 1946, on the Eve of Independence, Gandhiji had said :

"Supposing India becomes a free country tomorrow, all the capitalists will have an opportunity of becoming statutory trustees. But such a stature will not be imposed from above. It will have to come from below. When the people understand the implications of trusteeship, and the atmosphere is ripe for it, the people themselves, beginning with *Gram Panchayats*, will begin to introduce such statutes. Such a thing coming from below is easy to swallow. Coming from above, it is liable to prove a dead-weight."*

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* This paper is abridged from a lecture delivered by Swamiji in July, 1976.

SRI AUROBINDO'S PHILOSOPHY OF CREATION

USHARANJAN CHAKRABORTY

I

Creation, with scientists and philosophers, is a natural phenomenon and nothing but a manifestation of hidden forces of Nature. With the materialists creation is material in nature, with the spiritualists it is spiritual and ideal. The idealists regard creation as an outcome of a spiritual principle. Thus naturalists and spiritualists contend quite opposite views with regard to creation.

Sri Aurobindo has made an attempt to reconcile these opposite views. But this reconciliation is not simply a juxtaposition of two opposite views. His interpretation of creation does not fall within either of these camps. He is undoubtedly a spiritualist, but unlike other spiritualists, he affirms the existence of matter. Still he is not a materialist, because he believes that matter potentially involves spirit.

Sri Aurobindo distinctly differs from other evolutionists as to the nature of creation. For them creation means evolution, an upward journey from the lower stage to the higher. Sri Aurobindo points out that prior to evolution, there must be involution. To the evolutionists the conception of involution is insignificant. But Sri Aurobindo boldly declares that evolution is meaningless if it is not preceded by involution.

What is meant by *involution*? To Sri Aurobindo involution means self-oblivion of Sacchidananda, and evolution is its self-discovery; involution is descent, evolution is ascent to itself; involution is self-negating, evolution is self-affirmation. This means that evolution is the reverse process of

involution. Involution-evolution is the "diastole-systole of the heart of Sacchidananda, it is Reality's game of hide and seek".¹ This double process of involution and evolution is pivotal to Sri Aurobindo's philosophy of creation. In fact this double activity forms one process. So to understand Sri Aurobindo's view of creation let us deal with involution and evolution separately.

II

Involution is a gradual descent of the Reality from its unique state of unity to plurality. As *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ananda* Reality is spaceless and timeless and without a second. Such a transcendent principle cannot be a creator. To make creation possible the Reality needs a different principle. This is called the Supermind. This Supermind is not apart from the Reality—it arises out of and lives within the Reality. Reality as the Supermind gradually descends to lower levels. These levels are created out of self-concentration of the Supermind. Thus multiplicity comes forth. So long the Supermind remains one with the Reality, there is no creation; with its involution creation begins. Now let us see how the Supermind effectuates its involution.

The first descent of the Supermind is the Overmind. The Supermind shares pure light and knowledge of the Reality. The Overmind is not all knowledge, it is a separating line between knowledge and ignorance. It is the origin of ignorance and plurality. It is a mixture of more light and less darkness. The Supermind delegates power to it to make creation possible and it performs that task faithfully. In its basis lies a cosmic unity but in its action it is the creator of divisions and differentiations.

The second descent of the Supermind is Intuition. Out of this original intuition mind-intuition, heart-intuition, life-

intuition and body-intuition originate. It is not thought or vision, but more than thought and sight. Its nature is to penetrate into the real nature of truth. It has a fourfold power; a power that reveals truth-seeing, a power that inspires truth-hearing, a power of truth-touch and a power of true discrimination. In spite of this fourfold power intuition lacks perfect knowledge by indentity and hence cannot go beyond ignorance fully.

The third descent of the Supermind is the Illumined Mind. The Illumined Mind is not a level of thought, but of spiritual vision. The spiritual sight is its characteristic. But as it lacks the supramental vision, it has little chance to claim superior knowledge.

The fourth descent of the Supermind is the Higher Mind. The characteristic of the Higher Mind is that it possesses a greater power of thought but it has deficiency of vision or sight. It does not act in accordance with the logical process but its thought comes out spontaneously. It consists of two aspects, namely, cognition and will. In spite of its spontaneous character ignorance peeps into it to a great extent.

This ignorance finds a free play when Supermind descends further to the level of the Mind. Mind is the only faculty of knowledge in man. The characteristic of mind is that it is aware of both subjective and objective forms.

The nature of mind is that it cuts out the things from their real source and limits them as if they are separate entities. It divides, multiplies, adds, subtracts; but beyond that it cannot go. It cannot catch the Infinite. While the Higher Mind is able to rise to the level of higher self-consciousness, Mind cannot do so. The self-oblivion along with the inclination to the lower levels leads Mind to misinterpret things.

So far the Supermind descends to different mental planes. After mind the descent of the Supermind extends

to non-mental planes of which life is the first and matter is the last.

What is life? Life is nothing but a force of Cosmic Consciousness, an all-pervading dynamic energy of the Divine Being. Individual lives are created out of this universal life. Life takes body as a medium of its expression and when body dies, life creates another body. Even if the whole of the universe disappears, life will recreate a new world. Thus life is a creative force, creating incessantly. It performs triple function of building, sustaining and destroying forms in the world. Life appears as an intermediary principle between mind and matter and the final operation of the Consciousness-force. It is an infinite force working in terms of finite. When it comes in contact with finite lives, it comes under the influence of mind and forgets its one, undivided and universal character due to the dividing and disrupting function of mind itself.

The manifestation of life needs a medium. It needs a material body. This need is fulfilled by the creation of Matter out of further descent of the Supermind. The universal Mind creates the material universe out of itself by the instrumentality of a universal sense. Matter is the final form of the conscious Being and matter is divided within the Spirit itself by the action of a universal Mind. "Spirit is the soul and reality of that which we sense as Matter; Matter is a form and body of that which we realise as Spirit".² In matter the Supermind concentrates itself to the greatest extent. Therefore the Supermind in Matter seems to remain untraced.

III

Let us now pass on to Evolution. Evolutionists say that evolution is unfolding of what is infolded. No evolution can

explore such a thing that is not already existing implicitly. But such a view will lead to predetermination. Nothing new would emerge out of the prior level. If so, where lies the importance of evolution? Emergentists argue that in every level of its progress evolution must acquaint us with a new thing, it is not simply a repetition. We cannot predict beforehand what new thing would come out in the process of evolution. It moves freely, and therefore, it is unmechanical.

From the beginning Sri Aurobindo's view of evolution is *spiritual*. To him evolution succeeds involution, and evolution evinces a principle, which is spiritual in nature. Hence while evolution starts from matter, it is not matter that gives birth to life, it is the involved supermind, the spiritual consciousness in matter that rises to the level of life transforming the inert nature of matter itself.

Here a question may crop up. If evolution follows involution, how can Sri Aurobindo explain newness in evolution? As an emergentist Sri Aurobindo believes in newness in evolution. At the same time he holds that evolution explores that level explicitly which is nothing but a prior involved stage. So how can both involution and newness in evolution be reconciled?

Sri Aurobindo has an answer for this. Evolution cannot start from nothingness. There must be a basis wherefrom evolution starts. Let us suppose that basis is matter. Unquestionably we admit the existence of matter. But if one puts a question: why does matter evolve life, and life mind?—the evolutionists have no answer. Here Sri Aurobindo's view of involution gives us a solution. Matter evolves life because of the involution of the Spirit. Even Matter has come into existence out of the Spirit's involution. As to the newness in evolution Sri Aurobindo holds that involution does not pre-determine the evolutionary process. Evolution has every right to move freely. It is not a continuous process, not a mere repetition—gaps are found in it. Still it regards

the process of involution only to avoid any disorder. And it is also that an implicit state is explicitly manifested in evolution. In this respect involution cannot be avoided. That means evolution is free but with some self-restrictions. So evolution for Sri Aurobindo is ".....a creating, but self-creating, not a making of what never was, but a bringing out of what was implicit in the Being."⁸ He further holds, "An involution of Spirit in matter is the beginning, but a spiritual assumption of divine birth is the fullness of the evolution"⁴

Let us now come to the *process* of evolution. Evolution follows the triple process of a widening, a heightening and an integration. The process of widening takes place when evolution starts from simple matter to more complex ones and at this time the concentration and action of a complex and subtle form of consciousness is admitted. A simple form of matter undergoes a process of complication and integrate organisation for the manifestation of life in it.

The process of heightening consists in an ascent from a lower to a higher grade. The evolution of life out of matter and mind out of life is an ascent from the lower to the higher grade. At every stage of ascent it is the higher that lifts up the lower, not the lower that evolves the higher.

The process of integration begins to operate when evolution reaches a higher grade. It takes up the lower grade and transforms it according to its needs, laws and principles and the lower level is adjusted and integrated to the higher. When matter ascends to life, life lifts up matter from lower grade and transforms it into a fit instrument for its own manifestation ; and mind transforms life and matter according to its need. This triple process of evolution functions in cooperation, not apart.

Evolution, according to Sri Aurobindo, consists of two forms : Cosmic and Individual. We start with cosmic evolution first.

Cosmic evolution starts from matter, the lowest level of involution. It is the first grade of evolution. The consciousness-force present in matter is heightened and intensified from below upwards and at the same time the consciousness-force of the higher level gives a downward pressure on the material plane giving birth to life and thus transforms the nature of matter. Then the consciousness-force involved in life is heightened and intensified from below upwards and the consciousness-force of the higher level pressurises life, pulls it up towards itself, transforms the nature of life and the mental level emerges. The same process continues till it reaches the spiritual and the supramental plane.

Evolution starts with matter but aims at the emergence of consciousness. Plants possess life but no consciousness. Animals are conscious but not self-conscious. They are conscious about surroundings. Man's consciousness is concerned with both objectivity and subjectivity. But his mental consciousness has limitation. Therefore, to gain infinite consciousness he should cultivate spiritual consciousness which lies with the ultimate Reality. Through gradual progress of evolution man can attain the level of infinite consciousness. Sri Aurobindo maintains that for the attainment of this infinite consciousness man has to take birth many times. No single birth can lead a man to reach that state.

Upto mind the journey of evolution is external. But the real aim of evolution, according to Sri Aurobindo, is internal. This internal change gets prominence when evolution reaches the spiritual level. But spiritual transformation alone cannot change the nature of man and Nature as such. A radical and total transformation needs the descent of the Supermind to man and Nature. for the Supermind brings with it light and power from above. But the human mind can neither reach the Supermind by a leap nor can it contain the supramental power within it because of its own limitations. So to bridge over the gulf between the mind and the Supermind there should

take place ascent and descent of some other planes and this would enable the Supermind to pass through a triple transformation called (a) the psychic, (b) the spiritual, and (c) the supramental transformation.

(a) Although man is not conscious of his soul, the existence of soul in him is a fact. Sri Aurobindo calls this soul as Chiatya Purusha. This soul in man is veiled from him. It is an ever immaculate and ever flowing flame of the Divinity. This vital psychic entity in man must come in the light of man's surface being. The first condition of psychic emergence lies in its direct contact with the spiritual Reality in the surface being. For inmost change this is indispensable.

The second condition for psychic emergence lies in direct contact with Reality through the heart. Just behind the heart is the occult seat of the soul. So an approach to the heart is necessary for the spiritual man to appear as a devotee in the emotional nature.

The third condition for the emergence of the psychic being, in addition to the experiences of the heart, is a consecration of the pragmatic will which carries with it the dynamic vital part of our mind.

All these three approaches—the approaches of the mind, the will, and the heart—create the psychic condition of the surface being and nature in which we find a larger and more complex openness to the psychic light within us on the one hand, and the spiritual self and Reality on the other.

The first integral transformation of Nature consists in bringing the hidden psychic entity to the surface consciousness. Psychicisation means to illumine the surface mind, life and body by the inmost light of the psychic being. Through the psychic emergence, a communion of the self, god or Iswara and Divine Śakti becomes possible. The experience of the cosmic consciousness, the inner communication and interchange of all beings in Nature,

the illumination of mind by knowledge, heart by love, joy and ecstasy and senses by higher experiences is the inevitable result. Psychicisation is the first beginning of the spiritualisation and divinisation.

Sri Aurobindo divides the central soul in man into two forms : Psychic soul and Spiritual soul. The spiritual soul is the higher form and the psychic soul is the lower form. The spiritual soul is a part of the Divine being. The chief characteristic of the spiritual soul is that it presides over our empirical existence although it is in itself a transcendent principle. But the psychic soul acts in the psycho-physical organism as the representative of the spiritual soul and supports its activities.

(b) In psychicisation we come to know the real status of our soul. But this is not enough. Mind, life and body that constitute the external aspect of human personality must know their original status. For this an ascent from the lower to the higher is necessary. The ascent of the mind consists of four upward gradations, namely, Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuition and Overmind. The human nature is transformed and transmuted by the descent of knowledge and power of these higher levels and ultimately total transformation becomes possible through the descent of the Supermind. With the downward movement of the Supermind the lower levels are enlightened by the supramental truth, knowledge and light. Thus any spiritual transformation consists of a double process, *viz.*, ascent of the lower to the higher plane and the descent of the higher to the lower plane.

(c) The process of ascent and descent in the spiritual transformation is also followed in the supramental transformation. The Supermind concealed in Nature tries to ascend on account of a push in the evolutionary nature itself, and a pressure from the above plane of the Supermind intervenes, descends, and transforms its lower planes. This is called the integral activity of the Supermind:

The supramental evolution is marked with perfect light and knowledge. Not the least sign of ignorance is found in it. The spiritual being is transformed into gnostic being or superman and the lower nature is transformed into supernature.

Of course the evolutionary process does not stop with the emergence of superman and supernature. A further task of the supramental transformation lies in the manifestation of bliss of Sacchidananda in the terrestrial nature. The Supermind descends from Bliss and in the gnostic evolution ascends to It again and thus the bliss of Sacchidananda is manifested into the earth-consciousness. The evolution of gnostic beings gives rise to the evolution of beings of bliss. This is the goal of evolution which Sri Aurobindo earnestly desires to reach, and this is the culmination of his philosophy of creation.

IV

Sri Aurobindo looks at evolution from two angles of vision—cosmic and individual. We have delineated the cosmic evolution above. Now we shall deal with the individual evolution. The contribution of the individual evolution consists in the acceleration of the activity of the cosmic evolution. So one is complementary to the other.

The individual evolution consists in the upward journey of the soul, mind, life and body. For this a call of the aspirant to the Divine is necessary. The human being should have a strong desire to ascend to Divinity. This call would be responded to by the Divinity by its descent to the devotee. The supramental transformation results out of this simultaneous aspiration and call. This is the first condition of the individual supramental evolution.

The second condition consists in calmness and equality. Calmness is serenity and this arises out of our renunciation

of desires and passions. Non-attachment to any storm of passion leads one to higher planes.

The third condition is surrender. This means complete self-dedication to the Divine. If we let ourselves lose at the mercy of the Divine, the whole of our being will be a fit medium for divine action, and the Divine himself will transform our life.

Through the fulfilment of these three conditions an individual will actively help the purpose of cosmic evolution and both individual and Nature will be completely divinised.

V

This is, in short, Sri Aurobindo's view of creation. It is necessary to make an assessment of his view and we shall do it within a brief span.

Sri Aurobindo holds that it is the same Supermind which is involved in every lower level. As it concentrates more and more, the new levels are created. Each level has a different name and character which is different from the character of the Supermind. But it may be thought that if each level has a distinct character of its own, then the spirit within that level is also more or less coloured by that level. That means the Spirit no longer remains the same. Life and Mind being two different levels, the spirit of the level of life and the spirit of the level of mind need not be necessarily one, but two. So at each level of creation it is not the self-same supermind that is involved. Every level manifests a different kind of supermind.

But to interpret the Supermind in this way is to lose sight of the basic principle of unity in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy. If every level evidences a different supermind, then a world of plurality, although spiritual, would emerge.

Such a pluralistic spiritual world cannot surely explain the integral character of the creative principle itself.

Moreover, Sri Aurobindo holds that the Supermind arises out of a unitary principle called Sacchidananda and to make plurality possible a single supermind is enough. It is a fact that in each lower level of creation the feeling of unity becomes feeble. To restore this feeling of unity evolution of the supermind is necessary. So the nature of the supramental creation is neither a plurality-less unity, nor a unity-less plurality—it is a unity-in-plurality and a plurality enjoying its unity constantly. Thus through the creation of new levels the character of the Supermind is not lost, it is simply 'forgotten' and this forgetfulness is removed when the Supermind begins an upward journey from the lower level to the higher level. So involution of a single universal consciousness in different levels is not alogical.

VI

One may argue that Sri Aurobindo is highly imaginative, exercising less reason, being influenced more by mysticism. The concept of the supermind has originated out of his imaginative mind. The existence of human mind is a fact, but then a world of plurality, although spiritual, would emerge. The notion of the supermind is a fiction. Moreover, the human mind has a psychological, logical and historical basis, but the supermind is completely unhistorical and non-existent.

Such a criticism, although sharp and caustic, needs a satisfactory reply.

First, it is not true that Sri Aurobindo's view is less rational. He has tried his utmost to place his view before his readers with strong arguments. And to do this he refers to ancient Vedic sources. Sri Aurobindo says that the

ancient seers had a notion of this supermind. In the Vedas the word 'Rta Cit' is found, and this 'Rta Cit' is identical with the Supermind. So the concept of the supermind is not an invention of his imagination.

Secondly, to introduce a mystic element in philosophy is not a crime. Many religious philosophers have done it previously. If any mystic element can be supported by arguments, then it would be rather unwise not to introduce mystical elements in Philosophy.

The supramental creation may carry a mystic element in it. But Sri Aurobindo has not introduced it bluntly. He has pointed out that evolution cannot be a blind mechanical process. The very work of evolution shows an evidence of its conscious progress. So evolution in itself cannot but be spiritual.

Thirdly, evolution took a good deal of time to create man. Philosophers and scientists agree that the appearance of man on earth is a remarkable advance on the part of evolution. But evolution has not stopped—it is still moving ahead. If evolution can lead an ape to man, why should not evolution lead man to superman? What illogicality lies in conceiving of such a thing? While human civilisation is trying to move with high pace, would it not be rather rational to think that better man and better world would come in future?

Lastly, that human mind has a logical and psychological history is a fact. But before man's appearance, surely such a history did not exist. And who could have predicted then that a new creature like man would emerge and create his history? Likewise 'unhistoricity' of the superman will persist so long the supramental world does not appear. But then it would not be very much wise to predict the non-appearance of the supramental world in future.

VII

Indeed in his theory of the supramental creation Sri Aurobindo has brought forth a new spirit of optimism. While everybody is busy with internecine struggle, while frustration and annihilation hover over the human world, it is Sri Aurobindo who with his philosophy has aroused a hope in man of a healthy and godly living. It is through his philosophical argumentation that he says like the ancient sage, "Hear the sons of God, you are *the* God incarnate, realise Him in you and all ; be immortal and cross over the sea of death."

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ANANDA COOMARASWAMY'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

PABITRA KUMAR ROY

The aim of this paper is to give a philosophical account of Ananda Coomaraswamy's views on art and related matters. One of my concerns will be the theoretical nature of the propositions he has sought to establish. The interrelations of these propositions will be examined in terms of some general considerations. Some of the key-notions or concepts involved in the context or implied by Coomaraswamy will be taken note of and formulated.

I

Coomaraswamy's writings on art are of diverse sorts—they comprise theories of art and beauty, criticism of rival notions of art, meta-criticism and appreciations. Some of these are concerned with deeper philosophical issues like theory of meaning, nature of symbolic reference, concept of man or cultural anthropology, and theory of knowledge. He writes with conviction and enormous erudition in the subjects he is talking about. It is a feast of Reason to study Coomaraswamy. His conclusions are nearly always those of a scholar of magnificent talent, of striking and incredible industry. A panoramic mind was his.

Most of his writings produce the enlivening shock of a multi-dimensional metaphor as he leaps from language to language and locus to locus with his identical concepts. Partly for this reason perhaps his notions are seldom worked into their new relations when they arrive at a new context. The

word 'aesthetics', for example, retains for him its original association with sensuousness and does not grow with the discipline. He hardly ever takes into account the eighteenth century thinkers. His theory of passions is naive and unexamined. The notions of 'sensibility' and 'pleasure' have a resisting finity of meaning for him, always pejorative. He seems not to have undergone the labour of thinking through Kant's criticism of aesthetic judgment. He always refers to Kant's notion of disinterested delight or pleasure as pure non-sense. And above all, he often classes together concepts externally alike rather than logically entailed.

Coomaraswamy's theory of art may not inaptly be described as an immediate deduction from his general philosophical outlook. Art for him was a kind of metaphysical statement. Truth is eternal, not progressive or conditioned. Art being the symbolic communication of truth is essentially identical from age to age. The graphic character of art is but a reminder of final things. All these need not be exceptionable in themselves. Since he has to be understood against the climate of "national idealism" of India, many of his views sound like those of an advocate. He was right in deflating the myth of progress, yet one cannot always help feeling that he was evoking an idealised mediæval India such as had never existed. As an historian, in most of his moods he was an irrealist, or his ideology was romantic-archaistic. For much of it, the cultural struggle, together with its ambivalences he lived through, was responsible. Yet after all that may be put to the debit side, the fact remains that Coomaraswamy is one of our modern masters, and our schooling with him has not perhaps been over.

II

The proposed philosophical account of Coomaraswamy's and related matters will be based on the following of his

works : *Essays in National Idealism* (Colombo, 1909) ; *Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought* (Luzac & Co., London, 1946) ; *The Transformation of Nature in Art* ; *Christian and Oriental Philosophy of Art* (both Dover Publications, New York, 1956) and *The Dance of Shiva* (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1948). These will be abbreviated respectively as N.I. ; F.S. ; T.A. ; C.O.P. and D.S.

Is art aesthetic ? No. Coomaraswamy repudiates the assumption that it is essentially aesthetic. He calls it the "collegiate point of view" (F.S., p. 247). In contrast he calls his own view "normal". What does he mean by calling his view of art 'normal' ? Or what should it be to call a view of art 'normal' ?

The term 'normal', as Coomaraswamy uses it, is evaluative, that is, it is descriptive as well as prescriptive. As a descriptive term the term 'normal' should refer to some actual human societies where a particular view of art had been held. As having prescriptive force the term would be expected to point to a view of art that might be adopted in some possible society. The prescriptive meaning of 'normal' is primary, or else the normal view of art would be rendered sociologically archaistic. The set of synonyms for 'normal' are "traditional" and "historical" in the sense of "historic continuity" (N. I., p. 42). The view is thus distinguished from "conventional". A convention is the *manner* of artistic presentation. Coomaraswamy conceives 'tradition' as a language of communication spoken directly without any loss of intelligibility. The normal view is also called "humane", since it is never eccentric or irresponsible. It takes proper care of the audience or consumer. The synonyms of the term 'normal' suggest that the view of art so-called has been historically so. But the evaluative character of this view is brought out clearly in the following passage : this theory, says Coomaraswamy, is "not merely hitherto and elsewhere

universally accepted as basic to the structure of society, but also a correct or upright doctrine of art" (*C.O.P.*, p. 66).

The "normal" view hence cannot be an empirical generalisation, for in that case the view would lose much of its bite, at best it would be an attested historical truth. But from a logically precarious or merely contingent assertion as any empirical generalisation can be, one cannot derive a prescription. This is a point of logic, unless of course the generalisation conceals value terms of general import. If the "normal" view is not a sociological archaism, it should oblige us to accept it. It should have an imperatival force. To ask if the "normal" view had such a force would be to look for its relevance. One cannot perhaps answer the question in a straight-forward manner, since there are many strings attached to the "normal" view. It rests on certain presuppositions, a theory of meaning, of symbolic reference or "linguistic of metaphysic" (*F. S.*, p. 223), a concept of man, and, not the least, a social philosophy. In order to spell out the "normal" view of art many of its grounds or conditions will have to be taken into account.

How does the "normal" view oblige us? It should be worth mentioning that Coomaraswamy's has been a search for authenticity, a meaningful living, spontaneous, homogeneous, traditional. He finds man in estrangement from the Spirit and from perfection, an outsider alienated from tradition. This is frankly a metaphysical opinion. The "normal" view of art is related to the "whole man" (*C.O.P.*, p. 31) and in this sense it is pregnant with the burden of human destiny. The modern man's malady is his aesthetic demoralisation. Suffering as man does from "schizophrenia" (*F. S.*, p. 249) a "re-formation" (*F. S.*, p. 113) becomes imperatival. Coomaraswamy's philosophical anthropology is not merely descriptive, it is also revisionary. As it is, the human situation is hardly in a desirable state of affairs and this implies

that a transcendence should be possible. Whatever takes us across is a valuable vehicle. Art is one such. A drastic transvaluation of our fashionable values is then called for.

What is the nature of the "whole man" art is said to relate to? Coomaraswamy appears to take the distinction between 'the sentimental self' and 'the intellectual self' for granted. May be he is looking back to Plato, or even to the Vedanta equation of *adhyātma* with 'human'. Kant's celebrated duality of the rational and the pathological selves also could have been availed of by Coomaraswamy. His concept of man is two-tier. Kierkegaard's notions of the moral and aesthetic man would not have been too distant from his. He states the nature and function of the two selves in the following manner. "The soulful or sentimental self enjoys itself in the aesthetic surfaces of natural and artificial things, to which it is akin; the intellectual or spiritual self enjoys their order and is nourished by what in them is akin to it. The Spirit is much rather fastidious than a sensitive entity". (F. S., p. 13). The "whole man", which comprehends the two selves, then "does not merely feel but also understands" (F. S., p. 182). The two selves are "simultaneous", our aesthetic and cognitive experiences are only distinguishable in logic. In respect of the simultaneity of sensitive and intellectual selves of man Coomaraswamy is not always univocal. In some moods he appears to disallow the term 'human' to be applied to the sensitive self; "sensation is an animal property, and knowledge distinctly human" (C. O. P., p. 74). It is one thing to say that the two selves are not of equal representative worth. The intellectual self represents our humanity more than the sensitive self does. Such a position as this will of course have its own difficulties, even though it has long been in vogue. But it is quite another thing to say that the sensitive self is *not* human. If the two selves make the "whole" man, each of them is entitled to

being called 'man'. 'If of the two selves, the intellectual alone is "distinctly human", the "whole man" would suffer from atrophy. In another passage the sensitive self or a life of sentiments or emotions is reckoned as "subhuman". Only a life active in contemplating forms is human. To identify man with his sentimental self is to commit "pathetic fallacy" (C. O. P., p. 16). If it be a fallacy of metaphor only, then it should perhaps be harmless. But it could be a fallacy of logic as well. In that case to identify man with his intellectual self would be disquieting indeed. In either case, there would be an over-simplification. The "whole man" is not integral man. Coomaraswamy seems indecisive in point of descriptive and evaluative import of his expression, and this should be philosophically disturbing. His talk of "whole man" at the first instance looks like a definist thesis. Is 'man' an exact concept like those of mathematics, or an inexact one as any empirical notion is? Overlooking the nature of the concept, let us suppose that 'man' is definable. Since a definition determines the nature of term or notion defined, one will have to admit that 'man' is identical with 'intellectual self', which in turn is determined by its active contemplation of forms. Coomaraswamy would accept this position, since he has put it categorically that the intellectual operation involved in contemplating forms is free. One is free when one is contemplative. "The man is passive only when he identifies himself with the psychological ego.....in act he directs it" (C. O. P., pp. 36-7). This is rationalist's statement, reminiscent not only of Leibniz and Kant, but also of Plato's image of the charioteer and the wild horses. The rational alone is free, and hence the sentimental self, the psychological ego or the sense of individuality is determinable by the intellectual or the "supra-individual" self. However familiar these notions may be, they are highly troublesome philosophically. Specific mention should be made of varied problem of freedom and

determinism implied by Coomaraswamy's assertions. Again, historically he appears to have been an angel unaware of a dilemmatic thesis. The rationalistic or the platonic and the Vedanta notions of self are not congruent. Their implications and presuppositions are various. Samkara's distinction between the real and the apparent man hardly corresponds to Coomaraswamy's approvingly adapted notions of the intellectual and the sentimental selves.

He deplores that "we have forgotten what *we are*" (C.O.P., p. 30, italics not in the text.). "The whole man", he says, "is naturally a metaphysician" (C.O.P., p. 30). The adverb 'naturally' reads like a near synonym of 'essentially'. Does he mean 'what we ideally are' i.e., 'what we ought to be like'? The Mimāṃsaka would say that such statements are merely honorific or *arthavāda*; they do not commit us to a specific ontology. Now, if Coomaraswamy is stating something about man's nature, or what man is in essence, he would be taken to make descriptive (ontological) claims. This would entail greater philosophical responsibilities. If, on the contrary, his statements about the "whole man" are *arthavāda*, they would then be regulative ideas presupposed in order to explain human actions in the domain of man's value-experiences. This is a piece of Kantian wisdom.

The difficulties with regard to the philosophical niceties of Coomaraswamy's concept of man have their source mainly in the historical anchorages of his thought. These may be overlooked without affecting the viability of his philosophical anthropology. His concept of man is neither eccentric nor fashionable. Its chief merit lies in restoring us to human dignity and the intellectual fraternity of *philosophia perennis*.

I should like to make a point of methodological interests: A concept of man functions as a regulative notion, that is, no account of man's value experiences can be given without

presupposing what does one understand by 'man'. Art is one such human phenomenon, and in that domain the statement that one has the sort of art what one has *become* is as much true as the statement that one has the sort of art what one is. In each case one's having the sort of art depends on one's self-identity, cultural or philosophical. If this be granted, then the difference between "normal" or traditional art and the art of the post-Renaissance period is what it should be. The post-Renaissance concept of man had become different from the one presupposed by the "normal" view of art. Ours again is a concept of man grown under a different sky. The change in what the Renaissance people understood by 'man' implied a change in their view of art. In this they were no less consistent than the artist in the traditional society. Coomaraswamy makes this logical point an object of moral critique. I am not minimizing the value of Coomaraswamy's criticism of "burgeoisic fantasy". What appears incredible is his view that the development of philosophy since Descartes and Locke has been on a wrong track. Must there be as many heresies as there are truths? This is what seems to be suggested by Coomaraswamy's Platonist-Scholastic orthodoxy.

III

His concept of man is frankly metaphysical. Metaphysics, as Coomaraswamy would like to have it, implies an ontology of the supersensuous. A view of art that presupposes a metaphysical notion of man would be committed to repudiating such views as art is a matter of taste or aesthetic experience. *Aisthesis* is sensation. That art is aesthetic is then Coomaraswamy's *purva pakṣa*. He calls such views "materialistic" (C. O. P., p. 46) not only by implication of the term 'aesthetic', but also in a pejorative sense. Contrarily, the "normal" view of art is "intellectual".

(C. O. P., p. 12), and hence he proposes to discard the term *aesthetic* altogether. The chief reason for such a proposal is based on a consideration of the Greek original meaning of the term. 'Aisthesis' in Greek includes sensations, reactions of organisms (human and subhuman) to external stimuli, our passions and emotions. Passional experiences are passive. Aesthetics thus reduces the phenomena of art to psychology or taste. To call art aesthetics is a pathetic fallacy, rendering an intellectual affair "sentimental" (C. O. P., p. 25). According to the aesthetic view of art to appreciate art is to enjoy ourselves, "our comfortable feelings" (C.O.P., p. 27). And to do that is to leave the *raisons d'être* of art unexplained. "The student [of art] understands the logic of composition; the illiterate only its aesthetic value" (C.O.P., p. 41). Rather than being a matter of feeling, art is an intellectual virtue. If art were a matter of our likes and dislikes, i.e., if it were an emotive phenomena, one could also love ugly forms or deformities. The argument is neat and cogent. But is it decisive? Can it explain the grotesque in art?

Plato returns with Coomaraswamy's theory of art. What was more a matter of logic with Plato—his theory of Forms—becomes a matter of mystical gnosis with Coomaraswamy. One might feel that he has exploited the mystical possibilities of such of his mentors as Plotinus, St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine to such an extent as of obliterating subtle distinctions in their thinking.

However, I shall first state what Coomaraswamy has to say about the nature and function of art. Let me begin with his theory of art, i.e., his views on how 'art' should be defined. Or in other words what does he mean by 'art'? 'Art' he says, "is a kind of knowledge by which we know *how* to do our work"; it is "a means of communication by signs and symbols" (F. S., p. 250). Further, we are told that art is a metaphysical rite.....No distinction can be drawn between

art and contemplation" (F. S., pp. 177-8). Finally, art is "the embodiment in material of a preconceived form" (C. O. P., p. 69); it is "the knowledge of how things ought to be made" (F. S., p. 23). Art is mimetic iconography.

To consider the thesis that art is a kind of knowledge. Cognition of art is constituted by two factors: contemplation and mimesis of archetypes. Art is a conscious transformation of a material by impressing on it a form, which is the intellectual component of art. The form is an archetype conceived in intellect. It is imitable, and the act of transforming a sensuous material by impressing on it the intellectually conceived form is mimetic. It is possible to ask whether art has for its domain the *imitable* forms or forms as such? Are forms in general imitable? Obviously the archetypes of art are not the only archetypes. There is a vagueness in Coomaraswamy's saying that in art we imitate an imitable form. Or else it is a tautology.

Let us bring in another near synonymous term 'intelligible'. The intelligible form, he says, is the model, which the artist imitates. Mimesis is bringing into being an *image* of the model. Art thus is a matter of *imagination*. Whatever gives effectiveness to truth is rhetoric. Art is rhetoric, since a work of art is made to be effective. Art as aesthetic is false rhetoric or sophistry, i.e., intended for *effect*. This is a linguistic conception of art; and its implication will be perceptible in a while.

Art is adequate representation or symbolism of an intelligible model. Rhetoric is a general term for the act of *informing* any given material in such a manner that the archetype, the intelligible form, the model or truth (all of these are used interchangeably) is correctly represented. We get two sorts of things, 'works of art' and 'truth of art'. A work of art, for Coomaraswamy, is not an art-object which may be valuable for its own sake. Moreover, from the point

of view of art as adequate symbolism, an art-object would be regarded as referentially opaque, to be looked *at*. But Coomaraswamy would have us look *through* a work of art, it should be a reminder of the truth of art. In his remarkable phrase, art is a "figure of thought".

All art is applied art ; a work of art is made to be effective, and not meant for effect. A work of art is for use, for life. Art is for life's sake—this is a key-idea of Coomaraswamy's "normal" view of art. One can talk of 'fine art' only if one holds that art is aesthetic. Art is craft, a work of art is an *artefact*. This may be regarded as a general implication of Coomaraswamy's notion of art as mimesis and rhetoric. There are two elements in a work of art, meaning and utility; one can fairly ask, how are they related? He says, "Function and meaning cannot be forced apart.....Meaning is even historically prior to utilitarian application" (C.O.P., p. 40). This is Platonism pure and simple. But how and in what sense meaning can be 'historically' prior? It should rather have been *logically* prior to use. Something can be said to stand in an historical relation to another thing only if it is a natural, i.e., temporal (*a la* G. E. Moore) entity. Meanings or forms, since they are intellectual conceptions, cannot be natural entities, and hence cannot stand in an 'historical' relation to a natural entity or property like utility. Coomaraswamy's own admission will illustrate the validity of this criticism. He says, "Forms such as that of the dome, arch and circle have not been "evolved", but only applied : the circle can no more have been suggested by the wheel than a myth by a mimetic rite" (C.O.P., p. 40). How, one can pertinently ask, that which is a non-evolutionary entity be "historically" prior to an evolutionary one? Coomaraswamy's apriorism would reject any such suggestions as that there may be a *history* of architecture or calligraphy or sculpture.

Yet what he says about the relation of art to life is worth reminding an alienated generation. Art, if it be "abstracted from the general activity of making things for human use, material or spiritual" (C.O.P., p. 62) would become either sentimental or cynical. "In an integrated society everyone possesses art of some sort, whether of painting, sculpture, blacksmithing, weaving, cooking or agriculture" (C.O.P., p. 68). In that state of affairs, every maker is responsible, and business for profit-making does not take precedence of life.

What is the logical status of a work of art? It is adequate symbolism, and hence the question of truth or falsity. The symbols of art are traditional and not personal, or icons of private feelings. "Adequacy" and "inadequacy" of symbols, are to Coomaraswamy, cognates of their 'truth' and 'falsity'. That is to say, works of art have normative constraints in the truths of art. A symbol is judged adequate or inadequate with reference to its referent, which it symbolizes. A meaningful symbol is neither conventional nor arbitrary. According to such a view as this, there cannot be 'art-forms' properly so-called. Symbols of art are inevitable, since no other can replace them. A symbol of art, in being a likeness of the truth of art is typical; it is iconic. Symbols of art are projections of their intended referents.

Coomaraswamy's notion of symbolism is linguistic. He says that symbolism is "a language and a precise form of thought; a hieratic and a metaphysical language and not a language determined by somatic or psychological categories. Its function is in the analogical correspondence of all orders of reality and states of being or levels of reference" (F.S., p. 187). At the farthest remove from Wittgenstein (*Tractatus*, "A picture is a model of reality" 2.12. Also 2.1511 and 2.1512. See Ganguly, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Visva-Bharati, 1968, p. 2), Coomaraswamy says that "all words

are by first intention signs or symbols of specific referents... while words are signs of things, they can also be heard or read as symbols of what these things themselves imply" (F. S., p. 114). Works of art or symbols of art are intended as means of communicating supersensuous truths or forms. "The form is in the work of art as its 'content'; but we shall miss it if we consider only the aesthetic surfaces and our own sensitive reactions to them" (F. S., p. 138). Aesthetic surfaces are not terminal values in art. To see the elegance of works of art is one thing, to use it according to the intention of its having made at all is another. The former case makes a "fetish" of a work of art. Fetishism, Coomaraswamy explains, is "an attribution to the physical tangible symbol of values that really belong to its reference; ...a confusion of actual with essential form.....The modern aesthetic approach makes fetishes of traditional works of art precisely in this sense" (F.S., p. 171). Does he absolve our appreciation of modern works of art from the change of fetishism? He should.

On the part of the artist, art is a kind of knowledge how things ought to be made, efficiently embodying, rather symbolizing by an object of sense a form conceived in intellect. Works of art thus made are used for an "intellectual operation" by the spectator. This operation consists in identifying the referent symbolized. In this sense the symbols of art are *quasidescriptive*. Their meaning lies adequate symbolism, and it is on this account the spectator comes to know what the symbol is about. Perspicacity then is a value of works of art *qua* symbols.

The question of intelligibility is thus indispensable. A work of art should be defensible in terms of intellectual reasons, not in terms of *aesthetic* reasons. The nature of symbolism, for Coomaraswamy, is analogical. What does it mean? We cannot say that between a work of art and

its referent there is a structural identity. It can of course be an analyzed awareness (or feeling ?) of vague resemblance between the two. I say 'vague' in the sense of non-isomorphic. A work of art is not a logical picture or map of its referent. In Aristotelean terms, Coomaraswamy says, the intelligible form is a *formal* cause of works of art. As an *informed* entity a work of art is the *final* cause of the entire creative process. The spectator beholds the formal cause exhibited analogically, in the final. He sees "the Buddha as the image rather than an image of the Buddha" (F.S., p. 168). He sees as the artist was required to have seen. Both of them share the experience of the same creative vision. 'Same' is a strong word, but Coomaraswamy would require it. In saying all these he is presupposing a society different from our own, with shared goals and intentions within a common way of life. 'Art' is another name for life.

IV

The question of meaning and value in art is related with the question of intention in art. In assessing or evaluating a work of art both the meaning *and* the result are taken into consideration. Usually evaluation consists in considering what the work of art ought to be rather than what it is intended to be. According to Coomaraswamy the principle of criticism should consider "the ratio of intention to result" (F.S., p. 125). He distinguishes criticism of work of art from criticism of intention. The latter is moral, and the business of the critic *qua* art critic is "to decide whether or not the artist has made a good job of the work he undertook to do" (F.S., p. 126). If the critic, on the other hand, goes "behind" a work of art and says what the work should have been, he is making a prudential judgment. Only if the intention were morally objectionable such judgments would

be appropriate. In a successful work of art, Coomaraswamy says, form and content (here the words are used in their ordinary sense) become inseparable, that is, the work of art is internally consistent. One cannot say whether a given work of art is well done or not unless one knows what was to be done. Coomaraswamy takes it for granted that evidences for what the artist wanted to do are available. To an extent this is certainly true, and such evidences are presupposed in objective criticism. A preoccupation with effect or aesthetic surfaces would render criticism subjective, a matter of taste. The ideal critic is a *rasika*, i.e., one who knows and is interested in the values the artist cherishes. The *rasika* would be able to see the artist's point of view. Not all but the *rasika* would be qualified to say what the artist ought to have meant.

The word 'intention' is often employed in various senses. It may mean 'ends' or 'goals' ; also what the artist has got to say or do. The two senses are not identical. Answers to questions about the former are not answers to questions about the latter. Sometimes the word used to mean attitudes that cause the artist select his themes. Hume thought that one of the sources of our appreciation of works of art is our awareness of the fitness of the work to the end for which it is produced. This is what is meant by the *functional* beauty of a work of art. Croce's case is one of cognitive intentionalism. There are others like Clive Bell, who totally repudiate intention by saying that in order to appreciate a work of art one does not bring anything from Life, any knowledge of its ideas (Mallarmé's dictum about poetry may be recalled, or even Paul Valéry's emphasis on uselessness of art). Coomaraswamy would have a short way with such thinkers, and a longer way with Rabindranath (in most of his moods), Croce and Maritan, since all of them believe, in some or other sense, that art is knowledge. But Coomaraswamy would not

identify, as Croce does, art with the activity of making it. He should, I believe, stand closer to Hume.

There is a conceptual basis of the relation between art and intention. Works of art are intentionally made artefacts. *Qua* man-made they are intentionally made. The point is trivial, though important. Works of art are functional goal-oriented objects, hence the intentional aspect is more than merely arbitrary ; it explains the rationale of art. Intention is embedded theoretically in the very concept of art. This Coomaraswamy would not deny. He would say that intention should be considered in point of the fitness or adequacy of the symbols of art, or with respect to the artist's ulterior concerns. In saying this he is with the Marxists also. But what he in fact disallows is the use of the word 'ought' in judging works of art *qua* works of art. Is it not a disguised Kantianism ?

Coomaraswamy has argued that different kinds of art do not require different principles of criticism. There can be a common critical method applicable to works of art of different kinds. This can be said only on the basis of a unified theory of art. He believes that "all art has a fundamental unity" (*N.I.*, p. 193) or, "the true philosophy of art is always and everywhere the same" (*F.S.*, p. 29). A unified theory of art proceeds by asking a general question like 'what is art ?' To ask such questions as this is to expect to find out and state the defining properties of art. Or, in other words, what the different works of art, say, the Parthenon and the *Ramayana*, a Bengali folksong and a poem by Rilke, have in common ? Coomaraswamy thinks that questions like this can be asked and answers are possible to be given. But those who think that there is no such basic phenomenon as art would contend that Coomaraswamy is committing the essentialist fallacy. The serious do not always talk of fallacies. Often such disputes are parochial and based on frail and

fashionable philosophical usages. Those, who really care for asking 'what is art?', do in point of fact make general statements about the nature of art. All of them need not necessarily be Platonists. Definitions of 'art' in terms of "significant form", "expression", "intuition", etc. illustrate the case.

What is important in Coomaraswamy's context is his concern with art in its basic, undifferentiated form or its fundamental nature. He can justifiably hold that for the purposes of evaluation a general principle would be available if critical judgments on different kinds of works of art are to be made. What would be further required are different kinds of knowledge in each case. An argument with two such premises would be formally valid by *modus ponens*.

V

Beauty, says Coomaraswamy depends not on taste but on judgment. It is a cognitive property of works of art. "What ever is well and truly made, will be beautiful in kind because of its perfection" (C.O.P., p. 76). It functions like a grading word. He writes "the well-built ship will be beautiful, but it is not for the sake of making something beautiful that the shipbuilder goes to work" (C.O.P., p. 69). Beauty is not a goal of art, it is an "inevitable accident". When used in judgments the word 'beautiful' stands as the name of a supervenient property. 'Beauty' is the philosophers' word, it is not there in the vocabulary of the artists.

But there is something polyguous about Coomaraswamy's notion of beauty. He says that beauty can be discovered anywhere, in natural objects and artefacts alike. This sense of 'beauty' is different from the sense it has as a functional term. Does he equivocate the term? With respect to 'beauty' he says two different things. One is the formalist

view, that beauty is identical with ideal form ; "Beauty...is always "ideal" in the proper sense of the word" (F.S., p. 68). The other is the view expressed as follows : "it is a matter of fact that a well-made icon will be beautiful, in other words that it will please when seen by those for whose use it was made" (F.S., p. 69). Neither does the example of ship above nor that of icon show that beauty is ideal.

There is a third account of 'beauty' in Coomaraswamy. "In point of fact, the conception of beauty and the adjective "beautiful" belong exclusively to aesthetic and should only be used in aesthetic judgment. We seldom make any such judgments when we speak of natural objects as beautiful ; we generally mean that such objects as we call beautiful are congenial to us, practically or ethically" (D.S., p. 63). This is a Kantian position. Coomaraswamy uses the phrase 'complete judgment' (F.S., p. 20) to mean a comprehensive judgment by art *and* value. A judgment by art merely says that such-and-such object is a true work of art, i.e., an adequate symbol of its archetype. A judgment by value states whether or not a work of art has a value for us, i.e., whether the model is well chosen and so made as to serve our immediate need. As regards values his opinion is that it is neither advantageous, nor possible to separate spiritual and physical values in such a manner as to make some things sacred and others profane. But that is another story.

What matters most in the present context is his retaining, in spite of his notion of complete judgment, if not the primacy, at least the uniqueness of 'aesthetic' judgments. He says that to regard "the useful, the stimulating and the moral elements in works of art as the essential" (D.S., p. 64) is to indulge in "sentimentality",

Essentialism recurs again. What is the sole property which the most dissimilar works of art possess in common ? In answer to this question Coomaraswamy recalls "the

history of a work of art." There is in the beginning an aesthetic intuition ; its internal expression ; then its communicative externalization by technical activity, followed finally by an approximate arousal of the primitive intuition in the spectator or critic. For Croce the first two moments would have been identical, the third, extra aesthetic. Anyway, do these four moments of creative history *define* a work of art ? Do they constitute sufficient and necessary conditions for an object's being a work of art ? These may be necessary though not sufficient. But Coomaraswamy is not advocating a definist thesis either. He says it explicitly that beauty is not a natural property, it cannot be said to exist anywhere. Rather it is a matter to be discovered. Does he mean *esse est percipi* ?

Beauty can be talked about from two levels, one of judgments, the other of vision. Coomaraswamy's meta-aesthetics or even meta-criticism is confined to the judgmental level. More important is the vision of beauty, which, he says, is "a state of grace". How can one achieve this state ? It being spontaneous no deliberate effort can bring it about. All that one can do is removing hindrances to its manifestations. The state of beauty is contra-causal. The Vedanta metaphor is that of brushing the surface of an unclean mirror. Once the hindrances are removed, it might be possible that the state of grace would dawn on the artist. This is Coomaraswamy's Vedanta.

Aesthetic judgments are elliptical expressions. Works of art have *significant* form (not in Clive Bell's sense of the phrase) in two ways. It reminds the spectator of the artist's vision of beauty, and thereby awakens in him aesthetic emotion. A work of art being adequate symbolism the distinction between the beauty reminded and the reminder is maintained. Correspondingly there would be a difference between experience and opinion in art :

✓ "experience can only be bought by experience ; opinions must be earned" (D.S., p. 68). Criticism can either be based on experience or on opinion. In the latter case aesthetic judgments are used, so to say, within inverted commas, that is, taking on authority that such-and-such work of art is beautiful. In the case of criticism based on experience we have an altogether different thing, namely, creative criticism.

~ Coomaraswamy has raised the important point concerning the ways in which unsuccessful works of art are "tolerated". There can be "uncritical" tolerance on grounds of charm or prettiness. It is well-known that there are easy beauties. In cases of "creative" tolerance the correspondence of form and content is completed by force of imagination, that is, recreating the original experience from "mere suggestion". This may be granted. But do we creatively tolerate the great Buddha of Mathura (with its nose chopped off and a hand broken) or the Venus de Milo? None of these is "imperfect" works of art. Should we not say that we can also creatively tolerate successful though mutilated works of art. This would be a third possible case of tolerating works of art besides the two mentioned by Coomaraswamy. In these cases creative tolerance is another name of appreciation, and we can do that because a perfection permeates the fragments. Suggestions in those works of art are hardly "mere", rather enough.

" The office of the creative critic is a high one. It is for him to reproduce the original vision that moved the artist. He discovers it anew both for himself and for us also. Above all, his business is to reveal beauty "where we should have otherwise overlooked it, or more clearly than we have yet received" (D.S., p. 69). Creative art also functions in a similar manner. In Rabindranath Tagore's phrase, by art the "invisible screen of the commonplace" is removed from the face of things, and thereby "their ultimate significance"

is intensified (*The Religion of Man*, London, 1953 p. 94. Recall what Wordsworth felt seeing a picture of Peele Castle, painted by George Beaumont: "The light that never was, on sea or land"). Art is a liberating force, if it is creative. A few instances of creative criticism in Coomaraswamy's sense may be cited: Rabindrnath's essay on *Meghaduta*; Coomaraswamy's own 'The Dance of Shiva'; Sri Aurobindo's passage on The Mother and Child fresco from Ajanta; Pater's study of Botticelli's *The Birth of Venus*. The critic, no less than the artist, is "challenged to reveal the beauty of all experiences, new and old" (D.S., p. 69). Art so conceived is imaginative realism.

By rediscovering beauty, as by discovering also, we "momentarily recover the unity of our being released from individuality" (D.S., p. 69). This is one of the spiritual implications of Coomaraswamy's "discovery"-view of art. It is an open avowal of Vedanta. To be freed from individuality is to be released from mental and emotional confusions that bedevil the vision of beauty. To say that art-experience provides an escape from the tutelage of our pathological self is to maintain an instrumental valuation of art. This is Vedanta. It is Kant also, and even more Schopenhauer. For Coomaraswamy art is finally a hieratic aesthetic script of man's spiritual and contemplative experience.

The central feature of the Vedanta view of art, which we find Coomaraswamy embrace, is *disinterestedness* of art-experience. In most of his moods one can see him a little harsh or impatient with the notion of disinterested delight. With Kant the notion is theoretical, designed to distinguish our experience of the beautiful from both hedonism (the satisfaction in the pleasant) and our apprehension of the relation of reason to an act, actual or possible, of will. In either case the satisfaction is *interested*. But the satisfaction

which occasions such judgements as 'This is beautiful' is *disinterested*, since we use no conception of the thing's nature. The judgements are 'reflective', not 'determinant'. A suggestion of *meaninglessness* is somehow interwoven with Kant's analysis, and this would be exceptionable for Coomaraswamy. He would not say works of art can be viewed without using any conception of their nature. It would not be enough for him, as it is with Kant, to say that in calling a work of art beautiful we simply assert that it *seems* designed. The phenomenalist ring in Kant belies the phrase 'work of art'. A work of art is designed.

There is another point of greater significance. Disinterestedness is the *sine qua non* of any work of art for Kant. But with Coomaraswamy it should be the mark of our encounter with an "intellectual" work of art only. Such a work of art is "perfect" and therefore is a "convincing statement of truth" (F.S., p. 205). Our encounter with such works of art transports us from aesthetic delight to understanding. "In the deepest experience that can be induced by a work of art...our very being is shaken...to its roots", says Coomaraswamy. In no other sense he would allow the notion of disinterested delight in our art-talk. In a sense disinterested feeling is no feeling at all. It is another name for knowledge as Schopenhauer has remarked. Rabindranath has put the matter in a memorable sentence: "Beauty is no phantasy, it has the everlasting meaning of Reality" (*Creative Unity*, Macmillan, 1959, p. 15). Coomaraswamy would have much to agree with it. In his own words, "Nothing unintelligible could have been thought of as beautiful" (COP, p. 112).

VI

I should like to put on record what I owe to Ananda Coomaraswamy. This is my centennial homage to him.

It was he who had drawn my attention to the supreme beauty of *Nataraja*. I wonder if Rabindranath had something to do with 'The Dance of Shiva' when he composed his song *nrtyêr talê talê* (নৃত্যের তালে তালে). Who else could have opened my eyes to the strange lovely *Prajñāpāramitā* from Java? Or the tender beauty of Rajput painting? The majesty and grandeur of the Buddha at Anuradhapura? Jawaharlal Nehru has celebrated this sculpture in a noble passage (See his *The Discovery of India*, Meridan Books, London, 1960, p. 204). Did he know his Coomaraswamy? I owe to him many serene moments filled with Peace. I treasure them.

KANT AS A PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE

MOTI BIR RAI

I

In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant raised the question : Is Metaphysic at all possible ?¹ By 'metaphysic(s)' Kant understood a body of knowledge which is non-empirical (*a priori*). This knowledge is believed to be knowledge of supernatural objects or things (e.g., God, immortality and freedom). According to Kant, there is no book on metaphysic as there is on Euclid's geometry. Thus by metaphysics Kant understood a supposed science of the supernatural. Leibniz and others were the metaphysicians who tried to acquire true propositions (as equivalent to knowledge) about God, universe, soul etc. But the metaphysicians were always quarrelling among themselves and the problem remained : Who is right and who is not ? Since the metaphysicians used abstract arguments to prove their theories it was quite obvious that metaphysical judgments were *a priori*. Whether metaphysical judgments are really knowledge or not could be ascertained by comparing them with other forms of *a priori* judgment. In mathematics and physics we have *a priori* judgments. Accordingly, Kant instituted an epistemological inquiry into the sources, conditions, scope, limits etc. of mathematical and physical judgments. Hence, *the Critique of Pure Reason* is essentially Kant's reflections on mathematics and physics. In other words, the *Critique* embodies Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Science (especially, Physics). Kant's inquiry shows that metaphysics as a science is impossible because it lacks 'empirical intuition'. Our knowledge involves sensation, space and time as well as categories. But

the supposed metaphysical objects cannot be spatio-temporal and hence experience (or empirical knowledge) of something non-empirical (i.e. metaphysical) is a contradiction in terms. This means that metaphysics as a body of knowledge is impossible.

II

For Kant mathematics, physics and metaphysics are three different bodies of *a priori* judgments. Mathematical judgments (and concepts) are not by themselves knowledge (See B 147, 148) of things^a. They can be regarded as knowledge only on the assumption that there are things corresponding to these judgments. Physical judgments which are *a priori* are the principles of empirical physics. The problem for Kant is: How are these *a priori* judgments possible? Kant's answer is: They are our fundamental forms of thinking (of an object). The next problem is: How are these *a priori* judgments valid for (or applicable to) things (which are other than the subjects, i.e.us)? Kant's solution is: These things are objects (to subjects) and hence they are subject to our modes or forms of thinking. Thus the physical judgments which constitute the *a priori* foundations of empirical physics are subjective (in the sense of epistemic as opposed to ontic), yet they are valid for objects of sense because these are the fundamental forms of objective thinking of the subjects. Pure physics (i.e., the body of *a priori* physical judgments) is possible, because it involves thinking and this thinking is done by our understanding through the concepts which are necessary for *a priori* judgments of physics. This means pure physics or pure science of Nature is possible because we have the thinking faculty called the understanding which thinks objects in its own way, namely, by subsuming them under categories (pure concepts) which

give rise to *a priori* principles of physics. Moreover, these categories also constitute the *a priori* foundations of empirical knowledge which are presupposed by scientific (physical) knowledge. In fact, the categories are applicable to physics only because physics is dependent on empirical knowledge. This fact becomes obvious when we remember that physical thinking is one type of objective thinking (thinking of an object) and categories are the fundamental concepts of objective thinking and hence the categories necessarily enter into physical thinking. Categories, in fact, are our fundamental vehicles of thought which make social life and its products possible. Physics is a product of social life. Ultimately Kant's problem as to how the *a priori* judgments of physics are valid for things resolves itself into how empirical knowledge is possible. And the answer is: On the occasion of sense-impressions (or sensations) being received the understanding subjects these sense-impressions to its categories, i.e., thinks them through categories. Philosophy of physics is, therefore, intimately connected with the Philosophy of empirical knowledge.

Kant has set forth his Philosophy of Physics in the Transcendental Analytic and in the Prolegomena. The *Prolegomena* was written with a view to helping his readers who found the first edition of the *Critique* too difficult, and were led to misunderstanding. When the second edition of the *Critique* was published many changes were introduced. The changes were only changes in the mode of exposition; they are not changes of the doctrines themselves. As Kant himself has written in the two Prefaces and in the Introduction, the *Critique* is a philosophical work (epistemological) on the possibility and objective validity of mathematics, physics and metaphysics. This means that the *Critique* consists of Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Physics and Philosophy of Metaphysics (or rather Philosophical Resolutions of Metaphysical Illusions, since Kant shows that

there is no Metaphysics worth the name). Moreover, Kant considers mathematics as a body of *a priori* judgments and similarly, Physics as another kind of body of *a priori* judgments. Metaphysics turns out to be a body of pseudo-knowledge. In any case, these three disciplines are considered as different forms of knowledge. Hence the *Critique* is Kant's reflections on mathematics, physics and metaphysics as different kinds of knowledge (or pseudo-knowledge). All these three Kant calls rational knowledge and they presuppose knowledge which is empirical. Physical thinking as thinking is, in fact, identical with empirical thinking; both are conducted by means of the categories. Moreover, they have the same kind of object to deal with, namely, empirical objects. Thus by proving the possibility and objective validity of *a priori* aspect of empirical knowledge Kant proves the possibility and objective validity of the *a priori* aspect of empirical physics.

III

If we are to understand Kant as a philosopher of science (physics), we have to understand the Transcendental Analytic. Corresponding to the twelve forms of judgments there are twelve categories. The forms of judgments are analytical (because logical), but the categories (as applied to objects) corresponding to these forms of judgments are synthetic. As representations of things, the latter are material whereas the difference between different kinds of judgments is merely formal. Thus judgments express our thought and knowledge, but categories represent or symbolise the objects. Corresponding to 'all' we have 'unity' (the measure); corresponding to 'some' we have 'plurality' and corresponding to some 'individual' we have 'totality' (i.e., totality of manifold representations). Similarly, corresponding to subject-predicate form there is the category of substance-accident

and corresponding to hypothetical form there is the category of cause-effect. Categories become the real representations of objects (or things) only when they are accompanied by intuitions and as applied to intuitions they are synthetic and material.³

The fact that we use the categories like substance-accident, etc. in our daily life as well as in the sciences is too obvious to need any argument. Yet how this use or application of categories is valid is a question to be answered. Kant gives his answer in the Transcendental Deduction. The categories are pure concepts of the understanding; they are, therefore, of subjective (as opposed to objective, and consequently, of empirical) origin. But how is it possible for us to apply them to objects of experience (or perception)? That it must be possible is shown by the fact that already we have empirical and rational knowledge (e.g., mathematics and physics, etc). The problem is one of uniting harmoniously two heterogeneous elements, namely, sensibility and understanding. The former gives us intuitions (immediate representations of objects), while the latter has to think these objects by means of its categories which are *a priori*. But what is the justification for thinking these objects (which are empirical) in terms of categories which are *a priori*? Kant's answer may be regarded as represented by the following passage from the Transcendental Deduction⁴ :

"First of all, I may draw attention to the fact that by synthesis of apprehension I understand that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance), is possible.

In the representation of space and time we have *a priori* forms of outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis

take place at all. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold (of their own), and therefore are represented with determination of the unity of this manifold. Thus unity of the synthesis of the manifold, without or within us, and consequently also a combination to which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or in time must conform, is given *a priori* as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension—not indeed in, but with these intuitions. This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in accordance with the categories, in so far as the combination is applied to our sensible intuition. All synthesis, therefore, even that which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are therefore valid *a priori* for all objects of experience.”⁸

If we agree with Kant, we say, then, that the justification for applying categories to empirical objects consists in the fact that without applying the categories there cannot be empirical knowledge. (We must remember the fact that Kant never questions the certainty and validity of empirical knowledge. Philosophical reflection presupposes the validity and certainty of empirical knowledge. This is a point which many philosophers forget). Now Kant faces another question: How to apply these categories to perceptions (or objects of perceptions)? When the categories are actually applied to empirical objects they are synthetic and material (i.e. representatives of objects given in empirical intuition). But if divorced from objects or considered in abstraction from objects, they are nothing but analytical and formal concepts. In Kant's language, objects are sensuous but categories are intellectual. According to Kant these categories must be

given sensuous content and this means that they should be made temporal concepts. Thus substance should be regarded as co-extensive with time, *i.e.* permanent. In other words, the categories are to be schematized and the objects of experience are to be subsumed under the schematized categories.

Finally, Kant shows that the categories are applicable to objects of perception, because corresponding to the categories there are principles (fundamental rules) of understanding. Quantitative category can be applied to objects because of the principle : All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

Similarly, the qualitative category becomes applicable because we have the principle : In all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.

In the same way, we have principles concerning the three analogies of experience (substance, cause, agent and patient). Finally, we have three principles dealing with the postulates of empirical thought.

IV

The foregoing is perhaps a not too bad summary of Kant's argument in the *Analytic*. But if we are to understand Kant properly and do him justice, we must enter into the details and then compare his doctrines with that of other philosophers of science. Since science without space and time is not possible, Kant's views on space and time must be understood and compared with those of others. If we are to understand Kant's theory of space and time, we must enter into the *Aesthetic* and *Dialectic*. Even today there is a wide divergence of views about "the object" as substance (*i.e.* as permanent) and philosophers sometimes have self-contradictory

notion about it (e.g., Russell's concept 'quasi-permanents'). In spite of Russell and other critics, science still agrees with Kant in holding that matter is a substance :

Our two concepts of substance are, then, *matter* and *energy*. Both obey conservation laws : An isolated system cannot change either in mass or in total energy.⁶

Kant's treatment of causality is also very important, and it tries to do justice to all aspects of our experience. That this treatment is the right one has been realised by one of the greatest physicists of all times, namely, Albert Einstein. He pays tribute to Kant in the following words :

It seems to me, moreover, that you have not all done justice to the really significant philosophical achievement of Kant. From Hume Kant had learned that there are concepts (as, for example, that of causal connection), which play a dominating role in our thinking, and which, nevertheless, cannot be deduced by means of a logical process from the empirically given (a fact which several empiricists recognize, it is true, but seem always again to forget). What justifies the use of such concepts ? Suppose he had replied in this sense : Thinking is necessary in order to understand the empirically given, and concepts and 'categories' are necessary as indispensable elements of thinking. If he had remained satisfied with this type of an answer, he would have avoided scepticism and you would not have been able to find fault with him.⁷

From the above lines we must not infer that Einstein understood Kant completely and agreed with him on all points. Quite the contrary. The above passage is followed by others which show that Einstein misunderstood Kant and attributed to him what Kant never said. If we confine

ourselves to the above lines, then there is complete agreement between them. Even Max Planck agrees with Kant in holding that causality is necessary for thinking of an object. Einstein and Planck realised that without causality solipsism would be inevitable. The subject would be confined to himself; he would never have knowledge of an object. Thus both Einstein and Planck thought that empiricism is inadequate and felt that something more was needed. This something more is causality. Both urge that solipsism must be avoided. But they do not explain why it must be opposed. In fact, Planck admits that solipsism is the consequence of empiricism but empiricism itself is logically flawless. To quote his words :

To sum up, 'empiricism is unassailable on the fundamental ground of a pure logic ; and its conclusions are equally impregnable. But if we look at it purely from the standpoint of knowledge it leads into a blind alley, which is called solipsism. In order to escape this impasse there is no other way open but to jump the wall at some part of it, and preferably at the beginning. This can be done only by introducing once and for all, a metaphysical hypothesis which has nothing to do with the immediate experience of sense-perceptions or the conclusions logically drawn from them.'⁸

But if empiricism is logically flawless, why should we try to evade it? In fact, empiricism is self-contradictory, because it contradicts its own premiss. Empiricism is a philosophical doctrine preached by some philosophers. These philosophers believe that there are other persons in addition to themselves. That is why they argue against their opponents and their doctrines (opposed to empiricism). This means that the empiricist philosopher begins his investigations by assuming the existence of others. Solipsism

contradicts this assumption. Hence it contradicts its own basis ; it is, therefore, self-contradictory. Kant refuted Hume by showing that empirical knowledge is the foundation both of philosophy and of science. Empiricism as a philosophical doctrine cannot defeat empirical knowledge.

About Kant's third analogy of experience Hermann Weyl writes :

Kant's third analogy of experience, the principle of community between coexistent objects, has to be abandoned.⁹

The above statement of Weyl is the result of undue importance given by him to the Relativity Theory. He forgets the fact that this theory, like other theories, is only a theory, and scientific theories are never final. When Kant deals with community (action and reaction), he is dealing with the *a priori* conditions of empirical knowledge. To abandon the principle of community is equivalent to giving up belief in gravitation. If material bodies do not gravitate, then both Newton and Einstein must be credited with having solved a pseudo-problem. Gravitation is a technical name for what Kant calls reciprocal action (interaction) between and among material bodies. Since material bodies are substances, gravitation is the same as community. We may quote Mario Bunge :

...in the classical theory of gravitation we are not confronted with causation but with reciprocal action.¹⁰

V

The above are a few hints that the greatness of Kant as a philosopher of science can be known only by comparing him with other philosophers of science. Categories like substance, cause, interaction, etc. are indispensable for both

science and everyday life. Philosophically minded scientists like Planck, Einstein, Weyl, Heisenberg, Born, Bohm and others have extensively written on these topics. All these writers refer to Kant. The fact that some of them agree with Kant is enough to show that Kant's interpretation is not yet obsolete. A careful study of Kant's text shows that many philosophers of science disagree with Kant only because those people have misunderstood and misinterpreted Kant. But on the whole, scientists like Einstein, Planck, Poincare have understood Kant better than the professional philosophers like Vaihinger, Adickes, Prichard, Norman Kemp Smith, and others. But anti-Kant prejudice is fortunately being replaced by a sympathetic study of Kant's philosophy. Paton was the first English speaking scholar who tried to do justice to Kant. That some progress in the right direction has been made is evidenced by Justus Hartnack's small book *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Macmillan, 1968) and Graham Bird's book with the same title (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962). But even these two books do not deal with Kant as a philosopher of science. The purpose of this article is to give some hints about Kant as a philosopher of science by citing some examples. The detailed study of Kant's Philosophy of Science is yet to begin.

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STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF REALITY

SARADINDU BANERJI

I

As a consequence of Freud's work on the ego in the twenties and thirties, psychoanalysts now attribute greater importance to the ego than the instinctual impulses (Id) in the total personality. Publication of *Ego and the Id* in 1923 adopting the structural hypothesis of mind marked a turning-point in the history of psychoanalysis. It indicated the future course of development of the science of psychoanalysis in the form of Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology.

In his structural theory Freud conceived of the mind as consisting of three functional agencies in the form of Id, Ego and Super-ego. The id is the source of all drives, the reservoir of instincts. The ego is that aspect of the mind that handles reality and is guided by reason. The super-ego is the composite of the various commands, prohibitions and ideals that form the personality. Freud conceived of the mind of an individual as an unconscious id upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus, the system perceptual-consciousness. At birth, the id and the ego are undifferentiated; gradually, as the individual develops and comes into contact with reality, ego emerges as a distinct psychic agency. Later on, in the oedipal phase (5th year of life) and after, part of the ego splits off and forms the super-ego. This super-ego later on functions in our mind in the form of conscience.

According to Freud, id is solely guided by pleasure-

principle which means that it seeks immediate gratification of instinctual urges without taking reality into consideration. In this respect its nature is just like that of a child. The ego of an individual is guided by the reality principle. This does not mean that the ego does not seek pleasure. Ego also pursues pleasure but not blindly. In pursuing pleasure it takes reality situation into consideration. It can defer the enjoyment of pleasure, can modify the nature and quantum of the pleasure and can even forego an immediate pleasure for a fuller and durable pleasure of the future. As Freud says: ".....the ego learns that it must inevitably go without immediate satisfaction, postpone gratification, learn to endure a degree of pain, and altogether renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus trained, the ego becomes reasonable, is no longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, but follows the reality-principle, which at bottom also seeks pleasure—although a delayed and diminished pleasure, one which is assured by its realization of fact, its relation to reality"¹.

II

The transition from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle is one of the most important advances in the development of the ego. This results in the attainment of adult maturity. The psychoanalytic therapy also aims at bringing about such change in the neurotic. As Freud says: "The psychoanalytic worker is continually confronted with the task of inducing the patient to renounce an immediate and directly attainable source of pleasure. He need not renounce all pleasure, that one could probably expect of no human being, and even religion is obliged to support its ordinance that earthly pleasure shall be set aside by the promise of an incomparably greater degree of more inestimable

bliss in another world. No, the patient need merely renounce such gratifications as will inevitably be detrimental to him ; he needs only temporarily abjure, only learn to exchange an immediate source of pleasure for one better assured though longer delayed. Or, in other words, under the physician's guidance he must make that advance from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle by which the mature human-being is distinguished from the child".²

While in his later writings Freud gave much stress on the ego, he could not give it the same kind of systematic elaboration he had given to the instinctual drives belonging to the id. As early as in 1905 Freud in his *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* gave a detailed account of the development of the libido or sexual energy. The libido of an individual passes through different stages centering round the bodily zones called erogenous zone. They are called respectively Oral Phase, Anal Phase, Phallic Phase and Genital Phase. Sexuality first appears in the mouth and running through different intermediate stages it is ultimately located in the genitalia. The genital phase attained at puberty is the culmination point of the development of libido. The smooth flowing of the libido through different phases and culminating at the genital phase is a must for healthy development of mind. Fixation at any earlier stage of the libido may result in either neurosis or sexual perversion. The nature of the mental disease is determined largely by the phase at which the libido is fixated.

But inspite of such graphic account of the libido belonging to the id, Freud, as already said, did not give any account of the developmental stages of the ego's reality sense as late as 1913, when it was supplied by Sandor Ferenczi, a Hungarian psychoanalyst and contemporary follower of Freud.³ This much-needed information was hailed by Freud as an original contribution to the science of psycho-analysis.

As Freud says : "We know that a full understanding of any neurotic predisposition from the developmental point of view is never complete without taking into account not merely the stage of libido-development at which fixation occurs but also the stage of ego-development. Our concern has been confined to libido-development, however, and consequently does not afford all the information we are entitled to expect. At the present time little is known of the developmental stages of the ego-instincts ; I know only of one highly promising attempt by Ferenczi to approach this problem".⁴ A certain parallelism, a definite correspondence between the phases in the two developments (of the ego and of the libido) is essential ; indeed, a disturbance in this correspondence may become a pathogenic factor.

III

Following Ferenczi we are presenting below the different stages in the development of ego's sense of reality.

1. Period of Unconditional Omnipotence : This state of mentality prevails in the child just after the birth. The obsessive-compulsive patient also believes in the omnipotence of thought and action. He believes that his compulsive acts and obsessive ideas have a magical effect. The phrase, "omnipotence of thought" was first used by Freud and he got it from a patient of his. As he says : ".....that principle in the mind which I have called 'omnipotence of thoughts', taking the name from an expression of my patients".

According to Ferenczi, the first phase of "unconditional omnipotence" can be traced back to conditioning by the intra-uterine state of existence of the child. For what is omnipotence ? The feeling that one has all that one wants,

and that one has nothing left to wish for. The foetus, however, could maintain this of itself, for it always has what is necessary for the satisfaction of its instincts, and so has nothing to wish for; it is without wants. The traces of intra-uterine psychical processes do not remain without influence on the shaping of the psychical material produced after birth. The behaviour of the child immediately after birth speaks for this continuity of the mental processes.

In the intra-uterine state the human being lives as a parasite of the mother's body. All its needs for protection, warmth, and nourishment are assured by the mother. Indeed, it does not even have the trouble of taking the oxygen and nourishment that is brought to it, for it is seen to that these materials through suitable arrangements, arrive directly into its blood-vessels. All care for the continuance of foetus, however, is transferred to the mother, it is natural therefore, that the child must get from his intra-uterine existence the impression that he is in fact 'omnipotent'.

If one observes the behaviour of the new-born child one gets the impression that he or she is far from pleased at the rude disturbance of the wishless tranquility he had enjoyed in the womb, and indeed that he longs to regain this situation. Nurses instinctively recognize this wish of the child, and as soon as he has given vent to his discomfort by struggling and crying she deliberately brings him into a situation that resembles as closely as possible the one he has just left. They lay him down by the warm body of the mother, or wrap him up in soft, warm coverings, evidently so as to give him the illusion of the mother's warm protection. They guard his eyes from light stimulus, and his ear from noise, and give him the possibility of further enjoying the intra-uterine absence of irritation.

2. Period of Magical-Hallucinatory Omnipotence: In this phase every impulse, every wish is supposed to be

magically realized merely by hallucination. The child has no idea of external world—his mother or nurse. If, for instance, the infant is hungry, he will procure gratification for himself by the mere imagination of sucking, if he is not gratified in reality. From the subjective standpoint of the child the previously unconditional "omnipotence" has changed merely in so far, that he needs only to seize the wish-aims in a hallucinatory way (to imagine them) and to alter nothing else in the outer world, in order (after satisfying this single condition) really to attain the wish-fulfilment. Since the child certainly has no knowledge of the real concatenation of cause and effect, or of the nurse's existence and activity, he must feel himself in the possession of a magical capacity, that can actually realise all his wishes by simply imagining the satisfaction of them. We have only to think of magic action of imagination. Fantasies, daydreams, are likewise magical wish fulfilments which represent a correction of reality. By means of the same "magic", what is wished for is psychically realized in the hallucination of some hysterics and schizophrenics through visual excitation.

3. Period of Omnipotence by the help of Magic Gestures : The hallucinatory stage was already characterised by the occurrence of uncoordinated motor discharges (crying, struggling) on the occasion of disagreeable affects. These are now made use of by the child as magic signals, at the dictation of which the satisfaction promptly arrives (naturally with external help, of which the child, however, has no idea). The subjective feeling of the child at all this may be compared to that of a real magician, who has only to perform a given gesture (crying) to bring about in the outer world according to his will the most complicated occurrences. These efferent manifestations soon become insufficient to bring about the situation of satisfaction. As the wishes take more and more special forms with development, they demand

increasingly specialised signals. To begin with are such as imitation of the movement of sucking with the mouth when the infant wants to be fed, and the characteristic expressions by means of the voice and abdominal pressing when it wants to be cleansed after excreting. The child gradually learns also to stretch out its hand for the object that it wants. From this is developed latter a regular gesture-language : by suitable combinations of gestures the child is able to express quite special needs which then are very often actually satisfied, so that—if only it keeps to the condition of the expression of wishes by means of corresponding gestures—the child can still appear to itself as omnipotent. The hysterical symptoms, too, in which the unsatisfied needs are similarly fulfilled by means of magic gestures of different parts of the body. The hysteric goes into fits in order to draw the attention and sympathy of others to him. Psycho-analysis shows us in fact that the hysterical attacks present with the help of gestures the repressed wishes of the patient as fulfilled.

4. Period of Magic Thoughts and Magic Words : With the increase in the extent and complexity of the wants goes naturally an increase not only of the 'conditions' that the individual has to submit to if he wishes to see his wants satisfied, but also of the number of cases in which his ever more audacious wishes remain unfulfilled even when the once efficacious conditions are strictly observed. The out-stretched hand must often be drawn empty, the longed for object does not follow the magic gesture. Till now the "all powerful" being has been able to feel himself one with the world that obeyed him and followed his every nod, but gradually there appears a painful discordance in his experiences. He has to distinguish between certain perfidious things, which do not obey his will, as an outer world, and on the other side his ego; i.e. between the subjective psychical contents and the objectified ones.

One of the bodily means that the child makes use of for representing his wishes, and the objects he wishes for, attains then an especial significance, one that ranges beyond that of all other means of representation—namely, speech. Speech symbol thus gets substituted for gesture symbolism.

In spite of this the child knows how to preserve his feeling of omnipotence even in this stage of development, for his wishes that can be set forth in thoughts are still so few and comparatively uncomplicated that the attentive entourage concerned with the child's welfare easily manages to guess most of these thoughts. The mimic expressions that continually accompany thinking (peculiarly so with children) make this kind of thought-reading especially easy for the adults; and when the child actually formulates his wishes in words the entourage, ever ready to help, hastens to fulfil them as soon as possible. The child then thinks himself in possession of magic capacities, is thus in the period of magic thoughts and magic words.

In superstition, in magic, and in religious cults this belief in the irresistible power of certain prayer, chanting of mantras, cursing, blessing or magic formulas, which one has only to think inwardly or only to speak aloud for them to work, plays an enormous part.

5. Projection Phase of the Sense of Reality : In this stage the child gradually turns his attention from the internal to the external world. By repeated shocks and frustrations he learns that beyond his thought and wish there is a stern reality in the form of the external world to which he must bow down. Freud dates the end of the domination of the pleasure-principle only from the complete psychical detachment from the parents. It is also at this epoch, which is extremely variable in individual cases, that the feeling of omnipotence gives way to the full appreciation of the force of circumstances. The sense of reality attains its zenith in

science, while the illusion omnipotence here experiences its greatest humiliation: the previous omnipotence here dissolves in mere "conditions" (Conditionalism, Determinism).

The recognition that our wishes and thoughts are conditioned signifies the maximum of normal projection, i.e. objectification.

According to Herman Nunberg: "In psychic illness, the inhibition in the ego's development may occur at any stage; the particular stage at which the inhibition has occurred will put its imprint on the attitude of the patient toward reality. Thus the ego may also return to the stage of omnipotence and magic. In the symptomatology of some schizophrenics (as in catatonic stupor) unconditional omnipotence and magic apparently predominate; in paranoia, the magical over-valuation of the entire ego and of the 'demoniacal' external world seems to prevail; in hysteria, the omnipotence of ideas and gestures; and in the compulsion neurosis, the omnipotence of magic of thoughts". These relations, however, have not yet been appropriately studied with all neuroses, so that, according to Ferenczi, we have to be content with Freud's general formulation concerning the "choice of neurosis" namely, that variety of the subsequent disorder is decided by "which phase in the development of the ego and the sexual hunger is affected by the determining inhibition of development".

What we may conceive about the phylogenesis of the reality sense can at present be offered only as a scientific prediction. It is to be assumed that we shall some day succeed in bringing the individual stages in the development of the ego, and the neurotic regression-types of these, into a parallel with the stages in the racial history of mankind, just as, for instance, Freud found again in the mental life of the savage the characters of the obsessional neurosis.

IV

In general, the development of the reality-sense is represented by a succession of repressions, to which mankind was compelled, not through spontaneous "striking towards development" but through necessity, through adjustment to a demanded renunciation. The first great repression is made necessary by the process of birth which certainly comes about without active co-operation, without any "intention" on the part of the child. The foetus would much rather remain undisturbed longer in the womb, but it is cruelly turned out into the world, and it has to forget (repress) the kinds of satisfaction it had got fond of, and adjust itself to new ones. The same cruel game is repeated with every new stage of development.

Science has to repudiate the illusion of the feeling of omnipotence of at least always to know when she is entering the field of hypotheses and fancies. In myths, legends and fairy tales, on the contrary, phantasies of omnipotence are and remain the dominating ones. Just where we have most humbly to bow before the forces of Nature, the fairy tale comes to our aid with its typical motives. In reality we are weak hence the heroes of myths, legends and fairy tales are strong and unconquerable ; in our activities and our knowledge we are cramped and hindered by time and space, hence in fairy tales one is immortal or living thousands of years ; is in a hundred places at the same time, sees into the future and knows the past. The ponderousness, the solidity, and the impenetrability of matter obstruct our way every moment ; in the fairy-tale, however, man has wings, his eyes pierce the walls, his magic wand opens all doors. Reality is a hard fight for existence, in the fairy-tale the words "open sesame" are sufficient. A man may live in perpetual fear of attacks from dangerous beasts and fierce foes ; in the fairy tale a magic cap enables every transforma-

tion and makes us inaccessible. Physiology is of no avail here. For pregnancy and delivery are possible through ear as in the case of Kunti and her son Karna in the Mahabharata. How hard it is in reality to attain love that can fulfil all our wishes! In the fairy-tale the hero is irresistible, or he bewitches with a magic gesture.

Thus the fairy-tale, through which grown-ups are so fond of relating to their children their own unfulfilled and repressed wishes, really brings the forfeited situation of omnipotence to a last, artistic presentation.

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'ALIENATION' IN THE WRITINGS OF KARL MARX

UMA MITRA

Among the problems dealt with by the philosophers, that of 'alienation' stands out as having attracted major attention. It has become a prominent, even common, theme in current appraisals of man's situation in modern times. It is no doubt that these appraisals widely refer to the writings of Marx in which 'alienation' is a central concept.

Marx develops a new, materialistic approach to the problem of alienation. The problem of alienation concerns the relations of the individual with society and with the manifold products of man as a social man. In it, Marx shows the destructing effect of capitalist production on human beings, on their physical and mental states and on the social processes of which they are a part. Centering on the 'acting individual', Marx says that the concept of the active, productive man who grasps and embraces the objective world with his own powers cannot be fully understood without the notion of alienation. Man does not experience himself as the acting agent. His own deed in government, wealth and culture becomes to him an alien power, standing over against him instead of being ruled by him. Man is thus divided within him and never truly 'at home', 'truly whole' in his social life.

I

Marx forms his ideas of alienation through confrontation with Hegel's view on alienation in *Phenomenology*. He

praises Hegel by saying that 'the importance of Hegel's *Phenomenology*.....lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object (*Entgegenständlichung*), as alienation and as super-session of this alienation ;.....,¹ Alienation, for Hegel, is the state of consciousness as it acquaints itself with the external, objective, phenomenal world. At this stage objects appear to man external, and alien, and consciousness feels itself estranged and alienated in this otherness.

Hegel starts from the belief that man's existence has its centre in Reason, under whose inspiration he builds up the world of reality. In his *Phenomenology* he traces the development of mind or spirit, reintroducing historical movement into philosophy and asserting that the human mind can attain absolute knowledge. He analyses the development of human consciousness from its immediate perception to the stage of self-consciousness. The actuality of self-consciousness depends on the process that self-consciousness divests itself of its personality, by doing so creates its world, and treats it as something alien and external. This is the stage of reason itself, after which spirit by means of religion and art attains absolute knowledge, the level at which man recognises in the world the stages of his own. These stages Hegel calls 'alienation', in so far as they are creations of the human mind, yet thought of as independent and superior to the human mind.

II

But in spite of his praise for Hegel's theory of alienation, Marx attacks him on some crucial points. In the *Manuscripts*, Marx repeatedly charges that Hegel's treatment of alienation is 'mystifying' 'spiritual' and 'abstract' and the forms of alienation Hegel develops are themselves alienated. In these

charges he follows Feuerbach who sees Hegel's idealism as the apotheosis of abstraction which alienates man from himself because it inverts the real relation of thought to the world. Instead of seeing that the Absolute idea is itself derived from particular experienced things, Hegel derives particular experienced things from the Absolute Idea. Hence the essence of nature is outside nature, the essence of man outside man, and the essence of thought outside the thinking act. But genuine thought, Feuerbach holds, is determined by the opposite of thought existence, matter; sensibility, 'the immediate' as perception and passion. A real object, consequently, cannot be the object of abstract thought but only an object of the real complete man. What we need is to convert the predicate into the subject to get at the pure undisguised truth. From these premises Marx charges that with Hegel alienation and its resolution is itself alienated because it takes place only in the movement of thought and knowledge as is shown in *The Phenomenology of Mind*.

Feuerbach is fundamentally interested in religion. He shows that Hegel's philosophy is no more than rationalized theology and discovers the true materialist approach starting from the social relationship of man to man. Instead of saying with Hegel that Man is God in his self-alienation, Feuerbach argues that we must reverse this proposition and assert that God is man in his self-alienation. God springs out of the feeling of void and disappointment. The more empty life is, the fuller, the more concrete is God. From this analysis Feuerbach concludes that the anti-thesis of divine and human is altogether illusory. If man realises this they would be in a position to realize that they have created God, not God them, and thus to restore their alienated 'species-being' or communal essence.

What interested Marx is the application of this approach to Hegel's Philosophy. He says that though Hegel is aware

of the social problems, created by a competitive society, he mistakenly considers that these problems could be harmonised by the organs of the state into some 'higher' unity. For Hegel, Marx asserts, the family and civil society from which the state develops are nothing but manifestations, 'predicates,' of the Absolute Idea. Hence the state is an 'imaginary universality,' an 'estrangement', from the actual life of man. Hegel then resolves the problems of political life—particularly the cleavage between public and private existence apparent in the economic 'war of all against all'—by making politics 'a chapter in Logic.' Following Feuerbach Marx's fundamental critique of Hegel is that just as religion does not create man, but man creates religion, so the constitution does not create the people but the people the constitution.

III

Marx, while accepting in essence the religious account of Feuerbach goes much further and so broadens the notion of alienation as to encompass many other spheres of human activity. "It is the immediate task of philosophy," Marx asserts, ".....to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics."² For Marx, the concept of alienation has both descriptive and perspective content. Fundamentally, it refers to the tendency of objects and institutions that men have made to serve their purposes, to dominate their lives and to appear hostile to them. Thus man is producing and reproducing what he calls in the *Manuscripts* an 'inhuman power,' an alien and hostile world over against him, a world consisting of commodities and institutions which are alleged to serve man's ends but which really have the effect of dehumanizing

and oppressing him. The product of labour does not belong to the labourer but confronts him as an alien power. Thus the worker becomes servile, degraded, and in a sense contemptible when he falls under the sway of forces that are independent of him and when these forces, even though they are his own products, prescribe his way of life. This total estrangement of man's product and his complete loss of reality have been traced back to the alienation of labour.

Marx says that alienation occurs not only in respect of the product, but also with respect to the act of production. "After all, the product is simply the resume of the activity, of the production. So if the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity..... Alienation was thus self-alienation, the loss ofself."³ In the present day society, creation of objects, i.e., the objects of labour, instead of helping man to realize himself causes dehumanization.

In principle, labour is conceived as a whole, as man's species nature, the collective creative activity of mankind. It is the active relatedness of man to nature, the creation of a new world, including the creation of man himself. But as the private ownership of the means of production, a certain kind of division of labour and commodity production develop labour loses its character of being an expression of man's powers. Labour and its products assume an existence separate from man, his will and planning. The division of labour not only destroys unity by introducing inequality among the various occupations but it creates and reinforces social inequality. Besides, in a market economy where labour is treated as a commodity alienation is there. Marx also says that in an alienated stage man feels himself up against a system he does not understand and cannot control, though it consists of his own activities.

Consequently, worker is deprived of the most essential

things not only of life but also of work. In his work the worker does not fulfill himself but negates himself. His labour, far from constituting of his human potentialities, merely becomes a means of retaining his physical existence. In fact, life itself, appears only as a 'means to life'. Being deprived of fulfilment during his interminable hours of labour, the worker is reduced in his own time to merely bestial functions, 'eating, drinking, and procreating, etc.'

IV

Marx assumes that though alienation of work, is found to exist throughout history, capitalism is the economy that brings it to its highest pitch, and the working class is the most alienated, the most wretched of men. For the capitalist economy is an oppressive system. In it labour and the natural resources to which labour is applied and the instruments of labour all become commodities. They all become factors of production, and production becomes production for the sake of profit. That is why in the capitalist economy there can be widespread unemployment and misery, though there are resources, skills and labour enough to provide abundance. The worker under capitalism is not just exploited, he is degraded. Marx speaks of the worker under capitalism as exploited in such a way that real wages could rise and yet the misery of the worker increases with the power and volume of his production. Thus the capitalist economy does not provide for the 'full and free development of each individual'. "In proportion as capital accumulates, the condition of the worker, be his wages high or low, necessarily grows worse."⁴ Thus Marx speaks of the worker as crippled and mere fragment of man.

Marx also says that by the alienated product of labour, the entire productive system, and even the whole social

order, are affected by it. But the forms of alienation differ for each class because their position and style of life differ. In this sense of alienation, the capitalist is as much alienated as the worker. For, though he may direct the labour of the workers he hires, he does not control the productive system. He depends on the market, and must study it and adjust his activities to it, and may be ruined by it.

V

Marx's prime concern is the liberation of man from a kind of work which destroys his individuality, which transforms him into a thing, and which makes him into the slave of things. He says that the emancipation of the working class or the proletariat involves the emancipation of humanity as a whole, for it is a class in which the identity of universal interest with the interest of a particular social class is not imaginary and contradictory. It is a class whose interests are identical with the interests of man's universal, social nature. Its exclusion is not simply from the sphere of political life but from the sphere of human life itself. Its existence is the negation of all the benefits of human social life. Its interest, therefore, coincides with the interests of man's social nature. Thus Marx says that the sufferings of the proletariat are universal and the wrong done to him is not a particular wrong but wrong in general. He suffers a total loss of humanity.

But Marx does not see the proletariat simply as the negation of all human values. To him, proletariat is the history-making force. The ability of the proletariat to play the historical role of a truly universal class derives from the universal character of its deprivation. As he represents the whole of society he is the emancipatory agency. His class in redeeming itself redeems mankind ; that is why it is the

most revolutionary of classes. It can overthrow all the circumstances in which man is 'humiliated', 'enslaved', 'abandoned' and 'despised'. With Marx, therefore, a theoretical understanding of the human situation necessarily suggests a practical line of action to remedy the defects of this inhuman situation.

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VIOLENCE : A REFLECTIVE NOTE

S. N. GANGULY

1. Wherever death may surprise us, it will be welcome, provided that this, our battle cry reach some receptive ear, that another hand be extended to take up our weapons and that other men come forward to intone our funeral dirge with the staccato of machine guns and new cries of battle and victory.

(Che Guevara, *Socialism and Man in Cuba and other Works*, Stage I, London, 1968. p. 68).

2. We are born into a world where alienation awaits us. We are potentially men, but are in an alienated state, and this state is not simply a natural system. Alienation as our present destiny is achieved only by outrageous violence perpetrated by human beings on human beings.

(R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience*, Ballantine Books, New York, 1967, p. xiii).

The two quotations clearly reveal an apparent paradox. The first comes from one of the world's greatest revolutionaries whose love for oppressed mankind never dried up; and yet by ordinary Gandhian standard he is clearly preaching violence, and why? The answer is given in the second quotation. The lines there clearly reveal a diagnostic approach to our usual indulgence in violence and coming as they do from a renowned psychoanalyst who nearly has revolutionized our approach to mental illness sound like a note of warning. When we take a serious account of the two above perspectives we are forced to conclude that there must be a violence to defeat and destroy violence. But

then this is the 'paradox' that Gandhi untiringly cautioned us against. Can violence be a means to end violence? A resolution of this problem has kept a large number of humanists, thinkers, reformers and even psychologists busy in analysing human nature and existing social frames. My limited purpose in this paper is to show that there is something fundamentally wrong in the very formulation of the paradox. It is quite likely that my rebuttal will not be definitive but I am positive that the following analysis will help us gain some insight about the nature of violence and a possible methodology to deal with it in a human way. I shall first classify the various instances where the term is used and each of which reveals a recognizable perspective.

- (a) 'It has shown violence by doing *a*'—moral approach.
- (b) 'The act *a* is violent'—legal.
- (c) 'There are still violent tribes in Andamans'
—dispositional approach; this can also be called psychological.
- (d) 'We show a lot of violence in our films'
—sociological approach.
- (e) 'The snake eating a frog is a violent sight'
—naturalistic approach.

There may be many more but the cases cited are certainly the most common and frequent.

We can further summarize the above formulations in terms of the following questions.

- 1) Can a *person* be violent?
- 2) Can an *act* be violent?
- 3) Can a *situation* be violent?
- 4) Are there violent *laws*?

All the questions set above can be seen to have an implicit or explicit bias towards assuming a naturalistic approach to violence ; violence is variously treated as a trait, a characteristic, a disposition or force or aggression. That none of those mentioned above show an unexceptionable case should be ample evidence that violence may be displayed through any one of these situations but is always more pervasive than any one of them. This is why we often tend to treat very human emotion like anger as violence or killing as violence and so on ; at the same time the sophisticated jurists of the world today are prone to believe that there can be justifiable murder in mercy killing. This is why I shall contend in this paper that violence is absolutely non-natural in the sense that it is historical and embedded in the very ideology that a certain social structure generates and only thus affects the individual beings by placing objective impediment, to his development as a 'natural man'. Violence thus is violation of 'human nature' or 'natural man' as Marx or even Rabindranath Tagore will say.

As far as the word 'violence' is concerned it does signify a case of violation but violation only so far *a person* or human being is concerned. Violating natural laws is not violence unless that violation affects some person somewhere and only then will it constitute violence. There is a further reservation I want to make and that is unless such violation is seen within a certain relational network, a structured context the concept of violence does not derive its significance. As an isolated act a case of violation is merely a danger, a threat, a fear. Violence, in short, is ultimately *institutionalized* and, therefore, only institutions can be significantly described as a violent. This is not apparent or obvious and that is precisely what makes violence so dangerous in our society. We need a concerned in-depth analysis to discover this.

Ideology and Violence :

If we confront an individual and ask him 'How does he react to violence'?, the answer will always be in the negative. A non-violent man is proverbially a person who will not even hurt a fly. The Jains in India often are supposed to be merciful to the bed bugs, or they tie a piece of cloth around their mouth to save microbes from being destroyed. Such is the ideal of non-violence. In India there is a large number of people who are vegetarians with a zeal and often their arguments run on the line of not killing animals for one's own life. At the same time they will condone (amongst orthodox Hindus) sacrifice of animals in the name of God. It is stated in the scriptures that sacrifice of animals in the altar of *Yajña* is not a violent act. Again, the proverbially non-violent Jains will not hesitate for a moment to keep away from *Harijans* or adulterate baby food. One of the cruellest institutions of the world is the caste system. Many of these ideal 'non-violent types' will put up with this extreme form of de-humanization without even batting an eye-lid, without a twist or twitch of their muscles. As a matter of fact they will even justify the system. This is the 'double standard' in our society. Even our language is full of violence; we often refer to a beauty as a bombshell, population in terms of 'explosion'. It was the peace-loving leader of American democracy Woodrow Wilson who said in April, 1918: "Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit".¹ This hypocrisy is being injected into us through our ideology—the ideology that obviously is associated with a fetishistic, competitive, capitalistic society. The term ideology is used in different senses with different emphasis on its positive and negative aspects. I am using the term in the sense in which Marx used the term to refer to 'German ideology'. In this sense ideology is the underlying frame of reference which supplies

the principles of intelligibility of important social behaviour as well as a ready machinery which helpfully *rationalises* many of our actions which otherwise could appear unpalatable. In the following, I shall be concerned to describe this latter aspect of ideology to show how violent institutions are being not only carried through but systematically upheld, under the evil influence of which men can carry out a smooth programme of human annihilation without often being in the least aware of its immorality. Violence, I submit, is this concealed (sometimes though it comes out on the surface) historical process of de-humanization in society. That is why violence disrupts the community and creates a palpable 'communication-frustration' for in-group as well as out-group members. Let us take an example : a powerful and strong person overpowers another less strong person over some fruit. This is a case of rank *aggression, fight, attack*, etc ; but the process of violence is unleashed only when this fact or phenomenon is *institutionalized* as in master-slave relationship or caste system. Some of the various processes through which such institutionalization of violence occurs, are enumerated below :

(1) *Mystification* : This is a process which, in the side of theory, creates unnecessary technicalities, jargon or specialization demands and in the aspect of practice creates a false consciousness by devising grand names or causes for meanest and cruellest of activities. Dr. R. D. Laing describes this process aptly as :

It is not enough to destroy one's own and other people's experience. One must overlay this demand by a false consciousness inured, as Marcuse puts it, to its own falsity.

Exploitation must not be seen as such. It must be seen as benevolence..... We in Europe and North America are the Colonists, and in order

to sustain our amazing images of ourselves as God's gift to the vast majority of the starving human species, we have to interiorize our violence upon ourselves and our children and to employ the rhetoric of morality to describe this process².

Similarly poverty is shown to be *karma-phala*, or private property as sacrosanct, cheating as free and fair trade, brain-washing as curricular education, castism as purity and so on. Examples are numerous and one only has to be perceptive to see through the hoax.

(2) *Objectification*: This is the most de-humanizing in that it objectifies human beings disregarding the personal and interpersonal *experiences*. Through various roles persons are fixed on a strictly defined box and coming out of the box is forbidden by laws or prevalent definitions of social norms. Since our birth, our roles are determined in the family, an institution which is defined by R. D. Laing as a 'protection racket'. Being in the role of a son or a daughter is surrendering to the power demands of the parents. From the very beginning freedom is constrained and finally denied in the name of 'discipline'. Then there is the school and college and so on. In all these places roles are so strictly defined that the natural and free process of human development is thwarted and persons are manipulated according to the whims or desires of the appropriate authorities in the name of 'rules' or 'canons' or 'customs'. Nothing can be more violent than thwarting one's free development. Any deviant has to be *punished*, sometimes severely, if he dares to challenge or question the validity of such inhuman oppression. Roles objectify us instead of treating us as 'persons'. A 'woman' is primarily a woman and only incidentally a human being. A 'student' is similarly defined and there are such endless boxes. Undoubtedly such categories hinder a free and spontaneous communication of person to person.

No wonder, therefore, that we are bred up in violence and breed violence in turn in the name of 'authority', 'superiority', 'right', 'duty' and so on.

(3) *Elimination*: This is obvious from the name. Human beings who deviate from the established norms, customs, are put out of circulation under various labels of defined 'abnormalcy', as 'politically violent', 'criminals', 'mentally sick', 'mad' and such other epithets. Prisons, mental homes are there to keep them locked. I don't have to elaborate this process.

All these processes are subtly and constantly manipulating the 'person' in us and thereby we not only become self-destructive but also destructive to other persons. Shall we be far wrong if we call this constant de-humanization the in-built process of violence? In other words, a free human development is obstructed through the generation of a series of institutionalized constraints like, *caste, class, sex, race*, etc.

In conclusion I want to say that such phenomena as described above clearly reveal to us an inter-relationship between alienation, loss of freedom and de-humanization. But all these, in turn, are hovering superstructures on the more fundamental phenomenon of 'owning relationship' between 'person and person' or 'person and nature'. The direct outcome is attaching excessive importance to 'private property'. To generate, to guard and to increase property society makes a formidable and obsessive classification of human beings into (in the end) 'owner' and 'owned' and when this is organized, defended and rationalized through institutions (in the three-fold manner described above) we are only investing in violence.

Let us now come back to the original problem of the so-called 'paradox of violence'. Is there really any paradox in *fighting* violence through *revolutionary praxis*

or any other form of committed non-conformism? The paradox dissolves as soon as we realize that violence does not consist in an act even if that be an act of fighting, or in a personal disposition but always in an underlying institution of destroying *human freedom*. Violence, therefore, can really be contrasted with freedom and humanism. In the language of a contemporary philosopher :

To dissolve the paradox of violence, Gandhi is in favour of practising non-violence primarily at *personal* level and he believes that its impact would be felt in due course at the *institutional* level also. Any other moral way of dissolving the paradox is yet unknown.³

Through my entire note I have tried to show that the above lines express a typical confusion in truly understanding the nature of violence and that is, that violence should not be treated as an individual predicate whether of a person or a person's act or any other single phenomenon. Since violence itself is institutional there is, on the contrary, no other way to combat violence except in a *collective way*; and it is only by an uncompromising and collective fight against violence that we can regain our human personality. A *revolutionary* is neither *violent* nor *non-violent*,—he is only a historical vanguard in the *collective fight against violence*. The paradox, I am afraid, is more a verbal quibble. In reality, when we fight, resist and destroy violence we not only resolve the paradox but also violence itself. The true non-violence, therefore, is a *collective commitment to anti-violence*.

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VERSTAND AND VERNUNFT IN HEGEL

PRAHLAD KUMAR SARKAR

I

The advance of Hegel's thought, from a state of opacity to a state of scintillating clearness, owes much to his life-long commitment to a systematic exposition of experience that spirit undergoes with a view to making it true to its purpose and meaning. Long before the existentialists expressed their dismay over and anxiety for the fragmentation of the individual, Hegel felt the tide of a multidimensional culture exercising enervating influence upon the human soul leading to its perpetual mutilation and disintegration. Accordingly Hegel commits himself, silently but steadily, to the task of reorganising multidimensional aspects of spiritual experience under a broad conceptual scheme which to him never means a predetermined list of categories but a system of living forms capable of encapsulating and recording the rhythm of movement in different modes of experience. To accomplish this task Hegel does not wish to discuss, like our linguistic philosophers, the concept of ordinary discourse in their isolation; for Hegel verily believes that such discussion will ultimately turn out arid and barren to the point of distortion of the essential forms of experience. A completely new chapter opens up in the career of Hegel with his realization that fallenness and estrangement of the individual is due to a lack of rational understanding of experience as a coherent whole. Not the study of experience as such but the study into its systematization, therefore, becomes the ruling passion of his life. Within the broad compass of a system Hegel seeks solution to the burning problems of human life among which the

problems of estrangement and freedom engaged his special attention.

Hegel attributes the failures to solve these problems to a narrow view of spirit and its experience. We usually apply the law of 'Either-Or,' a law of understanding, and think of spirit as either centrifugal or centripetal, though spirit is, in its essence, both. In its onward march to freedom spirit assumes multidimensional forms; it becomes centrifugal. This does not mean that spirit gives itself to stray wanderings. On the contrary, it carves out its course uniformly by a process of progressive assimilation and integration of whatever falls on its path. Through a process of dialectical self-orientation spirit emerges as the all-encompassing unity of subject and object; it becomes centripetal. Such an all-encompassing reality alone is capable of surveying everything as the fruit of its own labour and integrating it into its bosom as its substance. The history of spirit is the history of a subject discovering its substance in its products. Subject-in-substantiality alone is truly free for the rationality of the process of its evolution leads to its self-realization that it is the master of all what it surveys and that nothing stands indifferent to its autonomy.

Hegel was in search of certain effective media of thought with which he could delineate the onward march of spirit, through diverse forms of experience, to freedom. Such much-needed media Hegel found in the two moments of thought viz, *Verstand* (Understanding) and *Vernunft* (Reason). Throughout his philosophic career Hegel employed these terms to show the essential and indissoluble connection between one's experience and its underlying system. These terms in their interrelationship constitute one of the chief motifs of Hegelian philosophy in its essential outline.

Hegel's use of these terms varies widely in different dialectical contexts. Before we inquire into the logic of the

relationship of these terms in their clear structural forms we may refer, for the sake of expository ease, to Hegel's early attempts at grappling with them. The terms were much in vogue in contemporary German literature and Kant, through Wolf, had transferred them to the domain of philosophy. Hegel had his acquaintance with these terms not through Kant's writings but through a book entitled "*Examination of Faculties*" by Grave, a thinker of considerable reputation belonging to the broad movement of *German Illumination*. Hegel was then a boy of 17 years only. In the course of making excerpts from Grave's book Hegel used the terms *Verstand* and *Vernunft* as two abstract attitudes towards experience. He identified *Vernunft* with the legitimate abstraction of concepts through experience and *Verstand* as the illegitimate abstraction of the meanings of words that one had come to know from book-reading. The distinction thus understood corresponds roughly to the distinction between personal knowledge and book-learning. Hegel was yet to appreciate the roll of *Vernunft* in the process of system-making and continued to treat it, along with *Verstand*, as a process of abstraction. Just one year later Hegel wrote an article entitled *On Some Characteristics which Distinguish Ancient Writers from Modern Ones*.¹ It is in this article that Hegel made use of, for the first time, the term *Verstand* as the power by which we analyse a complex living entity and thus destroy its life. Hegel never deviated, throughout his life, from using this term in this particular meaning.

At the age of nineteen Hegel was introduced to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* by J. F. Flatt, his teacher in the Tübingen Seminary. From Kant's monumental work he understood the terms in their philosophical connotation but his use of these never conformed to Kant's. Much against Kant he looked down upon *Verstand* and its products. In his essay *Religion ist eine*, the young Hegel branded all forms of canonized religion and morality as products of *Verstand*. He

instituted a comparison between *subjective religion*, the religion of heart or of faith and *objective religion*, the religion of *Verstand*. *Objective religion* is a distorted version of subjective religion for it plays into the hands of *Verstand*. Theology is a hand-maid of *Verstand*, it is farthest removed from living religion. True religion is one but the religion of *Verstand* is diverse. *Verstand* is a *socially* divisive force which sets up one community of people against another. Holding that *Verstand* is always at the service of objective religion Hegel remarks : "The Understanding (*Verstand*) is a courtier who adapts himself complaisantly to the caprices of his Lord. It knows how to scare up justifying arguments for every passion, and every undertaking, it is especially a servant to self-love..."² But what is at fault with one's being a courtier to somebody or a servant to self-love? At the very next paragraph Hegel provides the answer : "Enlightenment of the understanding (*Verstand*) makes us cleverer certainly, but not better. And if we reduce virtue to prudent cleverness, if we reckon it up that man cannot be happy without virtue, the reckoning is too cold and hairsplitting to be effective in the moment of action or in general to have influence on our lives."³ Not 'cold' and 'hairsplitting' theorizing but one that would issue in vigorous lively activities should receive our warm welcome. Here a discerning observer can perceive that the mature Hegel of *Phenomenology* or of *Encyclopaedia* is speaking out through young Hegel.

II

Attempt is being made, in accordance with contemporary practice, to drive a deep wedge in between early and later Hegel. But if we attend to Hegel's life-long commitment and the tools with which he operates we could find no justifying ground for such a division. Wherever we look into Hegel's writings we find him working for the systematization

of experience with the same instruments, *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.

Systematization of experience is, with Hegel, always a process from the abstract to the concrete. With an eye to the continuity of the process Hegel focusses his attention first on *Verstand* for it is the mode of abstract thinking. Through a critique of *Verstand* Hegel traces the development of dialectical thinking to *Vernunft*. In an attempt to describe the method appropriate to *Verstand* Hegel in *Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind* writes: "The action of separating the elements is the exercise of the force of Understanding (*Verstand*) the most astonishing and greatest of all powers or rather the absolute power."⁴ In a similar vein Hegel writes in the *Introduction to Science of Logic*: "But reflective Understanding (*Verstand*) assumed possession of philosophy. We must learn precisely what is meant by this expression, which is indeed frequently used as a catch word; by it is to be understood generally the *abstracting and separating intelligence* which clings tenaciously to the separation which it has made."⁵ The most incisive characterisation of *Verstand* by Hegel is to be found in the first part of the *Encyclopaedia* where Hegel states: "Thought, as Understanding (*Verstand*), sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own."⁶ Hegel thus takes *Verstand* to task for the sorry plight of philosophy. *Verstand* operates with its canons, the rules of formal logic. Accordingly, it views a determination as what it is and as expressly different from what it is not. It holds in water-tight compartments, and arrests the movements of, determinations of thought. It emerges as a divisive force that maintains the chasms of its own making. Thus it presents truth and falsehood, the finite and the infinite, appearance and reality etc. in their splendid isolation and makes no attempt to relate them.

An analysis of these concepts will cast spotlight on the nature and function of *Verstand*. Truth and falsehood are usually represented as natural adversaries. Each excludes the other once and for all and resolves not only to guard its own territory but also to dislodge the other from its territory. They thus stand not in the relation of mutual determination but in the relation of mutual exclusion. Adapting themselves to the standpoint of *Verstand* the zealous guardians of truth take the solemn pledge to guard it in its pristine glory, as a priceless pure metal free of all dross. The same interest manifests itself in the attempt to restrict falsehood to a definite sphere such that it cannot contaminate truth. Against such so-called protectors of truth Hegel urges that 'truth is not like a stamped coin that is issued ready from the mint and so can be taken up and used.'⁷ Substance of truth or falsehood does not lie in itself but in its negativity, its otherness from which it can be sundered only at the point of its total annulment. Truth is the otherness and hence the substance of falsehood and vice versa. Each is thus a unity which contains itself and its otherness as its essential moments. Hence Hegel forcefully argues that "the terms true and false must no longer be used where their otherness has been cancelled and superseded."

The attitude of *Verstand* is being continually reflected in those moral, religious and metaphysical speculations which cling to the absolute distinction between the finite and the infinite. It is often claimed, in these speculations that finitude is the perennial lot of the individual mind, that infinitude is a feature of God the *Unknowable*, or the *Unconditioned*. Even Kant retained the distinction by calling the object of *Vernunft* infinite and *Unconditioned* and the object of *Verstand* finite and conditioned. Hegel prefers to call the infinite that excludes the finite a bad, false or abstract infinite. "The real infinite," so argues Hegel, "far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of

the finite into its own fuller nature."⁹ Grasping the dialectical relationship between the finite and the infinite in this manner Hegel developed, in *The Philosophy of Mind*,¹⁰ one of the fundamental theses of his philosophy that mind is both finite and infinite. Hegel argues considerably to underline the infinitude of mind since the opposite theses remains uppermost in our mind. Hegel's argument for the infinitude of mind takes this deductive form: *That which is adequate to its Notion is truly infinite, mind is adequate to its Notion; therefore, mind is truly infinite.* He reinforces his argument by showing that no finite thing is mind. His argument to this effect takes this form: *Mind qua mind is adequate to its Notion, but no finite thing is adequate to its Notion and hence no finite thing is mind.* When Hegel says that mind is adequate to its Notion he underlines the fact that mind alone is the perfect unity of notional or conceptual existence and concrete existence. But how does it become so?—by virtue of its unlimited power of knowledge. Intentionality of its consciousness allows it to *absorb, integrate* and, above all, to *claim* that everything belongs to itself, as its object of knowledge. It knows all finite things as limited and through this process of knowing it transforms and preserves them in its knowledge. Mind alone consciously posits its *other* as its limitation and in knowing the limitation as its own it realizes its unlimitedness or infinitude. Absence of such knowledge is, according to Hegel, a mark of finitude. No other things, besides mind, know their limitations. Hence they are finite. But then Hegel argues that the finite is the substance of the true infinite. The true infinite is fully determinate and completely free. To become so however mind must suffer from otherness, from the infinite anguish of self-estrangement. This process of consummation of mind gives meaning to the finite for it is, after all, the infinite on its way home.

Kant's distinction between the objects of *Verstand* and *Vernunft* leads him to keep appearance and reality at polar

opposition. Objects of knowledge are rooted in experience and are made so by their being interpreted by the concepts or rules of *Verstand*. Since the objects of *Vernunft* are not grounded in experience, the rules of *Verstand*, in terms of which anything can be known, become inapplicable to them. Accordingly, we have knowledge only of the conditioned, the thing as it appears to us, and not of the *Unconditioned* thing as it is in itself. In getting to know the *Unconditioned* *Vernunft* tries to accomplish the impossible. As a result, it moves in soaring height and spins idle fancies which take the form of specific antinomies. Hegel holds Kant responsible for the denigration of *Vernunft*. A genuine organ of philosophy has been denied the power of knowing reality and this, Hegel believes, account for the domination of the *unreasonable attitude* in philosophy. Renunciation of *Vernunft* finds its complement only in subjective idealism, the thesis that renders knowledge entirely subjective. Moreover, the absolute dichotomy between appearance and reality is a distortion and falsification of truth. Appearance is reality by being the process of its self-evolution. Hegel writes in clear terms: "Appearance is the process of arising into being and passing away again, a process that itself does not arise and does not pass away, but is *per se*, and constitutes reality and life-movement of truth."¹¹ The operation of *Verstand* is reflected not only in those modes of philosophizing that harp on the absolute dichotomies of the sort we have discussed but also in the procedure of those sciences that are devoid of true purpose and content. The purpose or principle of mathematics, e.g., is quantity. It operates with and aims at quantitative relationship but truth and life are not thereby expressed truly. The principle of quantity leaves the units, the material with which mathematics deals, in their lifeless fixity and sunderedness. Hence it is incapable of dealing with that "sheer restlessness of life and its absolute and inherent process of differentiation."¹² The defect of the principle of mathematics is a

pointer to the material with which it deals. The units of mathematics are lifeless as they are devoid of inner movement. Since it deals with abstract entities its method of proof or of construction turns out arbitrary. The theorem of geometry has no living connexion with its proof. Even the result of a proof seems to have no living connexion with the proof itself. Again, there is no royal road to a proof. Different positions may be taken up and the proof demonstrated from alternative directions. Ultimately proof in geometry rests on axioms, postulates, definitions and deductive procedures which are only arbitrarily arranged in the construction of a system. Hegel's opposition to mathematics should not be construed as its outright condemnation. What Hegel is trying to make out is that mathematics is not, and cannot surpass, philosophy. Hegel's evaluation of mathematics as a work of *Verstand* is a grim warning to those efforts at philosophic construction which extol mathematics as a paradigm of the ideal of knowledge. It is needless to say that philosophy, in our times, could have moved much faster and be a genuine representation of life, if it were not bogged up with mathematical calculations.

III

Hegel's castigation of *Verstand* and its products makes it patent that there is no functional affinity between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. With its *analytic* procedure *Verstand* creates deep furrows into the bosom of reality and fosters the idea of a mechanical aggregation made up of disjointed still parts. It cuts, as it were, into dead pieces the cells, tissues and organs of a living organic unity. Having no intuitive or synthetic insight into the necessary connection among the moments of reality it banks only upon its discursive factor. With a perdurable obstinacy to insist on a ceaseless process

of division and distinction it plays with form or concept bereft of content and even where it comes to grips over form and content it leaves the two in their grotesque isolation. This prompts Hegel to remark that "in the thinking of Understanding (*Verstand*) the content is indifferent to its form, while in the comprehensive thinking of Reason (*Vernunft*) the content produces it from form itself".¹³

Hegel presents the life of *Vernunft* as a functional or structural unity of two capacities, negative and positive. These are, in fact, two moments of its intervention upon the products of *Verstand* with a view to seeing through their essential connection. In its negative or destructive capacity, when it is called *Dialectic*, it dissolves into nothing the determinations of *Verstand* by bringing into explicitness their implicit contradictions. It thereby resuscitates into life the innert and lifeless determinations of thought and invigorates them with the throbbing pulsation of life-movement. In its positive capacity, it confers upon them the cementing unity or bound of a system; as their essential unity it incorporates, assimilates and transcends them *within* itself. It is a unity of form and content, subject and object, the finite and the infinite and, in the ultimate analysis, it is an all coherent system of concrete universals. It emerges as a unity that absorbs within itself the determinations of *Verstand* as a necessary step towards its self-awareness. As George Lukacs very aptly puts it: "Hegel regards the determinations of reflection (*Verstand*) as an essential part of dialectics, but also as a mere stage in the understanding of reality."¹⁴

Hegel finds in *Vernunft*, like the Good of Plato, the supreme principle of Ontology and epistemology alike. Hegel variously calls it Speculative Knowledge, Intuitive Intelligence and Absolute or Spirit. As knowledge it gives content to itself, as intelligence it is a subject producing its

own object and as Absolute or Spirit it is the unity of Idea and Nature or as Hegel prefers to call it 'Reality in-and-for itself. It is a system of living forms or notions or the Notion *par excellence*. As Notion it is the Individual that is aware of the particular in the universal. It thus contains not only a discursive factor but also an intuitive factor.¹⁵

Post-script : It is to be conciously acknowledged that Hegel lays too much a claim upon *Vernunft*—a claim that becomes the veritable source of incongruities and absurdities of all sorts. It is a great tragedy that the great champion of the *rational attitude* in philosophy has to fall a prey to mysticism because of his novel use of the concept of *Vernunft*. The worth of Hegelianism should however be sought not in the concept of *Vernunft* but in Hegel's critique of the products of *Verstand* facilitating their smooth dialectical overcoming. Hegel's frequent insistence on *Verstand* as "the principle of all bourgeois virtue, the quality that makes a man sick to the duties of his calling"¹⁶ and the indispensable element in theory and practice underlines his concern for the absorption of its determination in a broad dialectical stream of thought. Hegel is keenly aware that departmentalised knowledge is an essential pre-requisite for keeping pace with the enormous strides of knowledge in particular fields but he is all the more aware that such knowledge must be brought to bear upon life in a systematic manner. Hence the need for the systematization of the products of *Verstand* through a continual process of their self-suppression. Whether Hegel's position can be so interpreted remains a moot point, for and against which many arguments might be advanced. In coming to a conclusion however we must not loose sight of the overall interest and aim of Hegel in philosophy.

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3. Ibid p. 490
4. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Trans. by Baillie, p. 93.
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9. Wallace, op, cit, p. 93.
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11. Baillic, op. cit p. 105.
12. Ibid p. 104.
13. Miller and Findley, Op. cit p. 226.
14. *The Young Hegel*—Georg Lukács p. 163.
15. In reflecting upon the Hegelian conception of Reason (*Vernunft*) Walsh in *Reason and Experience* remarks : "Reason contrasts with Understanding by containing an intuitive as well as a discursive factor ; its universals are not abstract but concrete." p. 175.
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SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENTS
AND
KANT'S RATIONALIST PREDECESSORS

KUMUD GOSWAMI

I

The problem of how *a priori* synthetic judgments are possible is, for Kant, not only the fundamental problem of pure reason, but one that has waited upon his *Critique* for its proper philosophical acknowledgement and solution. True, he admits that classical 'metaphysics consists, at least *in intention*, entirely of *a priori* synthetic propositions.'¹ By this, however, he only means that the classical metaphysicians do not recognize the synthetic *a priori* judgments they make for what they are, and do not, therefore, see the problem of justifying their possibility. It will be of interest to try to determine whether such non-trivial non-empirical judgments were in fact already recognized and legitimized by Kant's rationalist predecessors. In that case, obviously, we shall be forced to conclude, despite his claim, that his *Critique of Pure Reason* is just supererogatory.

Not long after the publication of Kant's first *Critique*, both the originality of his problem and the necessity for his special method of solving it were called in question by Eberhard. Kant in his turn, of course, made a reply to Eberhard. This has come to be known as 'the Eberhard-Kant controversy'.² This controversy is revived in modern times by Arthur O. Lovejoy, who has taken against Kant the side of Eberhard.³ Lovejoy has amassed amazing details to show that Eberhard's contention was based on the Wolffian theory of knowledge as clarified by Baumgarten

and that the Wolffian theory was the result of an advance accomplished upon the position of Leibniz. All these philosophers,—Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten—, have in their own ways, we are told, recognized and justified the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments, so that Kant's charge of dogmatism levelled against them is, to say the least, quite unfounded.

The object of the present paper is to separate the essentials from the mass of details furnished by Lovejoy and to determine how far he has succeeded in undermining the originality of the Kantian *Vernunftkritik*. Following his order, it begins with Leibniz and proceeds to Wolff as interpreted by Baumgarten and Eberhard. It progressively shows that there is nothing in these philosophers to justify Lovejoy's poor estimation of Kant, and ends by criticizing certain special points raised by Lovejoy himself. (It is sometimes said that synthetic *a priori* judgments were also recognized by Locke and Hume. This view, however, deserves to be discussed in a different paper.)

II

Leibniz holds, as Lovejoy has shown in detail, a twofold and incompatible doctrine of judgments: the one, that *all* judgments are analytic (to put it in the Kantian terminology), and the other, that only *some* judgments are analytic. It is the latter doctrine which has bearing on the present discussion, and has been fixed upon by Lovejoy.

Lovejoy here refers to Leibniz's distinction between 'identical judgments' and 'virtually identical judgments'. And he makes the following two points:

1) Leibniz's virtually identical judgments are the counterparts of Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgments; and

2) Leibniz has also justified such judgments by the Law of Contradiction in its enlarged sense.

On the basis of these two points Lovejoy concludes that Kant is wrong in supposing that his predecessors have not faced the problem of deduction of synthetic *a priori* judgments.

Let us first explain this view.

An identical judgment, for Leibniz, is that of which the opposite is obviously self-contradictory, e.g. 'A is A,' 'B is not non-B,' and so on. A virtually identical judgment, however, is one of which the opposite is seen to involve contradiction only after an adequate analysis of the definitions of its subject and predicate concepts into their constituent 'simple' concepts, and then by seeing that these simple concepts are not 'compossible,' i.e. mutually compatible. The point can be best understood in the light of Leibniz's doctrine of definition.

Definition, for Leibniz, is the process of forming a complex concept by combining in a single meaning either several simple concepts or several less complex concepts which in their turn can be resolved into simple ones. It is to be contrasted with analysis. Now Leibniz maintains, in the first place, that the analysis of a definition must give us certain simple (i.e. further indefinable) concepts, and, in the second place, that definition is after all not an *arbitrary* process. It follows that between simple and indefinable concepts there must subsist relations of ultimate compatibility or incompatibility, compossibility or impossibility. For otherwise definitions would be arbitrary. If there did not subsist between some simple concepts the relation of ultimate incompatibility or impossibility, then, as Lovejoy puts it, 'definitions *would* be arbitrary, and any conjunction of positive simple concepts into a single notion would be possible and legitimate...⁴' To return now to Leibniz's virtually identical judgments.

The opposite of a virtually identical judgment is one of which the subject and predicate concepts are analysable into impossible (i.e. not mutually compatible) simple concepts. Now, the relations of compossibility or impossibility between simple concepts are *synthetic* relations in the Kantian sense. For simple concepts being *ex hypothesi* unanalysable, which of them, or which aggregates of them, are compossible or impossible cannot be determined by analysis. Since, then, a virtually identical judgment is one which cannot be denied without ultimately coming to an aggregate of impossible concepts, and since the impossibility of these simple concepts cannot be determined by analysis, it is clear that such a judgment is not analytic, but synthetic, in the Kantian sense. In other words, virtually identical judgments are all ultimately based upon the synthetic relations of compossibility between certain simple concepts, and are accordingly synthetic. These are also *a priori* in the Kantian sense, because their opposites are inconceivable: their opposites lead to the combination of impossible simple concepts, and such a combination is inconceivable.

The virtually identical judgments are, then, the Leibnizian counterparts of Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgments. What is more important, according to Lovejoy, is that Leibniz has also given us a principle of justification of such judgments, this principle being nothing other than the principle of contradiction itself, only taken 'in its broader meaning', which might be stated as follows: '*that which, after the completest analysis of the ideas involved, implies the coinherence, in a single subject, of concepts that the mind is incapable of combining in thought, cannot be real, and that proposition of which the opposite is, in the sense just specified, inconceivable or self-contradictory, must be true.*'⁵ Consistently with this broader meaning, the principle of contradiction might be better called, Lovejoy says, 'the principle of the compossibility of concepts.'⁶

Lovejoy concludes that Leibniz has not only recognized and legitimized judgments of the 'synthetic *a priori*' kind, but has also rendered needless Kant's search for some extra-logical principle of deduction of the possibility of such judgments.

This conclusion, however, is not warranted, as will be evident from the examination which follows.

III

It need not be denied that Leibniz's virtually identical judgments are similar to Kant's synthetic *a priori* ones in certain respects. But the all-important question is whether Leibniz recognizes such judgments for what they are, i.e. as being of a radically different type from what he calls 'identical judgments'. A negative answer is suggested both by his titles for these judgments and by his actual treatment of them. Had Leibniz been conscious of the radical type-difference between his identical and virtually identical judgments, he would not have tried (as, Lovejoy says, he has done) to justify these two kinds of judgments in the same logical manner by having recourse to the law of contradiction alone. (Even if the law of contradiction is taken in a broader meaning, it is still supposed to remain a purely logical law). So far as his identical judgments are concerned, we can quite well see that these, like Kant's analytic judgments, are purely logically certifiable. Their opposites violate the law of contradiction in a straightforward sense. But what about a virtually identical judgment? Can it be certified by means of logical considerations alone? It has been said that the opposite of such a judgment also involves *contradiction* by ultimately leading to the combination of impossible simple concepts. But the incompatibility involved in the combination of impossible simple concepts cannot be

brought to light by purely logical considerations. It has already been admitted that the relations of incompatibility or compatibility (impossibility or compossibility) between simple concepts are synthetic relations. The law of contradiction, even in the enlarged sense of the principle of compossibility of concepts, at best says that two or more simple concepts, if they are impossible or incompatible, cannot be combined. It does not, however, enable us to decide which simple concepts are themselves impossible or compossible. 'We must, therefore, assume,' as Moltke S. Gram pertinently observes, 'another criterion prior to the Law of Contradiction in order to say, with regard to any two [or more] simple concepts, that they cannot be combined. But if this is so, then Lovejoy's case against Kant is weakened, for it is just this kind of prior justification which Kant demands but which cannot be supplied by the dogmatic metaphysician.'⁸

We may here part company with Leibniz, and turn to the Wolffian position as it is interpreted by Baumgarten, Eberhard, and Lovejoy.

IV

Wolff's theory of *a priori* judgments finds a precise expression in the *Acroasis Logica* of Baumgarten. The position of Wolff and Baumgarten may be stated in brief as follows :—

There are two kinds of *a priori* judgments (besides the judgments which are *a posteriori*), namely,

(1) The judgments in which the predicate is merely the whole (*essentia*) or part (*essentiale*) of the attributes that go to make up the definition (genus and differentia) of the subject ; and

(2) The judgments in which the predicate is a 'property'

or 'proprium' (*attributum*, *Eigenschaft*, as distinguished from the essence or definition) of the subject.

Both these kinds of judgments are *a priori*, because their opposites are inconceivable. The only difference between them is in effect this. The former kind of judgments, which are judgments *a priori per essentialia*, are merely identical judgments adding nothing to our knowledge; while the latter kind of judgments, which are judgments *a priori per attributa*, are pregnant and instructive truths. In Wolff's terminology, the latter kind of judgments are based on *notiones foecundae*—'pregnant concepts'.

In this Wolffian distinction between judgments *a priori per essentialia* and judgments *a priori per attributa* Lovejoy finds a clear anticipation of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic *a priori* judgments.

Lovejoy here only follows in the footsteps of Eberhard. Eberhard contends that Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgments and analytic judgments are respectively identical with the judgments *per attributa* and judgments *per essentialia* recognized in the Wolffian school. He says, to quote his actual words, that Kant's analytic judgments 'are those whose predicates express the essence, or a part of the essence, of the subject (*das Wesen oder einige von den Wesentlichen Stücke, des Subjekts*).'⁷ and that the Kantian synthetic *a priori* judgments are those whose 'predicates are "properties" (*attributa*) of the subject, that is, determinations which do not belong to the essence of the subject, yet have their sufficient ground in that essence.'⁷ The reason for thus equating the judgments *per attributa* with the synthetic *a priori* ones is this: such judgments are, on the one hand, instructive (not merely identical) and, on the other, characterized by the inconceivability of their opposites.

As regards the principle underlying the judgments *per attributa*, Eberhard says that it is the principle of sufficient

reason. But it must be pointed out at once that this principle is on his own view merely a consequence of the law of contradiction, as Kant informs us in his letter to Reinhold, May 12, 1789.⁸ Lovejoy, too, draws our attention to this in a footnote.⁹ It may be noted also that Wolff, whom Eberhard has followed, reduced the law of sufficient reason to the law of contradiction.

It is not difficult to see why the Wolffians think that the judgments *per attributa* are governed by the law of contradiction. The predicates of such judgments have, Eberhard says, 'their sufficient ground' in the essence of the subject, and this means that an adequate analysis of the definition or essence of the subject is all that is required to come to the predicates. In other words, such judgments are certifiable merely by the logical principle of analysis, namely, the principle of contradiction.

The gist of Eberhard's criticism of Kant is this: Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgments have all along been recognized in the Wolffian school in the shape of *judgments per attributa*, and, moreover, the principle required to justify such judgments has also been provided. Kant's so-called *Vernunftkritik*, therefore, is merely supererogatory.

We shall now proceed to see how Kant replies to Eberhard.

V

One of the very important passages containing Kant's reply to Eberhard is the following one, although, unfortunately, Lovejoy has not quoted it:

'In every synthetic judgment the predicates are attributes of the subject. But I cannot say conversely: Every judgment that asserts an attribute of its subject is a *synthetic a priori* judgment—for there are also *analytic attributes*.

Extension is an *essential part* of the concept of a body, for it is a *primitive* characteristic of the latter that cannot be derived from any other inner characteristic. Divisibility, however, is also a necessary predicate of the concept of body, and therefore an *attribute*, but only in the sense that it can be inferred (as subaltern) from another predicate (extension). Now divisibility can be derived from the concept of something extended (as composite), according to the law of identity; and the judgment "Every body is divisible" is an a priori judgment that has the attribute of a thing for its predicate (the thing for its subject) and thus is not a synthetic judgment. Consequently, the fact that a predicate in a judgment is an attribute does not at all serve to distinguish synthetic a priori judgements from analytic judgments.¹⁰

The above is only a fragment of Kant's detailed reply to Eberhard. We may, however, summarize Kant's view as follows.

It is wrong to suppose that judgments *per attributa* as such are synthetic a priori; for a distinction must be made between two kinds of attributes, namely, 'analytic attributes' and 'synthetic attributes' (*Bestimmungen*). The attribute which can be derived, by logical analysis, from the essence is to be called the *analytic attribute*; and the attribute which can be derived, not by logical analysis of the essence of the subject, but by 'construction' (i.e. exhibition in intuition) of the relevant object (i.e. the object corresponding to the subject concept) is to be called the *synthetic attribute*. Thus, the predicate of the judgment 'Every body is divisible' is an analytic attribute of the subject, because it is logically derivable by analysis of the concept or essence of 'body'; but the predicate of the mathematical judgment, say, 'The angle-sum of a triangle is equal to 180°' is a synthetic attribute because it is not logically deducible from the essence of a triangle, but is discoverable only by constructing the figure

of a triangle in the pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*) of space. Now, only the latter of the above-mentioned two judgments is synthetic *a priori*, while the former is undoubtedly analytic, though both are judgments *per attributa*.

Those, therefore, who equate judgments *per attributa* as such with synthetic *a priori* ones do not grasp the exact significance of synthetic *a priori* judgments. Such judgments cannot be established by the mere principle of analysis or the law of contradiction, and except by having recourse (somehow or other) to pure intuition.

This is the sum and substance of Kant's reply to Eberhard. Lovejoy, however, undertakes, to use L. W. Beck's words, 'the ungrateful task of defending Eberhard.'¹¹ Let us examine his defence of Eberhard.

VI

We have just now seen that Kant makes two important points in his reply to Eberhard: first, that only some judgments *per attributa* are certifiable by the law of contradiction and, secondly, that there are other such judgements which are so far from being established by this logical law that a theory of the *reine Anschauung* is necessary to account for their possibility or validity. It is these latter judgments which properly are, for him, synthetic *a priori*; and here (in this controversy with Eberhard) he has primarily the mathematical judgments in mind. 'Thus', Lovejoy here invites us to note, 'the theory of the *reine Anschauung* constitutes the last trench into which Kant retires to defend his antithesis of dogmatism and criticism.'¹² It is on this theory of the *reine Anschauung*, therefore, Lovejoy concentrates his criticism in his defence of Eberhard and the Wolffians.

Lovejoy argues that the theory of the *reine*

Anschauung is not really essential to the proof of the logical validity of the synthetic *a priori* judgments of mathematics and that this is illustrated by Kant's own procedure. As is well known, Kant's celebrated 'Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space' establishes the view that space is a pure intuition by appealing to the synthetic *a priori* judgments of geometry. This being so, Lovejoy contends, the synthetic *a priori* judgments of geometry in their turn cannot be justified by appealing to the pure intuition of space. As he puts it, '...the theory of the *reine Anschauung*expressly presupposes the *a priori* legitimacy of synthetic judgments in mathematics, and so cannot be regarded as the logical ground of their legitimacy.'¹³ Lovejoy thus thinks that the theory of pure intuition is only introduced by Kant as a subterfuge to give a touch of apparent originality to his procedure.

Lovejoy asks us to note that Kant's real proof of the logical validity of the synthetic *a priori* judgments in mathematics is, by his own showing, in terms of the inconceivability of their opposites: Such judgments are valid because their opposites are inconceivable. And this test of the inconceivability (*Undenklichkeit*) of the opposite is only borrowed by Kant, Lovejoy suggests, from the Wolffian school to which Eberhard belongs.

We may now point out the mistakes embodied in Lovejoy's contention.

As regards his charge that the Kantian theory of pure intuition is based on circular reasoning, we should like to point out that the circularity detected by him is only apparent, not real. Kant's explanation of the *a priori* legitimacy of the synthetic judgments of geometry by reference to his theory that space is an *a priori* intuition and his explanation of this theory by reference to the former are not to be regarded as anything like a *formal proof* of, say,

p by q, and q by p. His progressive move from p to q and regressive¹⁴ move from q to p are only his methodological expedient for exhibiting interrelated points in a system. If this reply seems to be evasive, then there is the following suggestion to be advanced: the pure intuitive character of the representation of space is the *ratio essendi* of the pure synthetic character of the geometrical judgments about space, and the latter is the *ratio cognoscendi* of the former. This fact that Kant's argument can be looked at from two different points of view goes to show that the charge of circularity against it is itself liable to the charge of an *ignoratio elenchi*.

We must add that Kant has also given us an antecedent justification of his thesis that space is a pure intuition which is independent of any appeal to the special character of geometrical judgments. This independent justification is offered in his Metaphysical Exposition of the concept of space. Curiously enough, Lovejoy has made no mention of this Exposition at all. This at any rate is quite unsatisfactory.

It is now time to pass on to Lovejoy's second criticism of Kant. No doubt, Kant has used the criterion of the inconceivability (*Undenklichkeit*) of the opposite as a test of the *a priori* validity of any *a priori* judgment. But Lovejoy is quite wrong in his supposition that this criterion has for Kant, as it has for the Leibnizian—Wolffian school, the merely logical significance derived from the Law of Contradiction. Inconceivability is another name for impossibility, and Kant has recognized two kinds of (possibility, and therefore correspondingly, two kinds of) impossibility: 'logical' and 'real'. The *logical* impossibility of a judgment consists in its self-contradictoriness (i.e. in its violating the law of contradiction); whereas the *real* impossibility of a judgment, notwithstanding its logical possibility, or self-consistency, consists in its counter-intuitivity (i.e. in its being descriptive of a state of affairs which is not an object of

possible experience). Kant's view as distinguished from that of his rationalist predecessors, although he himself has not put it thus, can now be baldly and yet accurately stated as follows: All *a priori* judgments have impossible (or inconceivable) opposites; but this impossibility of opposites is *logical* only in the case of those *a priori* judgments which are analytic,¹⁵ while it is extra-logical or *real*, in the sense of counter-intuitivity, when the *a priori* judgments concerned are synthetic. (The most important corroborative passage, which might be quoted here, is to be found at B268=A220-1 of the *Critique*). As regards geometrical judgments which are in dispute, their *a priori* validity is not in fact established by Kant by purely logical considerations, as Lovejoy maintains. Kant has clearly seen that the opposites of such judgments do not involve us in any logical contradiction, but are simply counter-intuitive. (Reference may be made, again, to the B268=A220-1 passage of the *Critique*). This fact of counter-intuitivity, however, requires to be explained; and the only explanation that Kant has been able to give is by his method of construction in pure intuition. His theory of the *reine Anschauung*, therefore, is not a superfluous addendum designed to create an appearance of originality, as Lovejoy insinuates.

What is still worse for Lovejoy is his singular failure to grasp the exact nature of Kant's *Critical* problem. The inconceivability of the opposites of the mathematical judgments in question shows no more than that they are valid *a priori*. But what of that? The main Critical problem as regards the mathematical judgments is not to explain *that* they are valid *a priori*, but to explain *how* it is that they are valid *a priori* and objectively valid. As I have said elsewhere: 'This problem is not a *quid facti*, but a *quid juris*.....' How to justify the fact that our *a priori* knowledge of objects, even though it is not determined by the experience of objects, is nevertheless valid of objects? This is the

problem of the justification, or deduction, of our *a priori* knowledge of objects.'¹⁰

Thus Lovejoy has failed to defend Eberhard, that is, to establish his conclusion that Kant did not succeed in differentiating his position from that of his German predecessors.

VII

Perceptive readers will perhaps grumble at the end on the ground that no discussion of *intellectual intuition* has been made in this paper. But the sole concern of this paper has been with Lovejoy's critique of Kant, and Lovejoy himself has not gone into that issue. If the pre-Kantian rationalists are to be credited with the recognition of synthetic *a priori* judgments, it must be equally emphasized that they also admit the possibility of intellectual intuition for man and that this sort of intuition is with them the sheet-anchor of the type of judgments in question. Considered in this light, the all-important question is whether or not Kant's total denial of human capability of intellectual intuition is justified. I appreciate, therefore, that a really comprehensive study of Kant's relation to his rationalist predecessors must have to do with a great many other points than have been dealt with by Lovejoy or in this paper.

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DOUBLE NEGATION IN NYĀYA LOGIC AND IN FORMAL LOGIC.

KĀLIKRIŚHNA BANERJEE

It is held by some Nyāya logicians that the negation of a negation is virtually identical with the negatum (*pratiyogī-svarūpa*) of the negated negation (of the first negation). Thus they hold that the negation of the negation of a jar is virtually identical with the jar, and the negatum-ness (*pratiyogitā*) in respect of the negation of a jar and residing in the jar may be said to be being this negation. In support of this view it is said that when we say that there is no jar on the ground we do not say that there is no jar on the ground. On the contrary we may say that it is not the case that there is no jar on the ground. Similarly, when we see or know that there is a jar on the ground, we do not see or know that there is no jar on the ground. On the contrary, we may be said to see or know that it is not the case that there is no jar on the ground. And thus our statements about negation and also our knowledge of negation bear out that a negation of a negation is the negatum virtually. And so, a Nyāya logician may be said to be a believer in the principle of double negation.

Now, an ordinary statement about a negation or about a negation of negation is elliptical and so we should say a few words on this point. Otherwise we may misunderstand the principle of double negation as understood by a Nyāya logician. Thus, the statement that there is a jar on the ground or any statement like it is elliptical. When we use it we put in it less than what we say or mean. For, the statement ordinarily means that a jar is on the ground in the relation of conjunction (*saṁyoga*). Similarly, the

statement that there is no jar on the ground means that it is not the case that there is a jar on the ground in the relation of conjunction. It may also be said that it means that the negation of a jar, a negative fact (*abhāva*) is on the ground in the relation of absential adjectivity (*abhāvīya-viśeṣaṇatā*) and the structure of the negative fact may be spelt out as a negation that describes a negatum-ness limited by jar-ness and the relation of conjunction. That is, it is a negation that describes a negatum-ness residing in a jar. But then when we speak of the negation of a jar in the relation of inherence we also speak of a negation that describes a negatum-ness residing in a jar. And we should distinguish between the two negations. Moreover, now we are not speaking of the second negation. Accordingly, while we spell out the structure of the negative fact under reference we should say that it is a negation that describes a negatum-ness that resides in a jar and is limited by (*avacchinna*) the relation of conjunction. Similarly, the negation of a blue-jar or the negation of a utensil also describes a negatum-ness that resides in a jar and may be limited by the relation of conjunction. But then such a negatum-ness is not co-extensive with jar-ness. The negatum-ness that is described by the negation of a blue jar does not reside in every jar. It is less extensive than the negatum-ness we are seeking to identify. Similarly, though the negatum-ness described by the negation of a utensil resides in every jar, yet it resides in objects other than a jar. It is more extensive. Thus neither being a blue jar nor 'being a utensil' is co-extensive with the negatum-ness we are seeking to identify. So, to identify the negatum-ness under consideration we should besides mentioning the limiting relation (*avacchedaka sambandha*) mention a limiting property (*avacchedaka dharma*), a property that is neither less extensive nor more extensive than it but is co-extensive with it. And this property is jar-ness. In other words, to distinguish

the negation of a jar from various other negations like the negation of a blue jar, the negation of a utensil, the joint negation of a jar and fire etc. we should while spelling out its structure state the limiting property of the negatum-ness that it describes and jar-ness being the property we should also mention it. And so when we say that there is no jar on the ground what we say is that a negation that describes a negatum-ness as limited by jar-ness and the relation of conjunction resides in the relation of absential adjectivity on the ground. And when we negate this negation we may be said to get back what is limited by jar-ness and is in the relation of conjunction on the ground. To put it differently, when we say that we know that there is a jar on the ground, do not know that there is no jar on the ground, and may be said to know that it is not the case that there is no jar on the ground, what we say is that when we know that what is limited by jar-ness is on the ground in the relation of conjunction we do not know a negative fact with the structure spoken of above as residing there in the relation of absential adjectivity and we may be said to know the negation of this negative fact as residing there in the negatum-ness limiting relation (conjunction being the relation in the case under consideration). In other words, the second negation that yields the original negatum is one that describes a negatum-ness as limited by the relation of absential adjectivity.

To expand a little the point just made. An ordinary negation of a jar (that is a negation that describes a negatum-ness limited by jar-ness and the relation of conjunction) may be on the ground in the relation of absential adjectivity or in the temporal relation (*kālika sambandha*). The relation of absential adjectivity is a natured relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) or a relation of the nature of the locus while the negation is being apprehended there. An ordinary negation of a jar is on the ground in this relation when its negatum

is not there in the negatum-ness limiting relation. Similarly when its negatum resides there in the negatum-ness limiting relation it is not there in the relation of absential adjectivality. Thus when we say or know that a jar is on the ground in the relation of conjunction, we do not say or know that its corresponding ordinary negation is there in the relation of absential adjectivality and we may be said to say or know that a negation of this negation (the negation that may reside in the relation of absential adjectivality) is on the ground. So there is an opposition between a negatum and its corresponding negation when it is the case that the negatum is considered to be residing in the negatum-ness limiting relation and its corresponding negation in the relation of absential adjectivality and in such cases when we negate the corresponding negation we get back the negatum. Thus there is an opposition between an ordinary jar (that is a jar that when a negatum to a negation is the seat of a negatum-ness limited by jar-ness and the relation of conjunction) and its corresponding negation provided we treat the corresponding negation in the relation of absential adjectivality, and when we negate such a negation of a jar we get back the ordinary-jar or the original negatum. Accordingly, when it is the case that the second negation describes a negatum-ness limited (property-wise) by the property of being the first negation and (relation-wise) by the relation of absential adjectivality, then it is the original negatum virtually. Thus the negation of the negation of a jar would be the jar virtually provided the first negation is treated as one that resides in the relation of absential adjectivality. In other words, when the second negation is a describer (*nirūpaka*) of a negatum-ness that is limited by being an ordinary negation of a jar and by the relation of absential adjectivality, then it is the jar essentially.

We may now consider what would be the result if the ordinary negation of a jar be understood as residing on the

ground in the temporal relation and not in the relation of absential adjectivity. Thus an ordinary negation of a jar may be a relatum, an adjunct (*sāṃsargika-pratīyogi*) in the temporal relation in that whatever is, is in time though time is not in everything. And the ground may be the other relatum, a subjunct (*sāṃsargikānuyogi*) in the temporal relation for it is not an object without an origin. Now, though an ordinary negation of a jar in the relation of absential adjectivity cannot reside in the locus in which its negatum (a jar) resides in the relation of conjunction—the negatum-ness limiting relation—an ordinary negation of a jar in the temporal relation may so reside. Thus while we know that a jar is on the ground in the relation of conjunction we may also know the negation of it as residing there in the temporal relation. So, a jar and its negation in the temporal relation are not opposed. The knowledge of one as residing in a certain locus does not arrest the occurrence of the knowledge of the other as residing in the same locus. Accordingly when we negate the ordinary negation of a jar in the temporal relation we do not get back the jar, the original negatum. To put it differently, when we say that there is a jar in the relation of conjunction on the ground we may also say without contradicting ourselves that its negation is there in the temporal relation and so we cannot say that its negation of negation is there. In other words, if the second negation be one that describes a negatum-ness residing in the first negation as limited by the temporal relation then it is not virtually identical with the negatum. It is an additional negation. But when the second negation describes a negatum-ness that resides in the first negation as limited by the relation of absential adjectivity, then it is virtually identical with the negatum.

We may present it in the form of a schema as follow :

- (1) Jar
Conjunction

(a jar that when a negatum to a negation is so as the seat of a negatum-ness limited by jar-ness and the relation of conjunction).

$$(2) \frac{\frac{\text{Jar}}{\text{conjunction}} + \text{negation}}{\text{absential adjectivality}}$$

(such a negation of (1) as resides in its locus in the relation of absential adjectivality)

$$(3) \frac{\frac{\text{Jar}}{\text{conjunction}} + \text{negation}}{\text{temporal relation}}$$

(such a negation of (1) as resides in its locus in the temporal relation)

$$(4) \frac{\frac{\frac{\text{Jar}}{\text{conjunction}} + \text{negation}}{\text{absential adjectivality}} + \text{negation}}{\text{conjunction}} = \frac{\text{Jar}}{\text{conjunction}}$$

(negation of (2) and it is virtually identical with (1) or the negatum of the first negation)

$$(5) \frac{\frac{\frac{\text{Jar}}{\text{conjunction}} + \text{negation}}{\text{temporal relation}} + \text{negation}}{\text{conjunction}} \neq \frac{\text{Jar}}{\text{conjunction}}$$

(negation of (3) and it is not virtually identical with (1), or the negatum of the first negation).

The above represents what a Nyāya philosopher understands when he says that the negation of the negation of a jar is virtually identical with the jar. We may now compare it with a formal logician's understanding of the principle of double negation. Thus a formal logician states the principle thus: p is materially equivalent to not-not- p . Now, it is a moot point if the statement of the formal logician is elliptical or as elliptical as the Nyāya statement of the principle is. In other words, when a Nyāya logician makes a statement about

a negation he would state explicitly (or would take it as understood) the negatum-ness limiting property, the negatum-ness limiting relation and also the relation between the negation and its locus. And so while formulating the principle of double negation he would state that the first negation is in the role of the negatum and accordingly the property of being the first negation is the negatum-ness limiting property, the relation of absential adjectivality, one of the relations in which the first negation may be said to reside in the locus, is the negatum-ness limiting relation—and so if the other relation or relations be treated as the negatum-ness limiting relation the principle will not hold—and the original negatum-ness limiting relation is the relation that holds between the second negation and its locus. But a formal logician while he formulates the principle does not—and possibly would not care to—speak in this way. True, he talks in a highly general way, and one may translate both not p , and not-not- p in the way a Nyāya logician formulates the principle. But then the question would arise if it would be fair to treat the principle in formal logic as a case of tautology.

Indeed, the principle as understood by a Nyāya logician is about fact that go about the universe and are not infrequently known directly. But that of a formal logician is about statements. In other words, the logic of a Nyāya philosopher is hyphenated with an ontology but that of a formal logician is ontology-free, and so in his view one may accommodate negative statements in one's logic but may refuse to admit negative facts in one's ontology. And so while a formal logician may establish his statement by a truth-table or as a theorem (theorems) in a logistic system, a Nyāya logician would refer to intuition (*anubhava*) and would seek to give a rational re-construction of it in terms of the law of parsimony. Thus, he would say that it is counter-intuitive to deny that

when we know a jar on the ground we know the negation of the negation of a jar there. Similar, it would be counter-intuitive to deny that when we know the negation of a jar on the ground, we know either a jar or a negation of its negation there. Accordingly, we may say that a jar and a negation of its negation are co-extensive and so are virtually identical. In other words, according to a Nyāya logician, a jar is an object or a fact that goes about the world. This is true also of the negation of a jar. And there is no reason why this should not be true of the negation of the negation of a jar. But then there would be an explosion of facts. For, if the second negation be a fact the third negation would also be and so on ad infinitum. But if to avoid the explosion of facts or infinite regress he says that the second and subsequent negations are not fact, he should, to be consistent, also say that the first negation is not a fact or he should show in what respect the first negation differs from the second and subsequent negations so that though the first negation is a fact, the other negations are not. Now, he cannot say that the first negation is not a fact. For, that would go against his ontology and so would not be in keeping with what he holds to be fundamental. Nor can he show in what respect the first negation differs qualitatively from the second and subsequent negations. For actually they do not so differ. An immanent inspection of the first true no-consciousness (that may be said to be about a negative fact and which negative fact is held to be an object that goes about the universe) does not reveal that it differs from the second and subsequent no-consciousness. Accordingly, the logicians of the early Nyāya school argued that a jar and the negation of the negation of a jar are virtually identical. That is, they are co-extensive. Each comprehends (*vyāpaka*) and is comprehended by (*vyāpya*) the other. Thus, when a jar is on the ground it is not the case that a negation of its negation is also not there. Similarly, when a jar is not on the ground, it is not the case that a jar or the negation of

its negation is there. So the two are co-extensive, and they may be said to be virtually identical. And, if we subscribe to this view, we need not hold that the negation of the negation of a jar is a third fact or an additional fact. And thus there would be neither any multiplication of facts nor infinite regress. The fundamental thesis on negation also would not be dishonoured. And it would not be required to show in what respect the first negation differs intrinsically from the second and subsequent negations. Thus, the Nyāya logician's reasons for holding that a negatum and a negation of its negation are virtually identical are different from a formal logician's way of understanding the principle of double negation, and the reasons being an integral part of their doctrine, the principle of double negation in Nyāya logic differs from the principle that has the same name in formal logic.

Again, a formal logician seems to hold that all negations are of one kind, but as this is not the case with the Nyāya logician he would say that both the negations forming part of the statement stating the principle are cases of constant negation (*atyantā-bhāva*). That is, if both the negation be not cases of constant negation he would have his reservations. That is, if the first negation be a case of mutual negation (*anyonyā-bhāva*) and the second one a case of constant negation he would have his reservations. If the first negation be a certain type of constant negation (that is, a constant negation with an incompletely residing object—*avyāpyavṛtti*—as its negatum) then also he would give a different answer. And if prior negations (*prāgabdhāva*) and posterior negations (*dhamsābhāva*) be introduced the situation would beggar description. And accordingly the principle of double negation in formal logic is different from the principle with the same name in Nyāya logic. This is not always noticed and it is sometimes thought that the sign of negation as used in formal logic is competent to state in a notational language a Nyāya statement containing negation but written in a non-notational language and the

consequence has been outrageous and the propositions that in the opinion of the Nyāya logicians are different are sometimes thought to be not so and what is considered by a Nyāya logician to be unacceptable has been thought to be logically equivalent with what in the opinion of a Nyāya logician is acceptable. Anyway, the principle of double negation in Nyāya logic differs from the principle bearing the same name in formal logic and unless we keep it in mind we misunderstand Nyāya logic.

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